Section. 1. Legislative power vested in senate and assembly. The Legislative authority of this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly which shall be designated "The Legislature of the State of Nevada" and the sessions of such Legislature shall be held at the seat of government of the State.

Where legislature has power to elect or appoint to office it has power to fill vacancy. Where legislature has power to elect or appoint to office, it has, by implication, power to fill vacancy in that office. Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75 (1865)

Legislative power of people of Nevada is limited only by Federal Constitution and state constitution. All political power is inherent in the people. Certain specific powers have been vested in Federal Government pursuant to U.S. Constitution. Remaining powers are retained by the people and are exercised through state governments. Legislative power of people of State of Nevada is vested in state legislature, and such power is unlimited except by federal Constitution and such restrictions as are expressly placed on it by state constitution. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283 (1869), cited, County of Pershing v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 78, at 93, 181 Pac. 960 (1919), Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, at 405, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, at 268, 428 P.2d 371 (1967)

Statute which empowered board of county commissioners to fix compensation of township officers was unlawful delegation of power. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 1, legislative authority of Nevada is vested in legislature, and, although Nev. Art. 4, § 20, provided that legislature had power to establish and regulate compensation of township officers, statute which empowered board of county commissioners to fix compensation of township officers was unlawful delegation of power, and duly elected, qualified and acting constable was entitled to be paid monthly salary of $150 under local act of legislature enacted a number of years before, rather than $125 pursuant to action of board of county commissioners under more recent act. Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), cited, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 411, at 413, 264 Pac. 696 (1928), distinguished, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 237, at 245, 255 Pac. 1073 (1927)

Statute requiring approval of municipal bond issue by majority of electors who owned real property and majority of electors who did not own real property did not violate separation of powers or legislative authority. Neither Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which divides government of state into three separate departments, nor Nev. Art. 4, § 1, which vests legislative authority of state in senate and assembly, was violated by statute which required that issuing of bonds by municipality be approved by majority of electors involved who were not real property owners, as well as by majority of electors involved who were owners of real property. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)

Subject of parole is within legislative authority. Subject of parole is within legislative authority given by Nev. Art. 4, § 1, to legislature. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824 (1960), cited, State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 485, at 487, 457 P.2d 217 (1969), Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 86 Nev. 252, at 256, 468 P.2d 350 (1970)

Statute prohibiting sale of commodity below resale price established by owner of trade-mark held unconstitutional as applied to seller who had not signed agreement to maintain price. Former NRS ch. 599, which prohibited sale of any commodity below minimum resale price established by owner of trade-mark, brand or trade name covering that commodity, was unconstitutional as applied to seller who had not signed any agreement to maintain resale price, because it violated Nev. Art. 1, § 1, guaranteeing rights in property, Nev. Art. 1, § 8, providing due process of law, and Nev. Art. 1, § 20, which provides that enumeration of rights does not impair or deny others retained by the people, and exceeded legislative authority conferred by Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964)

Police power. Police power of state to regulate businesses and grant or revoke licenses therefor is legislative within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, Republic Entertainment, Inc. v. Clark County Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd., 99 Nev. 811, at 815, 672 P.2d 634 (1983)

Definition of legislative power. As used in Nev. Art. 3, § 1, legislative power conferred by Nev. Art. 4, § 1, is power of lawmaking representative bodies to frame and enact laws, and to amend or repeal laws, and, unless there are specific constitutional limitations to contrary, laws are to be construed in favor of legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, AGO 94-24 (11-30-1994), AGO 95-13 (7-19-1995)

Extent of legislative power. All power of people not placed by constitution in executive or judicial departments is vested in legislative department created by Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967)

Enactment of local school support tax that increased sales and use tax authorized by referendum did not violate prohibition on amendment of referred law without approval of voters. In determining whether Nev. Art. 19, § 1, which prohibits amendment of referred law without approval of voters, had been violated where legislature enacted local school support tax law, NRS ch. 374, and in effect increased rate of sales and use tax which had been authorized by referendum of voters, it was necessary to pay deference to Nev. Art. 4, § 1, which vests lawmaking power in legislature, and to Nev. Art. 11, which requires legislature to provide for public education, and prohibition of Nev. Art. 19, § 1, was narrowly construed to accommodate other constitutional provisions. Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, 428 P.2d 371 (1967), cited, City of Las Vegas v. Mack, 87 Nev. 105, at 109, 481 P.2d 396 (1971), Westinghouse Beverage Group v. Department of Taxation, 101 Nev. 184, at 190, 698 P.2d 866 (1985)

Statute which gave district attorney discretion to charge defendant with felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor was unlawful delegation of legislative power. Criminal conviction of feloniously taking vehicle was reversed where former NRS 205.272 gave discretion to district attorney to charge defendant with felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor and thereby effected prohibited delegation of legislative power in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Lapinski v. State, 84 Nev. 611, 446 P.2d 645 (1968), distinguished, Hollander v. Warden, 86 Nev. 369, at 373, 468 P.2d 990 (1970), Nall v. Warden, 86 Nev. 489, at 490, 471 P.2d 218 (1970), Askew v. State, 89 Nev. 338, at 340, 513 P.2d 441 (1973), Jackson v. State, 93 Nev. 677, at 681, 572 P.2d 927 (1977)

No unlawful delegation of discretion to prosecutor in selection of penalty where statutes provided for separate offenses with different elements and penalties selected by court. Where defendant had been convicted of felony extortion under NRS 205.320, existence at time of former NRS 205.315 making malicious extortion a gross misdemeanor, did not constitute unconstitutional delegation of discretion to prosecutor to select penalty in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 1, because statutes provided for separate offenses with different elements, and penalty was selected by court under NRS 205.320 and fixed by law under former NRS 205.315. Nall v. Warden, 86 Nev. 489, 471 P.2d 218 (1970)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Attempt to delegate legislative power to Congress prohibited. Attempt to delegate legislative power to Congress violates Nev. Art. 4, § 1. AGO 17 (2-17-1923)

Legislature may not abdicate or transfer essential legislative functions. Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others essential legislative functions with which it is vested. AGO 188 (8-28-1935)

Legislative power may not be delegated to any officer or board. All legislative power is vested in legislature by constitution, and legislature cannot delegate this power to any officer or board. AGO 257 (5-26-1938)

Special act granting retirement payments to certain unqualified persons is valid exercise of legislative power. Legislature has power to enact any legislation which does not contravene constitution. Thus special act granting retirement payments to certain unqualified persons is valid exercise of legislative power. AGO 279 (6-14-1957)

Power granted to parole board by legislature is authorized by constitution. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 1, power granted to parole board by legislature is clearly authorized. AGO 228 (6-14-1961)

Section requiring vote of people to alter approved referendum measure applies only to referendum measures initiated by people. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 1, legislature has authority to refer legislation to vote of people on its own initiative, and may subsequently amend or repeal statutes so approved without further reference to the people, because provisions of Nev. Art. 19, § 1, requiring vote of people to alter approved referendum measure, applies only to referendum measures initiated by the people. AGO 190 (5-15-1975)

[Amended in 1889, 1958 and 1960. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1885 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1887 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held February 11, 1889. See: Statutes of Nevada 1885, p. 151; Statutes of Nevada 1887, p. 165. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1955 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1957 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1958 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 946; Statutes of Nevada 1957, p. 793. The third amendment was proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the general election of 1960.]

Legislature may not limit duration of or scope of matters to be considered at legislative session. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 2, relating to annual sessions of legislature, there is no authority for legislature to limit, by legislative enactment, scope of matters to be considered at legislative session or duration of legislative session. Such enactment would constitute amending Nevada constitution, which may be done only in manner prescribed by Nev. Art. 16, § 1. AGO 11 (2-19-1959)

Sec. 2. Biennial sessions of legislature; commencement and adjournment sine die; submission of proposed executive budget. [Effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election.]

3. The Governor shall submit the proposed executive budget to the Legislature not later than 14 calendar days before the commencement of each regular session.

[Amended in 1889, 1958 and 1960. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1885 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1887 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held February 11, 1889. See: Statutes of Nevada 1885, p. 151; Statutes of Nevada 1887, p. 165. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1955 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1957 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1958 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 946; Statutes of Nevada 1957, p. 793. The third amendment was proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the general election of 1960.]-(Amendment proposed and passed by the 1995 legislature and agreed to and passed by the 1997 legislature; effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election)

1. The members of the Assembly shall be chosen biennially by the qualified electors of their respective districts, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November and their term of office shall be two years from the day next after their election.

2. No person may be elected or appointed as a member of the Assembly who has served in that office, or at the expiration of his current term if he is so serving will have served, 12 years or more, from any district of this state.

[Amended in 1996. Proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the 1994 and 1996 general elections.]

No elector has right to vote for all assemblymen and senators. Although Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that qualified voters may vote for all officers including state assemblymen and state senators elected by people, no elector claims to exercise such right, because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, provide that assemblymen and senators be elected from their districts. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Prospective application of amendments to Nevada constitution limiting terms of office of certain public officers. Where initiative petition that amended Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, Nev. Art. 5, § 19, Nev. Art. 6, § 11 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3 by limiting terms of office of state officers and members of local governing bodies did not include language that amendments were retroactive in application, limitations on terms of office must be applied prospectively, become effective after vote is canvassed by Nevada supreme court pursuant to NRS 293.395 and apply only to officers elected after effective date of amendments. AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)

1. Senators shall be chosen at the same time and places as members of the Assembly by the qualified electors of their respective districts, and their term of Office shall be four Years from the day next after their election.

2. No person may be elected or appointed as a Senator who has served in that office, or at the expiration of his current term if he is so serving will have served, 12 years or more, from any district of this state.

No elector has right to vote for all assemblymen and senators. Although Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that qualified voters may vote for all officers including state assemblymen and state senators elected by people, no elector claims to exercise such right, because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, provide that assemblymen and senators be elected from their districts. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Legislature may provide for allotment of 2-year terms for senators when necessary to ensure election of one-half of senators every 2 years. Reapportionment statute, former NRS 218.030, which provided for allotment of 2- and 4-year terms of senators following election of whole senate as result of reapportionment, was constitutional because legislature has power under Nev. Art. 17, § 10, to provide for allotment of 2-year terms to members of senate when, but only when, such action is necessary to provide for election of one- half of their number every 2 years. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 4.) State ex rel. Herr v. Laxalt, 84 Nev. 382, 441 P.2d 687 (1968)

State senator who moves residence out of county after election not barred from serving his term. State senator, elected by electors of county in which he resides at time of election, is not barred from serving during his term even though he removes his residence, after election, to another county. (But see subsection 1(f) of NRS 283.040.) AGO 93 (8-11-1955)

Prospective application of amendments to Nevada constitution limiting terms of office of certain public officers. Where initiative petition that amended Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, Nev. Art. 5, § 19, Nev. Art. 6, § 11 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3 by limiting terms of office of state officers and members of local governing bodies did not include language that amendments were retroactive in application, limitations on terms of office must be applied prospectively, become effective after vote is canvassed by Nevada supreme court pursuant to NRS 293.395 and apply only to officers elected after effective date of amendments. AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)

Senators and members of the assembly shall be duly qualified electors in the respective counties and districts which they represent, and the number of senators shall not be less than one-third nor more than one-half of that of the members of the assembly.

It shall be the mandatory duty of the legislature at its first session after the taking of the decennial census of the United States in the year 1950, and after each subsequent decennial census, to fix by law the number of senators and assemblymen, and apportion them among the several counties of the state, or among legislative districts which may be established by law, according to the number of inhabitants in them, respectively.

[Amended in 1950 and 1970. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1947 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1949 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1950 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1947, p. 881; Statutes of Nevada 1949, p. 685. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1967 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1969 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1970 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1967, p. 1797; Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1723.]

Minimum age requirement of 21 to hold legislative office was not rendered unconstitutional by reduction of voting age to 18. Provisions of NRS 218,010, establishing minimum age of 21 years to qualify as candidate for legislative office, were not rendered unconstitutional by amendment to Nev. Art. 7, § 5, requiring senators and members of assembly to be qualified electors established minimum qualifications only, and did not prevent legislature from prescribing additional reasonable qualifications. Mengelkamp v. List, 88 Nev. 542, 501 P.2d 1032 (1972), cited, MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, at 305 (D Nev. 1993)

Provisions of Nevada constitution as adopted in 1864 were in harmony with requirements for legislative apportionment declared by U.S. Supreme Court. Provisions of Nevada constitution as adopted in 1864 were entirely in harmony with requirements for legislative apportionment as declared by U.S. Supreme Court in 1964. Dungan v. Sawyer, 250 F. Supp. 480 (D.C. Nev. 1965)

Provisions prescribing ratio of senators and assemblymen and limiting size of legislature are unconstitutional only if they prevent apportionment substantially according to population. Provisions of Nev. Arr. 4, § 5, prescribing ratio of number of senators and assemblymen and of Nev. Art. 15, § 6, limiting total number of members of legislature violated U.S. Constitution only if and to extent that under present or future distribution of population they would actually prevent apportionment of legislators substantially according to population. Dungan v. Sawyer, 250 F. Supp. 480 (D.C. Nev. 1965)

County commissioners may appoint qualified elector to fill legislative vacancy whether or not he is registered voter. Where person seeking appointment to fill vacancy in legislature meets all qualifications for electors as set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, county commissioners may appoint him whether he is registered voter or not. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)

Vacancy is created where assemblyman ceases to be resident of county that elected him. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 5, NRS 283.040 and former NRS 292.070, relating to residence requirements for assemblymen, vacancy is created where assemblyman ceases to be resident of county from which he was elected. AGO 70 (7-16-1959)

Assemblyman who lives and works out of county but retains home in county may retain legislative office. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 5, NRS 283.040 and former NRS 292.070, relating to residence requirements for assemblymen, assemblyman who lives, works and rents house in county other than one from which he was elected, but has not disposed of his home in county he represents or otherwise indicated intent to abandon his residence there, may retain his legislative office. AGO 70 (7-16-1959)

Legislature must reapportion at first regular session following each decennial census. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 5, legislature must reapportion at first regular session following each decennial census provided it deems then available data sufficiently definitive to provide basis for reapportionment in compliance with "one man, one vote: mandate. Otherwise, reapportionment must be accomplished at special session to be called after necessary data is available. AGO 18 (3-15-1971)

Names of underage candidates for legislature are not required to be placed on ballots. Where candidates for senator and assemblyman were disqualified because they were under age prescribed by NRS 218.010, provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 6, that each house shall judge qualifications of its members did not require that candidates’ names be placed on ballot. Mangelkamp v. List, 88 Nev. 542, 501 P.2d 1032 (1972)

Legislature not courts determine whether legislator who accepts executive position has implicitly resigned from legislature. Where legislator accepts appointment in executive department, legislature has authority to determine whether acceptance of executive position acts as implied resignation of legislative office. Courts have no jurisdiction over such matters. AGO 183 (7-9-1952)

Courts may not review power of legislature to judge qualifications of its members. Power of legislature to judge qualifications of members is final and not subject to review by courts. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)

(Amendment proposed and passed by the 1995 legislature and agreed to and passed by the 1997 legislature; effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election)

Sec: 7. Punishment of nonmember. Either House, during the session, may punish, by imprisonment, any person not a member, who shall have been guilty of disrespect to the House by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; but such imprisonment shall not extend beyond the final adjournment of the session.

Sec: 8. Senators and assemblymen ineligible for certain offices. No Senator or member of Assembly shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, nor for one year thereafter be appointed to any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term, except such office as may be filled by elections by the people.

Senator not prevented from accepting employment as superintendent for exposition. Superintendent employed by board of directors for Nevada of Panama-Pacific and Panama- California expositions pursuant to statutory authority was not state officer and Nev. Art. 4, § 8, did not prevent state senator from accepting such employment. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915)

Word "office" may not be accorded broader meaning than in constitutional provision unless context requires. Where word "office" is frequently used in statute in context beyond its normal meaning, court is justified in according it broader meaning than its true definition imports, but such proposition is not authority for giving word "office" broader meaning than normal as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which disqualifies legislators for certain offices, in absence of context which would affect its proper meaning. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915)

Framers recognized distinction between "officer" and "employee" as used in provision prohibiting legislators from holding certain civil offices. Recognition by constitutional convention of distinction between "officer" and "employee" in Nev. Art. 4, § 28, is evidence that it was aware of such distinction in Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits members of legislature from holding civil office of profit created during their term, and that it was intended to exclude mere employment from such prohibition. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS.

Elected officers may hold appointive office provided office not created during their terms in legislature. Elected officer may hold appointive office, and draw salaries for both, provided appointment does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits senators and assemblymen from appointment to offices which have been created, or compensation for which has been increased, during their terms in legislature or for 1 year thereafter. AGO (1-30-1911)

Member of legislature that created state commission may not serve on commission during his term or 1 year thereafter. Member of legislature which created state commission, and provided for compensation and expenses for commissioners, may not serve as member of commission during his term of office or for 1 year thereafter. Nev. Art. 4, § 8. AGO 71 (10-18-1921)

Employment security department cannot use appropriated funds to replace salary paid to member of legislature who unlawfully accepted job with unemployment division. Where member of legislature takes job with unemployment division in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 8, and is paid salary from federal funds, employment security department cannot use funds appropriated in subsequent years to replace salary, nor has legislature power to make appropriation for this purpose as such appropriation would constitute expenditure of money in violation of constitution. AGO 23 (4-13-1943)

Appointment of legislator as executive secretary of local housing authority not prohibited. Appointment of legislator as executive secretary of local housing authority is not appointment to civil office of profit prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 8, for creation, tenure and compensation of such office is determined by local housing authority, not by legislature, even though legislature created local authority. AGO 48 (6-7- 1943)

Member of legislature that created office of deputy labor commissioner in 1943 permitted to accept position in 1945. Where legislature creates office of deputy labor commissioner in 1943, providing for expiration of office in 1945, and 1945 legislature continues office at same salary, legislator who was member at both sessions may be appointed to office in 1945, since office was created in 1943 and salary was not raised by subsequent legislature. AGO 239 (11-7-1945)

Legislator may not serve on commission created during his term nor for 1 year thereafter. Legislator may not serve on commission created during his term of office nor for 1 year thereafter because of prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 8. AGO 736 (4-12-1949)

State senator prohibited from accepting office of tax commissioner. Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, prohibits state senator from accepting office of tax commissioner while he remains senator. AGO 28 (3- 12-1951)

Offices of state senator and tax commissioner are incompatible. Offices of state senator and tax commissioner are incompatible under common law principles and cannot be held by same person. AGO 28 (3-12-1951)

Legislator who increases salary of chairman of industrial insurance commission cannot be appointed to such office in same year. Member of legislature which increases salary of chairman of industrial insurance commission cannot be appointed to such office within same year. AGO 108 (10-22-1951)

Legislator who increases compensation of deputy county assessor cannot be appointed to such office during his term. Member of legislature which increases compensation of office of deputy county assessor cannot thereafter, during his term, accept appointment to such office. AGO 353 (11-24-1954)

Position of maintenance engineer and building inspector for school district is not civil office for profit. Position of maintenance engineer and building inspector for school district is not civil office of profit within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 8. AGO 62 (5- 17-1955)

Appointment of legislator who has resigned from legislature to any state civil office will not be rendered invalid by increase in emoluments of such office by next legislative session. Restriction imposed by Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits appointment of legislators to any state civil office of profit which was created or emoluments of which were increased during term for which such legislator was elected, must be strictly construed, and since restriction goes to appointment and not to incumbency, appointment of legislator who has resigned from legislature to any state civil office will not be rendered invalid by increase in emoluments of such office by next-succeeding legislative session, notwithstanding such session takes place during term for which such legislator was elected. AGO 25 (3-23-1959)

Legislator may not accept position in executive department the emoluments of which were increased by legislature during his term until 1 year after his term. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 8, relating to appointment of legislator to civil office of profit within state, legislator may not be appointed to position in executive department the emoluments of which were increased by legislature of which he was a member, until 1 year after his resignation from legislature or expiration of his term. AGO 95 (9-28-1959)

Legislator may seek election to civil office for profit created during his legislative term. Nev. Art. 4, § 8, relating to appointment of legislator to civil office of profit created during term such legislator served, does not prohibit any such legislator from seeking election to any such office. AGO 151 (4-8-1960)

Member of legislature may accept position in classified service or as superintendent of public instruction. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which forbids appointment of legislator to office which has been created or its emoluments increased during his term of office, member of legislature may accept position in classified service where salary schedule is established by personnel division of department of administration or as superintendent of public instruction where salary is set by state board of education. (But see Nev. Art. 3, § 1.) AGO 280 (11-24-1965)

Where statute was amended to change title of position without changing duties, no new position was created. Where NRS 385.310 et seq. were amended to change title of position to assistant superintendent of public instruction for administration, without changing duties, no new position was created within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits appointment of legislators to certain offices. AGO 293 (1-5-1966)

Sec: 9. Federal officers ineligible for state office; exceptions. No person holding any lucrative office under the Government of the United States or any other power, shall be eligible to any civil office of Profit under this State; Provided, that Post-Masters whose compensation does not exceed Five Hundred dollars per annum, or commissioners of deeds, shall not be deemed as holding a lucrative office.

Federal officers disqualified from serving as state attorney general. Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which disqualifies federal officers from state office, is not limited to legislative offices and includes the office of attorney general notwithstanding eligibility of "any elector" under Nev. Art. 5, § 19. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867)

U.S. District Attorney ineligible for office of Nevada attorney general. One who holds office of U.S. District Attorney on date of election of attorney general of State of Nevada is ineligible for latter office. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 9.) State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Where candidate for state attorney general mailed resignation from U.S. District Attorney Office day before election, he was not ineligible for office of attorney general. Where candidate for attorney general placed in mails day before election unconditional resignation from office of U.S. District Attorney, he was not ineligible for office of attorney general under Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which disqualifies federal officer from state office. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867)

Meaning of "eligible" as used in section. The word "eligible" in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which disqualifies federal officers from state office, means both incapable of being legally chosen and incapable of legally holding. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867), cited, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, at 338, 31 Pac. 545 (1892), State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, at 173, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Offices of notary public and receiver of public money for U.S. land office are incompatible. Office of notary public is civil office of profit within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding any lucrative office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any "civil office of this state," and offices of notary public and receiver of public money in United States land office were incompatible under such provision. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

"Eligible" refers to officers who hold civil office by appointment as well as election. Word "eligible," as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which provides that no person holding any lucrative office under government of United States or any other power shall be eligible to any civil office of profit under this state, refers to officers who hold such civil office by appointment as well as by election. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

Notary public is civil office. Language of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding any lucrative office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any civil office of profit in this state, clearly includes office of notary public as civil office, and court could not speculate further as to what real intentions of drafters were. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

"Civil office" includes officers connected with the civil administration of government, not military officers. Words "civil office" as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any civil office of profit under this state, refer only to such officers as are connected with civil administration of government, and were doubtless to include all such, to the exclusion of military officers. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

Word "office" in section does not include president, trustees, executors or deputies of corporation. Sometimes "office" and "civil office" would include president and trustees of corporation, executors or deputies, but no such meaning could be attached to such words under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any "civil office" under this state. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

Makers of the constitution had power to include office of notary public as civil office within meaning of section. It was within power of makers of constitution, whether or not sufficient reason existed for their so doing, to include office of notary public as civil office within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding any lucrative office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any civil office of profit in state. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

State senator's acceptance of appointment as U.S. Army paymaster created vacancy in senator's office. State senator who accepted appointment as paymaster in United States Army became incapable of holding office of senator by provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 9. His acceptance was resignation of state office and created vacancy in such office. Election of successor was valid without issuance of writ of election as provided by statute because no session of legislature was to take place before next general election and because appointment of senator to United States post was of great public notoriety in his county. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Postmaster with annual income exceeding $500 prevented from acting as notary public. Postmaster with annual income in excess of $500 is prevented from acting as notary public by Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which prevents federal officer from holding "civil office of profit under this state." AGO (6-4-1900)

Reversed, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

U.S. Postmaster receiving more than $500 per year must resign before general election or cannot be chosen for justice of the peace. U.S. Postmaster receiving more than $500 per year may be nominated for justice of the peace, but if he has not resigned at time for general election, he cannot legally be chosen, nor can he legally hold office of justice of the peace, because of prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO (9-2-1910)

U.S. Postmaster whose compensation does not exceed $500 may serve as notary public. U.S. Postmaster is eligible to hold office of notary public only if compensation as Postmaster does not exceed $500 per year. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 9 and NRS 240.010.) AGO (11-8-1911)

Reversed, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Statute stating what an officer should be paid does not constitute an appropriation of that amount. Statute which states officer ". . . shall receive a salary not to exceed $1,800 per annum, and necessary traveling expenses, payable out of the general fund of the State of Nevada . . ." does not constitute an appropriation, and state controller cannot legally draw warrant on treasury for salary or expenses. AGO (4-17-1912)

Primary election is not election for state and county officers contemplated by section. Primary election is not such election for state and county officers as is contemplated by Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO 137 (8-26-1914)

Mail route contractor does not hold U.S. Government office. Star mail route contractor cannot be considered as holding "office" under U.S. Government within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, prohibiting United States officeholders from holding state offices. AGO 2 (1-6-1917)

District judge may not accept appointment as U.S. Commissioner. Nev. Art. 4, § 9, prohibits district judge from accepting appointment as United States Commissioner. AGO 211 (7-31-1918)

County commissioner is civil office of profit. County commissioner is "civil office of profit under this state" within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9; thus commissioner becomes ineligible for office if he accepts federal job. AGO 109 (12-27-1923)

Holder of lucrative office in U.S. Government is ineligible to serve as election officer. Person holding lucrative office under U.S. Government is ineligible to serve as election officer. AGO 316 (9-1-1928)

Acceptance of appointment as Special Assistant to Attorney General for $1 per year does not violate section. Acceptance of appointment as Special Assistant to the Attorney General in connection with Selective Service Act at $1 per year is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which prohibits state officer from holding lucrative office under United States. AGO 367 M (12-17-1942)

Public officer inducted into Army is not U.S. Government officer within meaning of section. Public officer inducted into Army as private is not officer of U.S. Government within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO 1 (1-16-1943)

Public officer inducted into military who assigns his compensation and takes no part in conduct of his office is not holding civil office for profit. Public officer inducted into military service who assigns his compensation and takes no part in conduct of his office is not considered, during period of military service, as holding "civil office of profit within state" so as to disqualify him under Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO 1 (1-16-1943)

"Office" means public employment by appointment with tenure, emolument and duties. Word "office" in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, means public employment conferred by appointment with tenure, emolument and duties. Thus sheriff who merely contracts with U.S. Government to carry mail is not holding federal office so as to become ineligible to act as sheriff. AGO 302 (5-22-1946)

"Office" or "officer" does not include employee. Where word "office" or "officer" appears in Nevada constitution, it does not mean or include term employee. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 9) AGO 229 (12-11-1956), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Employee of U.S. may be appointed notary public. Word "office" in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, does not include employees. Thus employee of U.S. may be appointed notary public. (See also NRS 240.010.) AGO 229 (12-11-1956), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Federal officer ineligible to hold office of school district trustee where trustees are paid. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 9, prohibiting federal officer from holding civil office of profit under state, federal officer was ineligible to hold office of school district trustee in district where trustees are paid salary for attendance at meetings. See also AGO 229 (12-11-1956). AGO 670 (7-1-1970), but see AGO 5 (1-26-1971)

Federal employee may hold state civil office. Nev. Art. 4, § 9 does not preclude employee, as distinguished from officer, of federal government from holding civil office of profit with state or political subdivision, Federal employee may legally serve as school district trustee. AGO 5 (1-26-1971)

Secretary of state may appoint U.S. Postmaster to be notary public. Appointment by secretary of state of U.S. Postmaster to be notary public does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 9 because Postmaster is no longer holder of office of profit appointed by U.S. President but rather employee of Federal Government. (See also NRS 244.010.) AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Sec: 10. Embezzler of public money ineligible for office; disqualification for bribery. Any person who shall be convicted of the embezzlement, or defalcation of the public funds of this State or who may be convicted of having given or offered a bribe to procure his election or appointment to office, or received a bribe to aid in the procurement of office for any other person, shall be disqualified from holding any office of profit or trust in this State; and the Legislature shall, as soon as practicable, provide by law for the punishment of such defalcation, bribery, or embezzlement as a felony.

Section requires conviction of bribery before one is disqualified. Where defeated candidate for district attorney contested election of his opponent under statute which provided that elector could contest election of officer not eligible to hold such office, and alleged that defendant had offered to return portion of his salary if elected and offered to give bond guaranteeing such promise, but did not allege that defendant had been convicted of giving or offering bribe to procure election, demurrer was properly sustained, because Nev. Art. 4, § 10, requires that one be convicted before being disqualified for such offense. Egan v. Jones, 21 Nev. 433, 32 Pac. 929 (1893)

Sec: 11. Privilege of members: Freedom from arrest on civil process. Members of the Legislature shall be privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of the Legislature, and for fifteen days next before the commencement of each session.

Sec. 12. Vacancy. In case of the death or resignation of any member of the legislature, either senator or assemblyman, the county commissioners of the county from which such member was elected shall appoint a person of the same political party as the party which elected such senator or assemblyman to fill such vacancy; provided, that this section shall apply only in cases where no biennial election or any regular election at which county officers are to [be] elected takes place between the time of such death or resignation and the next succeeding session of the legislature.

Fact that legislature did not enact legislation for special election after repeal of provision for such election was significant in construing term "general election" in section. In construing term "general election" used in Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, it was at least significant that legislature promptly enacted legislation after adoption of original provision of that section of constitution which provided for special election to fill vacancy in office of state legislator, and that after such legislation was, by constitutional amendment of 1922, repealed by implication, no such legislation for special election was enacted. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940)

"General election" means election at which state senators are ordinarily elected. It was intention of legislature that term "general election" used in Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, means general election at which state senators are ordinarily elected. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940), cited, Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, at 502, 275 P.2d 376 (1954), AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

Vacancy in office of state senator is to be filled by appointment until next quadrennial election for that office. Where vacancy by resignation occurs in office of state senator, office is to be filled by election at next quadrennial election for that office, and vacancy is to be filled by appointment until that time, even though biennial general election occurs between time of resignation and next session of legislature, because term "general election," as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, pertaining to filling of vacancies in offices of state senator, means general election at which state senators are ordinarily elected. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940), cited, Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, at 502, 275 P.2d 376 (1954), AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

General election is when senators are ordinarily elected and not necessarily next biennial election. Fact that holding that term "general election" used in proviso of Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, means general election at which state senators are ordinarily elected and not necessarily next biennial general election would make operation of proviso remote would not make proviso a vain act, because it is enough that contingency could arise in which proviso would be operative under the holding. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940)

Appointment to fill vacancy must be made from district in which vacancy occurs. Assemblymen of Nye County are to be elected by vote of electors of entire county. Appointment to fill vacancy in office must be made from assembly district in which vacancy occurs. AGO 5 (1-28-1955)

County commissioners may fill senate vacancy only if legislative session intervenes between vacancy and next general election. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 12, county commissioners, in filling vacancy occasioned by death or resignation of state senator, have power to appoint only if session of legislature intervenes between vacancy and next general election, and term of appointed senator can last only until next general election. AGO 84 (7-18-1955)

County commissioners may appoint qualified elector to fill legislative vacancy whether or not he is registered voter. Where person seeking appointment to fill vacancy in legislature meets all qualifications for electors as set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, county commissioners may appoint him whether he is registered voter or not. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)

Legislative vacancy shall be filled at general election unless legislative session convenes before general election. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 12, relating to filling of vacancies in legislature, board of county commissioners may fill any such vacancy only when legislative session convenes prior to general election; otherwise any such vacancy shall be filled at such election. AGO 166 (6-21-1960)

Sec: 13. Quorum; compelling attendance. A majority of all the members elected to each House shall constitute a quorum to transact business, but a smaller number may adjourn, from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each house may prescribe.

Sec: 14. Journal. Each House shall keep a journal of its own proceedings which shall be published and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall at the desire of any three members present, be entered on the journal.

[Amended in 1994. Proposed and passed by the 1991 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1993 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1994 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1991, p. 2573; Statutes of Nevada 1993, p. 2974.]

Provisions do not apply to committees of either house. Assembly resolution that suspended standing rule which required that all meetings of standing committee be open to public did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 15, because provisions of section do not apply to committees of either house. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. State Legislature, 104 Nev. 672, 765 P.2d 1142 (1988)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Adjournment from Thursday to Monday without consent of other house does not violate section. Adjournment from Thursday to following Monday without consent of other house is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 15, because such adjournment is considered as lasting only 3 days. AGO (1-27-1911)

Constitution does not require committee meetings to be open and public. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 15, relating to public legislative sessions, and NRS ch. 241, relating to open meetings of public agencies, do not require legislative committee meetings to be open and public. Houses of legislature or individual legislative committees may provide rules governing open and closed committee sessions. AGO 113 (2-1-1973)

Sec: 16. Bills may originate in either house; amendment. Any bill may originate in either House of the Legislature, and all bills passed by one may be amended in the other.

Sec: 17. Act to embrace one subject only; title; amendment. Each law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter, properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only; but, in such case, the act as revised or section as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.

Example of sufficient connection between statute’s title and subject of section. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, there was sufficient connection between statute entitled ". . . an act to create counties and establish the boundaries thereof," and provision which required one county to pay $15,000 to another in connection with change in boundaries. Humboldt County v. County Comm’rs, 6 Nev. 30 (1870), cited, State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, at 443 (1880), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 238, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 241, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Only principal subject embodied in law need be expressed in title. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, it is necessary to express in title only principal subject embodied in law, and matters properly connected therewith need not be mentioned. Humboldt County v. County Comm’rs, 6 Nev. 30 (1870), cited, State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, at 443 (1880), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 238, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 412, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 241, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Title may be considered in construing statute. Title of statute (see Nev. Art. 4, § 17) may be considered in construing statute. Torreyson v. Board of Examiners, 7 Nev. 19 (1871), cited, A Minor Girl v. Clark County Juvenile Court Servs., 87 Nev. 544, at 548, 490 P.2d 1248 (1971), Thompson v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 100 Nev. 352, at 354, 683 P.2d 17 (1984), see also O’Donnell v. Perry, 100 Nev. 356, 683 P.2d 12 (1984), Roberts v. University of Nevada Sys., 104 Nev. 33, 752 P.2d 221 (1988), AGO 91-6 (5-23-1991), AGO 95-24 (12-31-1995)

Details of legislative act need not be specifically stated in title. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith which subject shall be expressed briefly in title, does not require that details of legislative act be specifically stated in title, but allows inclusion of matter germane to subject and adapted to accomplishment of object in view. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874), cited, State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 344, 10 Pac. 901 (1886)

Provisions for recording fees and penalties for neglect of duty by recorder were properly connected with act regulating marks and brands of stock. Provisions for recording fees and penalties for willful neglect of duty by recorder in act entitled "an act to regulate marks and brands of stock" were matters properly connected with purpose and enforcement of act, and could properly be included in act under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874)

Purpose of section is to prevent misleading of legislature and public. Purpose of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject which shall be expressed briefly in title, is to prevent combination of subjects which have no proper relation, and which could not be carried separately, in order that legislature and public will not be misled. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874), cited, Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194, at 201 (1881), State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 344, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, at 390, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 237, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 405, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, at 258, 52 Pac. 274 (1898)

Provisions of act that bore no relation to title of act were void. Where act entitled "an act to regulate marks and brands of stock" included penalties for unlawful killing of stock, such provisions bore no proper relation to regulation of marks and brands and were void under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874), cited, State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, at 253 (1875), State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, at 30 (1880), State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913), distinguished, Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 284, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407 (1909), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Statute entitled as supplementary to another act did not violate section. Statute entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled ‘An act concerning crimes and punishments,’ " did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, because statute to which it was supplementary concerned subject of crimes and related matter of punishments, and both were briefly expressed in title. State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439 (1880), cited, State ex rel. School Trustees v. County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, at 102, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), State v. Ceja, 53 Nev. 272, at 281, 298 Pac. 658 (1931)

Where title fairly indicates subject of statute and affords clue to contents, constitutional requirements are satisfied. Where title of statute truly and fairly indicates in general terms the subject of statute, nothing is contained in statute which is not suggested by its title, and title affords clue to contents, statute fulfills requirements of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439 (1880)

Section is mandatory but should be liberally construed. Requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, that each law embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, is mandatory, but should be liberally construed. Purpose of such provision is to prevent surprise or fraud upon legislature by means of provisions in bills of which titles give no intimation, and to apprise the public of subjects of legislation under consideration. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27 (1880), cited, State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, at 102, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, at 308, 30 Pac. 896 (1883), State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 345, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), State ex rel. Dunn v. Humboldt County, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 407, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 473, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), on rehearing, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 111 Pac. 770 (1911), Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 450, 171 Pac. 511 (1918), In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, at 348, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), Ex parte Mantell & Raigen, 47 Nev. 95, at 107, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), dissenting opinion, In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 139, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

If two incongruous subjects are embraced in same act, whole act is void. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, if two incongruous subjects are embraced in same act, whole act is void, and even where only one subject is embraced in act, if its title has been unnecessarily made so restrictive as not to cover whole subject, such parts of act as are not included in title must fail. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27 (1880), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 407, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion at 412, State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913), In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937)

Statute aimed at suppressing opium dens did not embrace more than one subject in violation of section. Object of ch. 27, Stats. 1877, as amended by ch. 116, Stats. 1879, was suppression of places commonly known as opium dens. Provisions of statute do not embrace more than one subject in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27 (1880), cited, State v. On Gee How, 15 Nev. 184, at 187 (1880), State v. County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, at 102, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), State v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 345, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Statute relating to care of insane which provided loan to erect asylum was not in conflict with section. Statute relating to care of insane which provided for loan from state school fund to erect asylum was not in conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that each statute shall embrace but one subject. Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194 (1881), cited, Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 288, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 415, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 104, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), dissenting opinion, Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Calif. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Where different steps of act are minor parts of same general subject, act is not in conflict with section. Where different steps of act by which result is to be accomplished are not different subjects but minor parts of same general subject, act is not in conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject. Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194 (1881), cited, Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 288, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 415, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 104, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), dissenting opinion, Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Calif. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Statute which authorized transfer of surplus money from certain funds to others did not violate section. Statute which authorized county to transfer surplus money from bond interest and sinking fund to school fund, and from courthouse bond fund to general fund, although it covered transfer of money from two different funds, embraced only subject of transfer of surplus money from one fund to another, and therefore did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. Board of County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Statute which directed transfer of surplus money from two different funds embraced only one subject and did not violate section. Statute entitled "An Act to authorize the county commissioners of Storey County to transfer certain funds," which directed transfer of surplus money from two different funds, contained nothing which was not suggested by title and embraced only subject of transfer of surplus money from one fund to another, and therefore did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. Board of County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Statute fixing salaries of county officers embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith and did not violate section. Statute entitled "An act fixing salaries of the various county officers in the several counties of this state, and other matters relating thereto," which contained section authorizing county commissioners to transfer from general fund to salary fund sufficient sums to meet all warrants drawn against salary fund, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, because statute embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and subject was briefly expressed in title. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, 30 Pac. 896 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 416, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 312, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Where act to redistrict state was not as briefly expressed as it might have been but was not misleading, act did not violate section. Although title "An act to redistrict the State of Nevada, prescribe the number and salaries of district judges, and fix the places of holding courts" was not as briefly expressed as it might have been, act did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title. Object of act was to redistrict state, and additions made to such object in title were not misleading, because they related to matters which were germane to redistricting of state. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), cited, State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 474, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Where details of act are unnecessarily expressed in title, legislature not prohibited from including details germane to act not named in title. Where some of details of act are unnecessarily expressed in title, Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, does not prohibit legislature from including in provisions of act other details not named in title which are germane to subject of act, and adapted to accomplishment of object in view. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 Pac. 901 (1886)

Where all matters embraced in act to redistrict state were adapted to secure such object, act did not violate section. Act entitled "An act to redistrict the State of Nevada, prescribe the number and salaries of district judges, and fix the places of holding courts" did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which declares that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, because act had but one general object, that of redistricting state, and all matters embraced in act were adapted to secure such object. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), cited, State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, at 390, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 286, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 416, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 312, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Amendatory act cannot include any other subject than that embraced in act to be amended. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, amendatory act cannot include any other subject than that embraced in act to be amended, and matter properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Title of act to be amended must be referred to in amendatory act and amended act must be reenacted and published at length. In order to comply with provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, not only must title of act to be amended be referred to in amendatory act, but sections as amended must be reenacted and published at length. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887)

Where act attempted to amend two separate acts and court could not determine which portion of amendment would have passed without other, entire amendatory act declared void. Where act which attempted to amend two separate acts, one relating to salaries of certain state officers, and other relating to salaries of justices of supreme court, violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, and it was evident that one portion of amendatory act was especially designed as inducement for passage of other, and court could not determine, from inspection of act, which portion, if either, would have been passed without other, it was duty of court to declare entire amendatory act void. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887)

Act which attempted to amend one act regulating salaries of state officers and another act regulating salaries of justices of the supreme court declared void. Where legislature passed act fixing salaries of justices of supreme court and act reducing and regulating salaries of certain state officers and attaches of state government, act passed during subsequent session entitled "An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act reducing and regulating the salaries of certain state officers, justices of the supreme court and attaches of the state government,’ " violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 408, 41 Pac. 145 (1895)

Amendatory act which did not properly refer to act sought to be amended violated provision that no law be amended by reference to its title only. Where legislature passed act entitled "An act reducing and regulating the salaries of certain state officers and attaches," subsequent act entitled "An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act reducing and regulating the salaries of certain state officers, justices of the supreme court and attaches,’ " did not properly refer to act sought to be amended, and violated provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, that no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only, which does not authorize legislature to dispense with reference to title of act sought to be amended. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), distinguished, State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, at 491, 151 Pac. 944 (1915)

Legislature could include different kinds of businesses that bore no relation to each other in act fixing closing time for saloons and gaminghouses. Act entitled "An act fixing the time for the opening and closing of saloons and gaminghouses" did not embrace more than one subject in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Subject, which is briefly and correctly expressed in title, is closing of certain kinds of licensed businesses during certain hours. Within such subject the legislature could include different kinds of businesses which bear no relation to each other, except that they must all come within power of legislature to regulate, restrict or abolish. Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 416, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 474, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977), distinguished, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 407, 41 Pac. 145 (1895)

Act held unconstitutional where title was so narrow as to be misleading and act embraced more than one subject. Portions of act entitled "An act defining the duties of state controller" which sought to impose penalties against other officers for failure to remit collections to state controller were unconstitutional because title was so narrow as to be misleading and act embraced more than one subject in contravention of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Hoadley, 20 Nev. 317, 22 Pac. 99 (1889), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 408, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Purpose of title is to give notice of subject of law. Purpose of title is to give notice of subject of law. Title "An act defining the duties of state controller" sufficiently expresses its subject so far as it relates to duties of state controller, but is inadequate to give notice of provisions imposing penalties on other officers delinquent in settlements with state controller. State v. Hoadley, 20 Nev. 317, 22 Pac. 99 (1889), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 408, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Matters properly connected with subject need not be mentioned in title. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, matters properly connected with subject need not be mentioned in title, and if they are, it simply makes title unnecessarily prolix, but does not constitute connected matter a separate subject or otherwise invalidate law. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, at 283, 30 P.2d 284 (1934), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

One act consolidating two county offices and fixing salaries of officers therein was not prohibited. Fixing of salaries of officers in, and consolidation of two offices of, certain county were not separate, distinct, independent propositions, having no connection with each other, which had been thrown together in same bill, and act containing such provisions did not come within mischief against which Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each law to one subject, was directed. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892)

Liberal rules of construction sustaining laws not coming within spirit and meaning of constitutional prohibition are necessary. As there is scarcely subject of legislation that cannot be divided into various heads, connection between which may be controversial, and seldom has validity of law been seriously questioned without claim of conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject, adoption of liberal rules of construction to sustain laws not coming within spirit and meaning of such constitutional prohibition is necessary. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, dissenting opinion at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

One object of provision was to prevent uniting several independent disconnected matters in one act. One of the objects of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, was to prevent uniting in one act of several independent, disconnected matters, because such unification makes possible the mustering of sufficient strength to pass act by obtaining support of all interested in each matter. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892)

Objections should be grave and conflict with constitution great before judiciary should disregard enactment on ground it embraces more than one subject. Objections should be grave, and conflict between statute and Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, should be palpable before judiciary should disregard legislative enactment upon sole ground that it embraces more than one subject. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Calif. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 241, 75 P.2d 727 (1938), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Only subject of act must be stated in title. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, it is only subject of act which must be stated in title, and matters properly connected with that subject need not be mentioned. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Object of section was to prevent fraud and surprise upon legislature and the people. Object of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, was to prevent uniting in one act of several independent and disconnected matters, and to prevent fraud and surprise upon members of legislature and the people. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Section should be construed to correct evil against which it is directed but not to thwart honest efforts at legislation. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each law to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, should be construed so as to correct evil against which it is directed, but at same time so as not needlessly to thwart honest efforts at legislation. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, dissenting opinion at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Statute which defined embezzlement but did not attempt to amend another statute relating to embezzlement by certain persons was constitutionally valid. Although statute which amends other statutes without reenacting or publishing them at length, as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 17, would be absolute failure, ch. 76, Stats. 1887 (cf. NRS 205.300), defining embezzlement as appropriation of property for any purpose other than that for which it was entrusted, was not attempted amendment of BH § 4634 or 4635 (cf. NRS 205.305 and 205.300), relating to embezzlement by clerks, servants, apprentices and bailees, and was constitutionally valid. State v. Trolson, 21 Nev. 419, 32 Pac. 930 (1893)

Statute defining embezzlement and fixing punishment embraced only one subject. Ch. 76, Stats. 1887 (cf. NRS 205.300), defining embezzlement and fixing punishment for such crime, embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith and did not contravene Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Trolson, 21 Nev. 419, 32 Pac. 930 (1893)

Where title of amendatory act mentioned only one section of former act but actually amended two former sections, amendment of such two additional sections held unconstitutional. Where title of act stated it was act to amend one particular section of former act, but body of amendatory act also purported to amend two additional sections of former act, such two additional sections were unconstitutional under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each law to one subject and requiring that title express subject. Ex parte Hewlett, 22 Nev. 333, 40 Pac. 96 (1895), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 405, distinguished at 412, 41 Pac. 145 (1895)

There is wide difference between liberal construction and nullification. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject, which shall be expressed in title, is to be liberally construed, to end that there shall be no unnecessary hampering of legislation, but there is wide difference between liberal construction and nullification. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 474, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Subject of act must be stated in title. Subject of act must be subject stated in title, and Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, does not say that all matters connected with purposes or objects of act may be contained in act, but only matter connected with subject stated in title. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

Title of act that was evasive in both letter and spirit of section embraced very evil against which section was directed. Act requiring county recorders to subscribe to one newspaper, and boards of county commissioners to print all legal advertising in such paper, but whose title merely indicated it was to amend act for purchase and preservation of newspapers, was evasive in both letter and spirit of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject, which shall be expressed in title, and embraced very evil against which that provision was directed. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Pac. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913), State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), distinguished, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Object of section was to defeat "log-rolling" legislation. Object of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject, which shall be expressed in title, was to defeat "log-rolling" legislation, or combining in one act of incongruous and distinct subjects, and to prevent fraud upon members of legislature and general public by covering up, under innocent titles, vicious and harmful provisions, of which titles gave no hint. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

Act incorporating town of Reno did not violate section. In proceeding in nature of quo warranto to determine constitutionality of act incorporating town of Reno, it was held that such act did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that each law enacted by legislature embrace but one subject, because the various provisions contained in act were reasonably and properly related to one another, and constituted integral parts of one general subject. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 Pac. 274 (1898), cited, State v. Lincoln County Power Dist. No. 1, 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941)

Where portions of act that covered subject not expressed in title were severable from act, act was not violation of section. Where first section of act provided for disincorporation of city, which was subject expressed in title, additional sections creating unincorporated town and providing for its government and payment of claims against city, if unrelated, were severable, and act was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899)

Law providing for removal of officers was not exempt from section. It was never intended that laws enacted by virtue of Nev. Art. 7, § 4, requiring that legislature provide for removal of officers, could be enacted differently from method prescribed for enactment of laws generally, and such law must comply with requirements of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, limiting each law to one subject and matter properly connected with it and requiring that subject be expressed in title. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875 (1905), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Where title of act related to elections, provisions relating to removal of officials contained in act violated constitutional limitation. Subject of removal of public officials from public office has no proper connection with that of their election within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, limiting each law to one subject and matter properly connected with it and requiring that subject be expressed in title, so that where act was entitled An act relating to elections, provisions included in such act which provided procedure for removal of public officers violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875 (1905), distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 472, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Matter of election contests has proper connection with subject of elections within meaning of provision. Matter of election contests, as opposed to that of removal of public officials from office, has proper connection with subject of elections within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, limiting each law to one subject and matter properly connected with it and requiring that subject be expressed in title, and inclusion of provisions for such contests in act entitled "An act relating to elections," did not violate Nev. Art 4, § 17. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875 (1905), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Statute which included matter not in title of act was void and admission of prejudicial testimony under such statute amounted to reversible error. In prosecution for murder, where testimony not admissible under any other phase of law was admitted under statute which provided that verified transcript of testimony given at preliminary examination before committing magistrate was admissible on trial of case, and statute was void as in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, because it included matter not embraced in title of act, admission of such testimony was so prejudicial to defendant that it amounted to reversible error. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353, 96 Pac. 1057 (1908)

Section was violated where one statute attempted to amend another by simply referring to it. Where statute provided that transcript of testimony taken at preliminary examination before committing magistrate was admissible in evidence on trial of case, as prescribed by another statute which provided that by consent of parties, such testimony could be reduced to writing and used by either party on trial, but only under certain specified circumstances, former statute attempted to amend latter simply by referring to it, and therefore violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, under which no law may be amended by reference to its title only, but section as amended must be reenacted and published at length. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353, 96 Pac. 1057 (1908)

Section violated where subject matter of act was neither embraced in title of act nor germane to subject matter defined in title. Where act entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of stenographers upon the hearing of preliminary examinations before committing magistrates, and to regulate the compensation thereof" contained provision that verified transcript of testimony given at such hearings was admissible in evidence on trial of case, such provision violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, under which each law enacted by legislature must embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject must be briefly expressed in title, because subject matter of such provision was neither embraced in title of act, nor germane to subject matter defined in title. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353, 96 Pac. 1057 (1908), distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 472, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

No necessity for separate designations in title for all different provisions of act relating to generic subject of banking. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in title, there was no necessity for requiring separate acts or even separate designations in title for all different provisions of act relating to generic subject of banking, even though title designated only one of matters with which others were properly connected. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 284, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, at 219, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, at 61, 146 Pac. 756 (1914), Turner v. Fogg, 39 Nev. 406, at 410, 159 Pac. 56 (1916), Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 442, 171 Pac. 511 (1918)

Where statute embraces more than one subject, part properly connected with title is valid, remainder may be unconstitutional. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that "each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith," where statute embraces more than one subject, part of statute which is properly connected with title is valid, although remainder may be held unconstitutional. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), cited, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 284, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Section is mandatory. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith is mandatory. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), cited, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 284, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, at 348, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 198, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

Statute dealing exclusively with subject of fees which public officers may charge for official services did not violate section. Act entitled "An act to regulate fees and compensation for official and other services in the State of Nevada" which prescribed fees and compensation for services allowable to various state officers including sheriff and constable, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, because act dealt exclusively with subject of fees which public officers may charge for official services and compensation which they may receive for services rendered in their official capacity. Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Part of act concerning public schools prohibiting house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse did not violate section. In act entitled "An act concerning public schools, and repealing certain acts relating thereto," inclusion of sections which made it illegal to keep house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), cited, State ex rel. Eggers v. Esser, 35 Nev. 429, at 435, 129 Pac. 557 (1913), Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, at 218, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, at 60, 146 Pac. 756 (1914), In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 140, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 98, 227 P.2d 206 (1951)

Writ of habeas corpus denied person convicted under statute prohibiting house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse. In habeas corpus proceedings instituted by person convicted under statute, which was part of act concerning public schools, making it illegal to keep house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse, where such statute was not superseded by RL § 6510 (cf. NRS 201.380), enacted same day as part of crimes and punishment act, making it illegal to keep house of ill fame within 400 yards of schoolhouse, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, and did not deprive petitioner of any vested rights given him by city ordinance regulating maintenance of houses of ill fame, writ of habeas corpus was denied. In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Statute which did not amend another yet covered same subject matter was in pari materia with other statute. Method for amending statutes is provided by Nev. Art. 4, § 17. RL § 4833 (cf. NRS 2.090), which provides that appeal may be taken from granting of or refusal to grant injunction was not enacted as amendment to previous acts and was therefore in pari materia with RL § 5329 (cf. N.R.A.P. 3A(b)), which provides that appeals could be taken from district court to appellate court in certain specified situations. State ex rel. Pacific Reclamation Co. v. Ducker, 35 Nev. 214, 127 Pac. 990 (1912)

Tax provision that was germane to act concerning public schools did not violate constitution. Provision levying tax for support of public schools was germane to act "concerning public schools" and did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that act comprise one subject only which shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Eggers v. Esser, 35 Nev. 429, 129 Pac. 557 (1913)

Provisions in general appropriation act which repeal or amend existing general laws are unconstitutional as not germane to title. Provisions in general appropriation act which purport to repeal or amend existing general laws of state are unconstitutional and void as not being germane to title under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in title. State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Act relating to marriage and divorce which prescribed residence necessary for divorce jurisdiction did not violate section. Act entitled "An act relating to marriage and divorce," and prescribing residence necessary to give court jurisdiction in divorce action, does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, because length of residence required before parties apply for divorce necessarily pertains to divorce, and therefore is matter connected with title of act. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914)

Act does not violate section if all matters dealt with relate to subject expressed in title and anything properly connected therewith. Although act deals with numerous matters, if all of matters dealt with relate to subject of act briefly expressed in its title and anything properly connected therewith, act does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914)

Where section of act was amended by statute then reenacted at length, no merit to contention that reenactment should have specified that amended version was reenacted. Where sec. 1 of act of 1875 amended sec. 22 of act of 1861, and act of 1913 reenacted at length, in compliance with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, the language designated as sec. 22 in act of 1861, act of 1913 amended act of 1875, and there was no merit in contention that act of 1913 should have specified that sec. 1, instead of sec. 22, was amended, because from title so stating and language used, it was apparent that by act of 1913 the legislature intended to amend act of 1875. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), cited, Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, at 175, 183 Pac. 387 (1919), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 220, 221, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

Clerical errors should be disregarded and legislative intention should govern. Where sec. 1 of act of 1875 amended sec. 22 of act of 1861, and act of 1913 reenacted at length, in compliance with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, the language designated as sec. 22 in act of 1861, that section was amended by act of 1913, and even if act of 1875 repealed sec. 22 and act of 1913 should have specified that sec. 1, not sec. 22, was amended, this would be only clerical error and section reenacted at length would still be one amended, because clerical errors should be disregarded and legislative intention should govern. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), cited, In re Counts, 39 Nev. 61, at 69, 153 Pac. 93 (1915), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 220, 221, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

No constitutional violation where title gave notice of what act sought to create and notice of powers and duties of thing created. Act entitled "An act to create a board of county commissioners in the several counties of this state, and to define their duties and powers," did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provided that each law enacted shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, because title gave notice of what the act sought to create and secondarily gave notice of powers and duties conferred on thing created. McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, 146 Pac. 756 (1914), cited, Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 450, 171 Pac. 511 (1918), In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 139, 253 Pac. 671 (1927)

Provision for emergency loans by county contained in act on reduction of county tax rate did not violate constitution. RL § 3831 (cf. NRS 354.430 and 354.618) and RL § 3832, providing for making by county of emergency loans and repayment of such loans, contained in act "relating to county government and the reduction of the rate of county taxation," were sufficiently related to title of such act to comply with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title. First Nat’l Bank v. Nye County, 38 Nev. 123, 145 Pac. 932 (1914), cited, Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 450, 171 Pac. 511 (1918), concurring opinion, In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 139, 253 Pac. 671 (1927)

Complete and independent acts held not to fall within section and may change prior statutes without referring to them. Where legislature seeks to amend act, it must comply with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that act as revised or section as amended shall be reenacted or republished at length, but subsequent, complete and independent acts are held almost universally not to be within terms of such constitutional provision and may modify or change prior statutes without referring to them. State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, 151 Pac. 944 (1915), cited, Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 208, at 217, 106 P.2d 751 (1940), Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, at 269, 428 P.2d 371 (1967)

Section did not apply where act regulating salaries of certain state employees was complete in itself and not amendatory. Act regulating salaries of certain state employees, which lowered salary of chief engineer of public service commission, was complete in itself and was not amendatory of previous act establishing powers of public service commission and providing for hiring of expert engineer and his salary. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that revised acts or amended sections be reenacted at length did not apply, and demurrer was sustained to petition for writ of mandamus to compel controller to pay such engineer higher salary. State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, 151 Pac. 944 (1915), cited, Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 208, at 217, 106 P.2d 751 (1940)

Act regulating primaries, conventions and nomination of party candidates was not void for containing more than one subject in title. Act entitled "An act regulating nomination of candidates by political parties, providing for holding of primaries and conventions, and regulating manner of nominating candidates by petition," was not void for containing more than one subject in violation of provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Turner v. Fogg, 39 Nev. 406, 159 Pac. 56 (1916)

Where statute related solely to subject of removal, challenge to court jurisdiction to remove sheriff from office on ground statute’s title violated constitution was without merit. In certiorari proceedings to review jurisdiction of district court to enter judgment removing county sheriff from office, contention that title of statute under which removal proceedings were held violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each act shall embrace but one subject which shall be briefly expressed in title, was without merit because statute related solely to subject of removal, even though it provided three distinct methods therefor. Gay v. Tenth Judicial Dist. Court, 41 Nev. 330, 171 Pac. 156, 173 Pac. 885 (1918), cited, Hawkins v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 248, at 253, 216 P.2d 601 (1950)

Contention that title of workmen’s compensation act violated constitution was untenable. In action by Nevada industrial commission against county to collect premiums alleged to be due under workmen’s compensation act, contention that title violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that every law shall embrace but one subject which shall be expressed in title, because it did not mention counties was untenable, and overruling of general demurrer was affirmed. Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, 171 Pac. 511 (1918)

Statute allowing electors in military to vote in accordance with repealed act held constitutional. Statute which provided that electors engaged in military service could vote in accordance with act approved May 14, 1899, which had been repealed, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that no law shall be revised or amended by its title only, and order overruling demurrer to complaint to enjoin secretary of state and lieutenant governor from complying with provisions of statute was reversed. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 Pac. 375 (1918)

Statute reviving repealed statute was not amendment or revision within meaning of constitution. "Amendment" is alteration effecting change in draft, or form, or substance of law already enacted or of bill proposed for enactment. Statute reviving former statute which had been repealed was not amendment or revision within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which prohibits amendment or revision of existing law by reference to title only. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 Pac. 375 (1918)

Revival of repealed statute by title was not within constitutional prohibition. Term "revive" as applied to legislative proceedings means reconference of validity, force and effect. Although revision or amendment by title only is prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 17, such prohibition does not extend to revival, and revival of repealed statute by title was not within constitutional prohibition. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 Pac. 375 (1918)

Title of act relating to organization and government of irrigation districts did not violate section. Title of ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS 539.010 et seq.), relating to organization and government of irrigation districts, contained but one general subject, organization of irrigation districts, and was not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that every act shall embrace but one subject. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), State v. Lincoln County Power Dist., 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941)

Section is mandatory but should be liberally construed. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, though mandatory, should be liberally construed. In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), cited, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 99, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Purpose of section is to prevent undesirable legislation through trickery or inattention. Purpose of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, is to prevent inconsiderate or undesirable legislation through trickery or inattention. In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), cited, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 99, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

To extent body of act was broader than its title it was unconstitutional. Where legislature passed act, title of which stated it was act to regulate issuance and revocation of licenses for businesses in unincorporated cities and towns, but body of act referred also to businesses outside of incorporated cities and towns, body of act was broader than title, and to this