Section. 1. Supreme executive power vested in governor. The supreme executive power of this State, shall be vested in a Chief Magistrate who shall be Governor of the State of Nevada.

Basic function of executive department. Pursuant to Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Nev. Art. 5, § 1, executive department enforces laws enacted by legislative department, and, except where there is constitutional limitation, legislative department may direct which acts executive department shall or may not perform. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, State Bar v. List, 97 Nev. 367, at 368, 632 P.2d 341 (1981), State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, at 21, 824 P.2d 276 (1992), AGO 94-24 (11-30-1994)

Governor had no authority to defer salary increase for state employees which was enacted by legislature. Where legislature passed bill appropriating money for salary increase for state employees, and governor signed bill into law, board of examiners and governor had no statutory or constitutional authority (see Nev. Art. 5, §§ 1 and 21) to defer salary increase and, therefore, state controller had absolute duty pursuant to NRS 227.160 to issue warrants to pay for salary increase. State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, 824 P.2d 276 (1992), cited, Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 128, at 153, 869 P.2d 795 (1994)

Designation of appointing board. Statute naming state officers to railroad commission does not constitute appointment of such officers to commission but merely acts as increase of their official powers and duties. Under Nevada constitu-tion, appointment is not exclusively executive function, because it is not prohibited to legislature and is conferred upon governor, who holds supreme executive power under Nev. Art. 5, § 1, only to fill vacancies under Nev. Art. 5, § 8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Sec: 2. Election and term of governor. The Governor shall be elected by the qualified electors at the time and places of voting for members of the Legislature, and shall hold his office for Four Years from the time of his installation, and until his successor shall be qualified.

Governor’s term consists of 4 official years as distinct from calendar years. Constitutional and statutory provisions regarding term of governor (see Nev. Art. 5, §§ 2 and 3 and NRS 223.020 and 223.030), when read together, indicate that governor’s term consists of 4 official years as distinct from calendar years. State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 877 P.2d 531 (1994)

Treasurer elected to succeed himself who delivers bond too late to comply with statutory requirements relinquishes right to hold over in office. Where state treasurer was elected to succeed himself, received his commission and took oath of office, but delivered his bond too late to comply with requirements of sec. 22, ch. 108, Stats. 1866 (cf. NRS 282.010), he had relinquished all right to hold over in office until qualification of his successor under Nev. Art. 5, §§ 2 and 19. State v. Rhoades, 6 Nev. 352 (1871)

Governor’s term consists of 4 official years as distinct from calendar years. Constitutional and statutory provisions regarding term of governor (see Nev. Art. 5, §§ 2 and 3 and NRS 223.020 and 223.030), when read together, indicate that governor’s term consists of 4 official years as distinct from calendar years. State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 877 P.2d 531 (1994)

Ambiguity in amendment required supreme court to use canons of construction and give effect to legal provisions in pari materia. Because amendment to Nev. Art. 5, § 3, which prohibits person who has served as acting governor for more than 2 years from being elected governor more than once, did not clearly indicate whether calendar year or official year was intended, it was necessary for supreme court in interpreting amendment to use canons of construction and give effect to all controlling legal provisions in pari materia. State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 877 P.2d 531 (1994)

Governor elected to full term after acting as governor for more than 2 calendar years but less than 2 official years was eligible for reelection. As used in Nev. Art. 5, § 3, which prohibits person who has served as acting governor for more than 2 years from being elected governor more than once, "years" means official years instead of calendar years. Therefore, person who served as acting governor for more than 2 calendar years but less than 2 official years of term to which predecessor was elected, and who was subsequently elected to full term as governor, was eligible for reelection. State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 877 P.2d 531 (1994)

Purpose of amendment to section was not furthered by interpreting "years" as calendar years instead of official years. Purpose of amendment to Nev. Art. 5, § 3, which prohibits person who has served as acting governor for more than 2 years from being elected governor more than once, was to limit entrenched incumbencies. Because calendar year is sometimes longer than official year, interpretation of term "years" as calendar years instead of official years did not further that purpose. State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 877 P.2d 531 (1994)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Governor not prohibited from running for second full term because word "years" as used in section means official years as opposed to calendar years. Word "years" as used in Nev. Art. 5, § 3, means official years as opposed to calendar years. Therefore, although Lieutenant Governor Miller served as acting governor for more than 2 calendar years of term to which Governor Bryan was elected, and was subsequently elected to full term as governor, Nev. Art. 5, § 3 did not prohibit Governor Miller from running for election for second full term as governor. AGO 92-14 (12-31-1992)

Section 4. Returns of general election transmitted to secretary of state; canvass by supreme court; declaration of election. The returns of every election for United States senator and member of Congress, district and state officers, and for and against any questions submitted to the electors of the State of Nevada, voted for at the general election, shall be sealed up and transmitted to the seat of government, directed to the secretary of state, and the chief justice of the supreme court, and the associate justices, or a majority thereof, shall meet at the office of the secretary of state, on a day to be fixed by law, and open and canvass the election returns for United States senator and member of Congress, district and state officers, and for and against any questions submitted to the electors of the State of Nevada, and forthwith declare the result and publish the names of the persons elected and the results of the vote cast upon any question submitted to the electors of the State of Nevada. The persons having the highest number of votes for the respective offices shall be declared elected, but in case any two or more have an equal and the highest number of votes for the same office, the legislature shall, by joint vote of both houses, elect one of said persons to fill said office.

NEVADA CASES.

Former statute providing person having highest number of votes cast is elected, required majority of votes for decedent be given effect by denying election to surviving candidate. In mandamus proceeding to compel issuance of certificate of election, where petitioner and another were candidates for office of county assessor, other candidate died 2 weeks before election, most voters knew of this, and decedent received majority of votes cast, Nev. Art. 5, § 4, and former statute (cf. NRS 293.393), which provide that person having highest number of votes cast is elected, required that votes for decedent not be discarded but be given effect by denying election to surviving candidate. Ingersoll v. Lamb, 75 Nev. 1, 333 P.2d 982 (1959)

Constitutional amendment to extend judges’ terms effective on date election results canvassed therefore not extending terms of incumbents. Amendment to Nev. Art. 6, § 5, increasing terms of office of district judges, which was adopted pursuant to Nev. Art. 16, § 1, became effective on date election results were canvassed by supreme court pursuant to Nev. Art. 5, § 4, not on date of election at which it was adopted, and therefore did not extend terms of incumbent district judges. As general rule, constitutional amendment will be given only prospective application from its effective date unless intent to make it retrospective clearly appears from its terms. Torvinen v. Rollins, 93 Nev. 92, 560 P.2d 915 (1977), cited, Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 111 Nev. 70, at 177, 893 P.2d 866 (1995), AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)

Sec: 5. Governor is commander in chief of state military forces. The Governor shall be Commander in Chief of the Military forces of this State except when they shall be called into the service of the United States.

Sec: 6. Transaction of executive business; reports of executive officers. He shall transact all executive business with the Officers of the Government Civil and Military; and may require information in writing, from the Officers of the Executive Department, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices.

More incumbent upon governor than ordinary resident to obey statute requiring performance of ministerial act. Provision in constitution that governor shall see that laws are faithfully executed, Nev. Art. 5, § 7, makes it even more incumbent upon him than upon ordinary citizens to yield obedience to statute requiring performance of ministerial act. State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev. 540, 113 Pac. 105 (1910)

Governor cannot refuse to perform ministerial act required by constitutional statute. Nev. Art. 5, § 7, making it the duty of governor to see that laws are faithfully executed, he cannot refuse to perform ministerial act clearly required by terms of statute not in conflict with or pertaining to his constitutional prerogatives, even though he may disagree with will of legislature as expressed in statute. State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, 33 Nev. 540, 113 Pac. 105 (1910)

Governor can only enforce statute as it stands. Until legislation is enacted to supplement NRS ch. 233, making discrimination, when proved, punishable by revocation of licenses, fine or imprisonment and empowering governor to insist that such penalties be invoked in accordance with his powers under Nev. Art. 5, § 7, he can only enforce statute as it now stands. AGO 60 (8-12-1963)

Sec: 8. Vacancies filled by governor. When any Office shall, from any cause become vacant and no mode is provided by the Constitution and laws for filling such vacancy, the Governor shall have the power to fill such vacancy by granting a commission which shall expire at the next election and qualification of the person elected to such Office.

People without power to fill office by election for unexpired term. Power conferred on people to elect for full term does not carry with it, by implication, power to fill office by election for unexpired term. Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75 (1865), cited, AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

"Vacancy" applies to newly created office. As used in Nev. Art. 5, § 8, which provides that governor shall fill vacancies by appointment when not otherwise provided by constitution or by statute, word "vacancy" applies to newly created office as well as to one which is vacant as result of death or resignation of incumbent. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, State ex rel. Dickerson v. Elwell, 73 Nev. 187, at 192, 313 P.2d 796 (1957)

For governor to fill vacancy there must be no other statutory or constitutional provision for filling it. In order for governor to fill vacancy in office under Nev. Art. 5, § 8, there must be vacancy and no provision made by constitution or by statute for filling it. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, at 138 (1876)

Person named sheriff by statute creating new county, and receiving commission from governor, lawfully in office. Where statute creating new county named certain person sheriff to serve until next general election, and such person received commission from governor, he was lawfully in office, either because legislature had power to appoint him or, if it did not, because he was lawfully appointed by governor under Nev. Art. 5, § 8, relating to power of governor to fill vacancies. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, at 138 (1876)

Designation of appointing board. Statute naming state officers to railroad commission does not constitute appointment of such officers to commission but merely acts as increase of their official powers and duties. Under Nevada constitution, appointment is not exclusively executive function, because it is not prohibited to legislature and is conferred upon governor, who holds supreme executive power under Nev. Art. 5, § 1, only to fill vacancies under Nev. Art. 5, § 8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Creation of board of appoint public officers. Under Nev. Art 5, § 8, which provides for appointment by governor to certain vacancies, and Nev. Art. 15, § 10, which empowers legislature to provide for election or appointment of certain officers, power of appointment was not limited to governor, but designation of three executive officers as board to select members of regulatory commission was not appointment by legislature. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (D. Nev. 1909)

Section applies to state officers, not officers of municipal corporations. Nev. Art. 5, § 8, granting governor power to fill vacancies by appointment, relates to state officers, not to officers of municipal corporations. AGO 136 (8-14-1922)

Sec: 9. Special sessions of legislature; business at special session. The Governor may on extraordinary occasions, convene the Legislature by Proclamation and shall state to both houses when organized, the purpose for which they have been convened, and the Legislature shall transact no legislative business, except that for which they were specially convened, or such other legislative business as the Governor may call to the attention of the Legislature while in Session.

NEVADA CASES.

May not reconsider bill vetoed in previous session unless requested by governor. Although secretary of state is required by Nev. Art. 4, § 35, to transmit to next session of legislature, whether general or special, all bills vetoed after adjournment of preceding session, special session may not reconsider such bill unless requested to do so by governor. Jones v. Theall, 3 Nev. 233 (1867)

Incidental reference does not authorize legislation upon subject. Many subjects may be mentioned incidentally in executive proclamation convening special session of legislature, but it can hardly be claimed that such incidental reference would authorize legislation upon such subjects at special session. Jones v. Theall, 3 Nev. 233 (1867)

Transmission of vetoed bill and governor’s objections thereto does not empower legislature to reconsider it. Transmission of vetoed bill and governor’s objections thereto by secretary of state to special session of legislature is not calling of attention to bill within meaning of Nev. Art. 5, § 9, and legislature may not reconsider bill at special session. Jones v. Theall, 3 Nev. 233 (1867)

Legislature strictly limited to business for which convened or other business called to its attention. Under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, legislature, at special session, is strictly limited to business for which it was convened or such other business as the executive may call to its attention. Jones v. Theall, 3 Nev. 233 (1867), cited, In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, at 307, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Section does not require "other business" be of same general nature as business for which special session called. Wording of Nev. Art. 5, § 9, "such other legislative business as the governor may call to the attention of the legislature while in session" is too plain and comprehensive to be construed as requiring that such other business must be of same general nature and related to business for which special session was called, and doctrine of ejusdem generis has no application. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Wording "such other legislative business as the governor may call to the attention of the legislature while in session," does not limit power of governor. Wording in Nev. Art. 5, § 9, "such other legislative business as the governor may call to the attention of the legislature while in session," cannot be construed to limit power of governor. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Legislature may consider only business governor deems necessary. Nev. Art. 5, § 9, forbids legislature, while in special session, to consider any business other than that which governor may deem necessary. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Any business governor calls to attention of legislature may be considered. Wording in Nev. Art. 5, § 9, "such other legislative business as the governor may call to the attention of the legislature," is presumed to have been employed in its natural and ordinary meaning, and any business called to attention of legislature by governor for consideration at special session may be considered. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

If any reasonable construction will permit, statute enacted to be held within governor’s message or call. Under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, any statute enacted at special session should be held within call or message of governor if any reasonable construction will permit it. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Governor need not express interest in proposed legislation to bring within scope of business properly considered. Under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, governor, in calling proposed legislation to attention of legislature at special session, need not express his interest in it or urge its passage in order to bring it within scope of business which can be considered by legislature. To call attention to it is sufficient. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Proposed legislation called to attention of legislature need not relate to type of legislation for which session convened. Proposed legislation called to attention of legislature while in special session under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, need have no relation to type of legislation for which session was convened in order that it may be considered and validly enacted. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Governor has exclusive power to call special session and designate subject of business to be considered. Nev. Art. 5, § 9, invests governor with exclusive extraordinary power to call legislature into special session and designate subject of business to be considered thereat. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Urgency of legislation exclusively within governor’s determination. Under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, urgency of legislation to be considered at special session of legislature is exclusively within governor’s determination. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Urgency of proposed legislation authorizes governor to call special session; not required other business be of urgent character. It is urgency of proposed legislation which authorizes governor to call special session of legislature under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, but it is not required by that section that other business which governor calls to attention of legislature while in session be of urgent character. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Legislature can only transact business for which convened, called to their attention by governor, incidental to organization or necessary to exercise legislative functions. In special session legislature can transact no business except: (1) Business for which they were specially convened; (2) business called to their attention by governor; (3) business incidental to organization, necessary to exercise legislative functions. AGO (3-21-1867)

Legislature restricted to subjects governor in message deems necessary to legislate upon. Special session of legislature is restricted to subjects which governor in his message deems it necessary to legislate upon. Thus, bill providing for compromise and adjustment of any debt owed state is beyond authority granted by governor’s proclamation calling for legislative consideration of proposed compromise between Carson Valley bank and state. AGO 295 (1-31-1928)

Governor’s convening special session not reviewed by courts. Exercise of power by governor to convene legislature for special session will not be reviewed by courts. AGO 622 (5-21-1948)

Period of notice of convening special session at discretion of governor. Law specifies no time for giving notice of convening of special session of legislature; period of notice is at discretion of governor. AGO 622 (5-21-1948)

Recommendations of governor’s message based on existing tax structure did not permit legislature to consider gambling tax legislation. Under Nev. Art. 5, § 9, which limits legislative business at special session to that embraced in governor’s original or subsequent message, legislature could not consider bill to increase gambling taxes where message recited that governor’s recommendations were made in light of existing tax structure. (But see In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296 (1940), at p. 308.) AGO 338 (5-18-1966)

Sec: 10. Governor's message. He shall communicate by Message to the Legislature at every regular Session the condition of the State and recommend such measures as he may deem expedient.

Sec: 11. Adjournment of legislature by governor. In case of a disagreement between the two Houses with respect to the time of adjournment, the Governor shall have power to adjourn the Legislature to such time as he may think proper; Provided, it be not beyond the time fixed for the meeting of the next Legislature.

Sec: 12. Person holding federal office ineligible for office of governor. No person shall, while holding any office under the United States Government hold the office of Governor, except as herein expressly provided.

NEVADA CASES.

"Commutation of sentence" means change of one punishment known to law for another. "Commutation of a sentence" means change of one punishment known to law for different punishment also known to law. Ex parte Janes, 1 Nev. 319 (1865)

Indefinite suspension of fine effectively remission of fine and beyond governor’s authority. Indefinite suspension of fine is in effect remission of fine and beyond authority of governor under Nev. Art. 5, § 13, limiting his power to suspend fines and grant reprieves to 60 days from time of conviction. Ex parte Shelor, 33 Nev. 361, 111 Pac. 291 (1910), cited, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Moran, 43 Nev. 150, at 154, 182 Pac. 927 (1919)

Governor’s power to suspend fines and grant reprieves does not conflict with board’s power to remit fines and grant pardons. Language of Nev. Art. 5, § 13, limits power of governor to suspend fines and grant reprieves to 60 days from time of conviction, and not indefinitely, thereby avoiding any conflict with Nev. Art. 5, § 14, vesting power to remit fines absolutely and to grant pardons in board of pardons (now state board of pardons commissioners) of which governor is but one member. Ex parte Shelor, 33 Nev. 361, 111 Pac. 291 (1910), cited, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Moran, 43 Nev. 150, at 154, 182 Pac. 827 (1919)

Governor’s order of indefinite suspension of fine void ab initio. Governor, having power under Nev. Art. 5, § 13, to suspend fine for only 60 days, his order attempting to make indefinite suspension of fine for contempt of court was void ab initio and not valid for period of 60 days, and petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. Ex parte Shelor, 33 Nev. 361, 111 Pac. 291 (1910), cited, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Moran, 43 Nev. 150, at 154, 182 Pac. 927 (1919)

Governor’s power to grant reprieves strictly limited to 60-day period. Governor’s power to grant reprieves under Nev. Art. 5, § 13, is strictly limited to period of 60 days dating from time of conviction. AGO 162 (9-21-1944)

"Conviction" to be given ordinary, legal meaning. Term "conviction" in Nev. Art. 5, § 13, should be given ordinary, legal meaning. AGO 162 (9-21-1944)

1. The governor, justices of the supreme court, and attorney general, or a major part of them, of whom the governor shall be one, may, upon such conditions and with such limitations and restrictions as they may think proper, remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, except as provided in subsection 2, and grant pardons, after convictions, in all cases, except treason and impeachments, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons.

2. Except as may be provided by law, a sentence of death or a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole may not be commuted to a sentence which would allow parole.

3. The legislature is authorized to pass laws conferring upon the district courts authority to suspend the execution of sentences, fix the conditions for, and to grant probation, and within the minimum and maximum periods authorized by law, fix the sentence to be served by the person convicted of crime in said courts.

[Amended in 1950 and 1982. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1947 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1949 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1950 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1947, p. 875; Statutes of Nevada 1949, p. 684. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1979 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1981 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1982 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1979, p. 2005; Statutes of Nevada 1981, p. 2097.]

NEVADA CASES.

"Commutation of sentence" means change of one punishment known to law for another. "Commutation of a sentence" means change of one punishment known to law for different punishment also known to law. Ex parte Janes, 1 Nev. 319 (1865)

Governor’s power to suspend fines and grant reprieves does not conflict with board’s power to remit fines and grant pardons. Language of Nev. Art. 5, § 13, limits power of governor to suspend fines and grant reprieves to 60 days from time of conviction, and not indefinitely, thereby avoiding any conflict with Nev. Art. 5, § 14, vesting power to remit fines absolutely and to grant pardons in board of pardons (now state board of pardons commissioners) of which governor is but one member. Ex parte Shelor, 33 Nev. 361, 111 Pac. 291 (1910), cited, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Moran, 43 Nev. 150, at 154, 182 Pac. 827 (1919)

Board of pardons commissioners’ powers derived from constitution. Powers of former board of pardons are derived from constitution, Nev. Art. 5, § 14, and are even greater than those specifically expressed in RL § 7261 (cf. NRS 176.095). In re Melosevich, 36 Nev. 67, 133 Pac. 57 (1913)

Power to commute death sentence vested exclusively in board of pardons commissioners. Power to commute death sentence to life imprisonment is vested exclusively in board of pardons (now state board of pardons commissioners) by provisions of Nev. Art. 5, § 14. State v. Butner, 67 Nev. 436, 220 P.2d 631 (1950), cited, State v. Echeverria, 69 Nev. 253, at 257, 248 P.2d 414 (1952)

Supreme court without power to commute death sentence. Nev. Art. 5, § 14, vests power to commute sentence from death to life imprisonment exclusively in board of pardons (now state board of pardons commissioners) and parole commissioners, and supreme court is without power to commute sentence. State v. Echeverria, 69 Nev. 253, 248 P.2d 414 (1952)

Legislature may grant court parole power and permit jury to fix penalty for first degree murder at life without possibility of parole. In prosecution for murder, there was no merit to defendant’s contention that Nev. Art. 5, § 14, which empowers governor, justices of supreme court, and attorney general to remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, precludes legislature from conferring power of parole upon court and makes NRS 200.030 unconstitutional insofar as it permits jury to fix penalty for first degree murder at life without possibility of parole. Parole is distinguishable from pardon. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824 (1960), cited, Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, at 812, 919 P.2d 403 (1996)

Probation not guaranteed right. Because probation is not guaranteed right under Nev. Art. 5, § 14, existence and extent of right is matter for legislative determination (see NRS 176.185), and where former NRS 176.330 (cf. former provisions of NRS 176.215 and 176.217), which provided for revocation of probation upon violation, did not require that probationer be represented by counsel, court did not under former interpretation of right to counsel violate any right of indigent probationer by failing to appoint counsel to represent him. Shum v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495 (1966), cited, In re DuBois, 84 Nev. 562, at 571, 445 P.2d 354 (1968), Smith v. Warden, 85 Nev. 83, at 86, 450 P.2d 356 (1969), Bargas v. Warden, 87 Nev. 30, at 31, 482 P.2d 317 (1971), distinguished, Rahn v. Warden, 88 Nev. 429, at 431, 498 P.2d 1344 (1972)

Improper to place defendant on probation after incarceration. In proceeding for writ of mandamus on ground of improper criminal sentence, where petitioner was sentenced to "ten years, eight years of sentence suspended and following serving of two years placed on probation for three years," sentence was improper because effect of sentence was to grant delayed parole, and in Nevada under Nev. Art. 5, § 14, granting of any relief from punishment after incarceration in state prison is executive function authorized by legislature and performed by state board of parole commissioners or state board of pardons commissioners and not judicial branch of government. (See NRS 176.185.) State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 485, 457 P.2d 217 (1969), cited, State v. Clark, 90 Nev. 144, at 147, 520 P.2d 1361 (1974), Ward v. State, 93 Nev. 501, at 503, 569 P.2d 399 (1977), Van Dorn v. Warden, 93 Nev. 524, at 526, 569 P.2d 938 (1977), Grant v. State, 99 Nev. 149, at 150, 659 P.2d 878 (1983), State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 100 Nev. 90, at 104, 677 P.2d 1044 (1984), dissenting opinion, Kelch v. Director, Dep’t of Prisons, 10 F.3d 684, at 686 (9th Cir. 1993), Wicker v. State, 111 Nev. 43, at 46, 888 P.2d 918 (1995), see also State ex rel. Dep’t of Prisons v. Kimsey, 109 Nev. 519, 853 P.2d 109 (1993), distinguished, Creps v. State, 94 Nev. 351, at 358, 581 P.2d 842 (1978), Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. 927, at 929, 604 P.2d 117 (1979)

Commutation of sentence invalidated by judicial decision. Where defendant convicted of murder was sentenced to death but this sentence was invalidated by decision of Supreme Court in another case, state board of pardons commissioners established by Nev. Art. 5, § 14, could commute sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, without his consent. Anderson v. State, 90 Nev. 385, 528 P.2d 1023 (1974)

Court’s power to suspend sentence and grant probation requires statutory authorization which is strictly construed. Petition for post-conviction relief was properly denied where defendant sought credit on his 10-year initial prison sentence for time spent on probation, without confinement, during suspension of sentence and before revocation of probation because legislature had not authorized giving of credit for time spent out of confinement. Under Nev. Art. 5, § 14, power of judiciary to suspend sentences and grant probation requires legislative authorization (see NRS 176A.100), and statutory power must be strictly construed. Van Dorn v. Warden, 93 Nev. 524, 569 P.2d 938 (1977), cited, Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. 927, at 931, 604 P.2d 117 (1979), dissenting opinion, Grant v. State, 99 Nev. 149, at 150, 659 P.2d 878 (1983), Webster v. State, 109 Nev. 1084, at 1085, 864 P.2d 294 (1993), Igbinovia v. State, 111 Nev. 699, at 707, 895 P.2d 1304 (1995), AGO 96-14 (5-22-1996), distinguished, Adams v. Warden, 97 Nev. 171, at 172, 626 P.2d 259 (1981)

Parole board has power to commute sentence of life without possibility of parole to sentence allowing for parole. Pursuant to NRS 213.1099 and Nev. Art. 5, § 14, state board of parole commissioners retains power to commute sentence of life without possibility of parole to sentence allowing for parole, subject to restrictions set forth in subsection 4 of NRS 213.1099. Smith v. State, 106 Nev. 781, 802 P.2d 628 (1990), cited, Sims v. State, 107 Nev. 438, at 440, 814 P.2d 63 (1991)

Revocation of commutation of prison sentence was constitutionally permissible. State board of pardons commissioners (see Nev. Art. 5, § 14 and NRS 213.010) issued order commuting prison sentence of appellant from 20 years to 5 years effective on date order was issued, but at subsequent hearing rescinded commutation and reinstated original sentence. Although order granting commutation gave appellant protected liberty interest, deprivation of that interest was constitutionally permissible because revocation of commutation was consistent with due process (see U.S. 1st amendment and Nev. Art. 1, § 8) since appellant was given notice and opportunity to appear at revocation hearing, was represented by counsel at hearing and was given opportunity to present evidence, witnesses and documents on his own behalf. Kelch v. Director, Dep’t of Prisons, 107 Nev. 827, 822 P.2d 1094 (1991)

State board of pardons commissioners has jurisdiction to rescind its commutation of sentence. State board of pardons commissioners (see Nev. Art. 5, § 14 and NRS 213.010) is executive board and has jurisdiction to rescind its commutation of sentence. Kelch v. Director, Dep’t of Prisons, 10 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 1993)

Revocation of commutation of sentence by state board of pardons commissioners did not violate substantive due process under circumstances. State has fundamental interest in appropriately punishing those who violate its criminal laws and in separating convicted criminals from public for protection of general population. State also has interest in ensuring that it has fair opportunity to present case against prisoners petitioning for early release and in protecting against premature release of dangerous criminals. Therefore, where state board of pardons commissioners (see Nev. Art. 5, § 14 and NRS 213.010) in granting application for commutation of sentence conducted initial hearing on application without affording district attorney notice of hearing at least 30 days before hearing as required by NRS 213.020, but later rescinded its commutation of sentence after conducting second hearing of which district attorney received proper notice and was allowed to respond to application, board did not violate applicant’s substantive rights to due process. Board’s subsequent action in rescinding applicant’s commutation of his sentence was rational and nonarbitrary means of effectuating state’s legitimate interests in maintaining informed and properly conducted proceedings for commutation of sentences and in protecting general population from dangerous criminals. Kelch v. Director, Dep’t of Prisons, 10 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 1993), cited, AGO 94-13 (10-18-1994)

Board of pardons commissioners’ authority to act independently of governor does not violate constitutional provision relating to pardons and commutation. Establishment of board of parole commissioners with authority to act independently of governor’s approval is not violation of Nev. Art. 5, § 14, as parole is different from pardon and commutation in that it does not shorten prisoner’s sentence, but merely allows him to go outside of prison while remaining in custody of parole commission. AGO 119 (4-25-1914)

Board of pardons commissioners, not governor, has power to remit fines. Power to remit fines lies in state board of pardons commissioners, not in governor personally. AGO 32 (8-10-1915)

Justice of peace cannot suspend criminal sentence. Justice of the peace cannot suspend criminal sentence either in whole or in part, because Nev. Art. 5, § 14, only authorizes legislature to confer that power on district courts. AGO 359 (9-28-1966)

Justice’s or municipal courts cannot suspend sentence or grant probation. Affirmative provision of Nev. Art. 5, § 14, that legislature may confer upon district