Section. 1. Legislative power vested in senate and assembly. The Legislative authority of this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly which shall be designated "The Legislature of the State of Nevada" and the sessions of such Legislature shall be held at the seat of government of the State.

Where legislature has power to elect or appoint to office it has power to fill vacancy. Where legislature has power to elect or appoint to office, it has, by implication, power to fill vacancy in that office. Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75 (1865)

Legislative power of people of Nevada is limited only by Federal Constitution and state constitution. All political power is inherent in the people. Certain specific powers have been vested in Federal Government pursuant to U.S. Constitution. Remaining powers are retained by the people and are exercised through state governments. Legislative power of people of State of Nevada is vested in state legislature, and such power is unlimited except by federal Constitution and such restrictions as are expressly placed on it by state constitution. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283 (1869), cited, County of Pershing v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 78, at 93, 181 Pac. 960 (1919), Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, at 405, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, at 268, 428 P.2d 371 (1967)

Statute which empowered board of county commissioners to fix compensation of township officers was unlawful delegation of power. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 1, legislative authority of Nevada is vested in legislature, and, although Nev. Art. 4, § 20, provided that legislature had power to establish and regulate compensation of township officers, statute which empowered board of county commissioners to fix compensation of township officers was unlawful delegation of power, and duly elected, qualified and acting constable was entitled to be paid monthly salary of $150 under local act of legislature enacted a number of years before, rather than $125 pursuant to action of board of county commissioners under more recent act. Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), cited, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 411, at 413, 264 Pac. 696 (1928), distinguished, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 237, at 245, 255 Pac. 1073 (1927)

Statute requiring approval of municipal bond issue by majority of electors who owned real property and majority of electors who did not own real property did not violate separation of powers or legislative authority. Neither Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which divides government of state into three separate departments, nor Nev. Art. 4, § 1, which vests legislative authority of state in senate and assembly, was violated by statute which required that issuing of bonds by municipality be approved by majority of electors involved who were not real property owners, as well as by majority of electors involved who were owners of real property. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)

Subject of parole is within legislative authority. Subject of parole is within legislative authority given by Nev. Art. 4, § 1, to legislature. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824 (1960), cited, State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 485, at 487, 457 P.2d 217 (1969), Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 86 Nev. 252, at 256, 468 P.2d 350 (1970)

Statute prohibiting sale of commodity below resale price established by owner of trade-mark held unconstitutional as applied to seller who had not signed agreement to maintain price. Former NRS ch. 599, which prohibited sale of any commodity below minimum resale price established by owner of trade-mark, brand or trade name covering that commodity, was unconstitutional as applied to seller who had not signed any agreement to maintain resale price, because it violated Nev. Art. 1, § 1, guaranteeing rights in property, Nev. Art. 1, § 8, providing due process of law, and Nev. Art. 1, § 20, which provides that enumeration of rights does not impair or deny others retained by the people, and exceeded legislative authority conferred by Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964)

Police power. Police power of state to regulate businesses and grant or revoke licenses therefor is legislative within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, Republic Entertainment, Inc. v. Clark County Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd., 99 Nev. 811, at 815, 672 P.2d 634 (1983)

Definition of legislative power. As used in Nev. Art. 3, § 1, legislative power conferred by Nev. Art. 4, § 1, is power of lawmaking representative bodies to frame and enact laws, and to amend or repeal laws, and, unless there are specific constitutional limitations to contrary, laws are to be construed in favor of legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, AGO 94-24 (11-30-1994), AGO 95-13 (7-19-1995)

Extent of legislative power. All power of people not placed by constitution in executive or judicial departments is vested in legislative department created by Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967)

Enactment of local school support tax that increased sales and use tax authorized by referendum did not violate prohibition on amendment of referred law without approval of voters. In determining whether Nev. Art. 19, § 1, which prohibits amendment of referred law without approval of voters, had been violated where legislature enacted local school support tax law, NRS ch. 374, and in effect increased rate of sales and use tax which had been authorized by referendum of voters, it was necessary to pay deference to Nev. Art. 4, § 1, which vests lawmaking power in legislature, and to Nev. Art. 11, which requires legislature to provide for public education, and prohibition of Nev. Art. 19, § 1, was narrowly construed to accommodate other constitutional provisions. Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, 428 P.2d 371 (1967), cited, City of Las Vegas v. Mack, 87 Nev. 105, at 109, 481 P.2d 396 (1971), Westinghouse Beverage Group v. Department of Taxation, 101 Nev. 184, at 190, 698 P.2d 866 (1985)

Statute which gave district attorney discretion to charge defendant with felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor was unlawful delegation of legislative power. Criminal conviction of feloniously taking vehicle was reversed where former NRS 205.272 gave discretion to district attorney to charge defendant with felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor and thereby effected prohibited delegation of legislative power in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Lapinski v. State, 84 Nev. 611, 446 P.2d 645 (1968), distinguished, Hollander v. Warden, 86 Nev. 369, at 373, 468 P.2d 990 (1970), Nall v. Warden, 86 Nev. 489, at 490, 471 P.2d 218 (1970), Askew v. State, 89 Nev. 338, at 340, 513 P.2d 441 (1973), Jackson v. State, 93 Nev. 677, at 681, 572 P.2d 927 (1977)

No unlawful delegation of discretion to prosecutor in selection of penalty where statutes provided for separate offenses with different elements and penalties selected by court. Where defendant had been convicted of felony extortion under NRS 205.320, existence at time of former NRS 205.315 making malicious extortion a gross misdemeanor, did not constitute unconstitutional delegation of discretion to prosecutor to select penalty in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 1, because statutes provided for separate offenses with different elements, and penalty was selected by court under NRS 205.320 and fixed by law under former NRS 205.315. Nall v. Warden, 86 Nev. 489, 471 P.2d 218 (1970)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Attempt to delegate legislative power to Congress prohibited. Attempt to delegate legislative power to Congress violates Nev. Art. 4, § 1. AGO 17 (2-17-1923)

Legislature may not abdicate or transfer essential legislative functions. Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others essential legislative functions with which it is vested. AGO 188 (8-28-1935)

Legislative power may not be delegated to any officer or board. All legislative power is vested in legislature by constitution, and legislature cannot delegate this power to any officer or board. AGO 257 (5-26-1938)

Special act granting retirement payments to certain unqualified persons is valid exercise of legislative power. Legislature has power to enact any legislation which does not contravene constitution. Thus special act granting retirement payments to certain unqualified persons is valid exercise of legislative power. AGO 279 (6-14-1957)

Power granted to parole board by legislature is authorized by constitution. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 1, power granted to parole board by legislature is clearly authorized. AGO 228 (6-14-1961)

Section requiring vote of people to alter approved referendum measure applies only to referendum measures initiated by people. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 1, legislature has authority to refer legislation to vote of people on its own initiative, and may subsequently amend or repeal statutes so approved without further reference to the people, because provisions of Nev. Art. 19, § 1, requiring vote of people to alter approved referendum measure, applies only to referendum measures initiated by the people. AGO 190 (5-15-1975)

[Amended in 1889, 1958 and 1960. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1885 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1887 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held February 11, 1889. See: Statutes of Nevada 1885, p. 151; Statutes of Nevada 1887, p. 165. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1955 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1957 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1958 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 946; Statutes of Nevada 1957, p. 793. The third amendment was proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the general election of 1960.]

Legislature may not limit duration of or scope of matters to be considered at legislative session. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 2, relating to annual sessions of legislature, there is no authority for legislature to limit, by legislative enactment, scope of matters to be considered at legislative session or duration of legislative session. Such enactment would constitute amending Nevada constitution, which may be done only in manner prescribed by Nev. Art. 16, § 1. AGO 11 (2-19-1959)

Sec. 2. Biennial sessions of legislature; commencement and adjournment sine die; submission of proposed executive budget. [Effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election.]

3. The Governor shall submit the proposed executive budget to the Legislature not later than 14 calendar days before the commencement of each regular session.

[Amended in 1889, 1958 and 1960. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1885 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1887 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held February 11, 1889. See: Statutes of Nevada 1885, p. 151; Statutes of Nevada 1887, p. 165. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1955 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1957 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1958 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 946; Statutes of Nevada 1957, p. 793. The third amendment was proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the general election of 1960.]-(Amendment proposed and passed by the 1995 legislature and agreed to and passed by the 1997 legislature; effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election)

1. The members of the Assembly shall be chosen biennially by the qualified electors of their respective districts, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November and their term of office shall be two years from the day next after their election.

2. No person may be elected or appointed as a member of the Assembly who has served in that office, or at the expiration of his current term if he is so serving will have served, 12 years or more, from any district of this state.

[Amended in 1996. Proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the 1994 and 1996 general elections.]

No elector has right to vote for all assemblymen and senators. Although Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that qualified voters may vote for all officers including state assemblymen and state senators elected by people, no elector claims to exercise such right, because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, provide that assemblymen and senators be elected from their districts. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Prospective application of amendments to Nevada constitution limiting terms of office of certain public officers. Where initiative petition that amended Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, Nev. Art. 5, § 19, Nev. Art. 6, § 11 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3 by limiting terms of office of state officers and members of local governing bodies did not include language that amendments were retroactive in application, limitations on terms of office must be applied prospectively, become effective after vote is canvassed by Nevada supreme court pursuant to NRS 293.395 and apply only to officers elected after effective date of amendments. AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)

1. Senators shall be chosen at the same time and places as members of the Assembly by the qualified electors of their respective districts, and their term of Office shall be four Years from the day next after their election.

2. No person may be elected or appointed as a Senator who has served in that office, or at the expiration of his current term if he is so serving will have served, 12 years or more, from any district of this state.

No elector has right to vote for all assemblymen and senators. Although Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that qualified voters may vote for all officers including state assemblymen and state senators elected by people, no elector claims to exercise such right, because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, provide that assemblymen and senators be elected from their districts. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Legislature may provide for allotment of 2-year terms for senators when necessary to ensure election of one-half of senators every 2 years. Reapportionment statute, former NRS 218.030, which provided for allotment of 2- and 4-year terms of senators following election of whole senate as result of reapportionment, was constitutional because legislature has power under Nev. Art. 17, § 10, to provide for allotment of 2-year terms to members of senate when, but only when, such action is necessary to provide for election of one- half of their number every 2 years. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 4.) State ex rel. Herr v. Laxalt, 84 Nev. 382, 441 P.2d 687 (1968)

State senator who moves residence out of county after election not barred from serving his term. State senator, elected by electors of county in which he resides at time of election, is not barred from serving during his term even though he removes his residence, after election, to another county. (But see subsection 1(f) of NRS 283.040.) AGO 93 (8-11-1955)

Prospective application of amendments to Nevada constitution limiting terms of office of certain public officers. Where initiative petition that amended Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, Nev. Art. 5, § 19, Nev. Art. 6, § 11 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3 by limiting terms of office of state officers and members of local governing bodies did not include language that amendments were retroactive in application, limitations on terms of office must be applied prospectively, become effective after vote is canvassed by Nevada supreme court pursuant to NRS 293.395 and apply only to officers elected after effective date of amendments. AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)

Senators and members of the assembly shall be duly qualified electors in the respective counties and districts which they represent, and the number of senators shall not be less than one-third nor more than one-half of that of the members of the assembly.

It shall be the mandatory duty of the legislature at its first session after the taking of the decennial census of the United States in the year 1950, and after each subsequent decennial census, to fix by law the number of senators and assemblymen, and apportion them among the several counties of the state, or among legislative districts which may be established by law, according to the number of inhabitants in them, respectively.

[Amended in 1950 and 1970. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1947 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1949 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1950 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1947, p. 881; Statutes of Nevada 1949, p. 685. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1967 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1969 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1970 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1967, p. 1797; Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1723.]

Minimum age requirement of 21 to hold legislative office was not rendered unconstitutional by reduction of voting age to 18. Provisions of NRS 218,010, establishing minimum age of 21 years to qualify as candidate for legislative office, were not rendered unconstitutional by amendment to Nev. Art. 7, § 5, requiring senators and members of assembly to be qualified electors established minimum qualifications only, and did not prevent legislature from prescribing additional reasonable qualifications. Mengelkamp v. List, 88 Nev. 542, 501 P.2d 1032 (1972), cited, MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, at 305 (D Nev. 1993)

Provisions of Nevada constitution as adopted in 1864 were in harmony with requirements for legislative apportionment declared by U.S. Supreme Court. Provisions of Nevada constitution as adopted in 1864 were entirely in harmony with requirements for legislative apportionment as declared by U.S. Supreme Court in 1964. Dungan v. Sawyer, 250 F. Supp. 480 (D.C. Nev. 1965)

Provisions prescribing ratio of senators and assemblymen and limiting size of legislature are unconstitutional only if they prevent apportionment substantially according to population. Provisions of Nev. Arr. 4, § 5, prescribing ratio of number of senators and assemblymen and of Nev. Art. 15, § 6, limiting total number of members of legislature violated U.S. Constitution only if and to extent that under present or future distribution of population they would actually prevent apportionment of legislators substantially according to population. Dungan v. Sawyer, 250 F. Supp. 480 (D.C. Nev. 1965)

County commissioners may appoint qualified elector to fill legislative vacancy whether or not he is registered voter. Where person seeking appointment to fill vacancy in legislature meets all qualifications for electors as set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, county commissioners may appoint him whether he is registered voter or not. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)

Vacancy is created where assemblyman ceases to be resident of county that elected him. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 5, NRS 283.040 and former NRS 292.070, relating to residence requirements for assemblymen, vacancy is created where assemblyman ceases to be resident of county from which he was elected. AGO 70 (7-16-1959)

Assemblyman who lives and works out of county but retains home in county may retain legislative office. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 5, NRS 283.040 and former NRS 292.070, relating to residence requirements for assemblymen, assemblyman who lives, works and rents house in county other than one from which he was elected, but has not disposed of his home in county he represents or otherwise indicated intent to abandon his residence there, may retain his legislative office. AGO 70 (7-16-1959)

Legislature must reapportion at first regular session following each decennial census. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 5, legislature must reapportion at first regular session following each decennial census provided it deems then available data sufficiently definitive to provide basis for reapportionment in compliance with "one man, one vote: mandate. Otherwise, reapportionment must be accomplished at special session to be called after necessary data is available. AGO 18 (3-15-1971)

Names of underage candidates for legislature are not required to be placed on ballots. Where candidates for senator and assemblyman were disqualified because they were under age prescribed by NRS 218.010, provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 6, that each house shall judge qualifications of its members did not require that candidates’ names be placed on ballot. Mangelkamp v. List, 88 Nev. 542, 501 P.2d 1032 (1972)

Legislature not courts determine whether legislator who accepts executive position has implicitly resigned from legislature. Where legislator accepts appointment in executive department, legislature has authority to determine whether acceptance of executive position acts as implied resignation of legislative office. Courts have no jurisdiction over such matters. AGO 183 (7-9-1952)

Courts may not review power of legislature to judge qualifications of its members. Power of legislature to judge qualifications of members is final and not subject to review by courts. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)

(Amendment proposed and passed by the 1995 legislature and agreed to and passed by the 1997 legislature; effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election)

Sec: 7. Punishment of nonmember. Either House, during the session, may punish, by imprisonment, any person not a member, who shall have been guilty of disrespect to the House by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; but such imprisonment shall not extend beyond the final adjournment of the session.

Sec: 8. Senators and assemblymen ineligible for certain offices. No Senator or member of Assembly shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, nor for one year thereafter be appointed to any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term, except such office as may be filled by elections by the people.

Senator not prevented from accepting employment as superintendent for exposition. Superintendent employed by board of directors for Nevada of Panama-Pacific and Panama- California expositions pursuant to statutory authority was not state officer and Nev. Art. 4, § 8, did not prevent state senator from accepting such employment. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915)

Word "office" may not be accorded broader meaning than in constitutional provision unless context requires. Where word "office" is frequently used in statute in context beyond its normal meaning, court is justified in according it broader meaning than its true definition imports, but such proposition is not authority for giving word "office" broader meaning than normal as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which disqualifies legislators for certain offices, in absence of context which would affect its proper meaning. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915)

Framers recognized distinction between "officer" and "employee" as used in provision prohibiting legislators from holding certain civil offices. Recognition by constitutional convention of distinction between "officer" and "employee" in Nev. Art. 4, § 28, is evidence that it was aware of such distinction in Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits members of legislature from holding civil office of profit created during their term, and that it was intended to exclude mere employment from such prohibition. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS.

Elected officers may hold appointive office provided office not created during their terms in legislature. Elected officer may hold appointive office, and draw salaries for both, provided appointment does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits senators and assemblymen from appointment to offices which have been created, or compensation for which has been increased, during their terms in legislature or for 1 year thereafter. AGO (1-30-1911)

Member of legislature that created state commission may not serve on commission during his term or 1 year thereafter. Member of legislature which created state commission, and provided for compensation and expenses for commissioners, may not serve as member of commission during his term of office or for 1 year thereafter. Nev. Art. 4, § 8. AGO 71 (10-18-1921)

Employment security department cannot use appropriated funds to replace salary paid to member of legislature who unlawfully accepted job with unemployment division. Where member of legislature takes job with unemployment division in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 8, and is paid salary from federal funds, employment security department cannot use funds appropriated in subsequent years to replace salary, nor has legislature power to make appropriation for this purpose as such appropriation would constitute expenditure of money in violation of constitution. AGO 23 (4-13-1943)

Appointment of legislator as executive secretary of local housing authority not prohibited. Appointment of legislator as executive secretary of local housing authority is not appointment to civil office of profit prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 8, for creation, tenure and compensation of such office is determined by local housing authority, not by legislature, even though legislature created local authority. AGO 48 (6-7- 1943)

Member of legislature that created office of deputy labor commissioner in 1943 permitted to accept position in 1945. Where legislature creates office of deputy labor commissioner in 1943, providing for expiration of office in 1945, and 1945 legislature continues office at same salary, legislator who was member at both sessions may be appointed to office in 1945, since office was created in 1943 and salary was not raised by subsequent legislature. AGO 239 (11-7-1945)

Legislator may not serve on commission created during his term nor for 1 year thereafter. Legislator may not serve on commission created during his term of office nor for 1 year thereafter because of prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 8. AGO 736 (4-12-1949)

State senator prohibited from accepting office of tax commissioner. Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, prohibits state senator from accepting office of tax commissioner while he remains senator. AGO 28 (3- 12-1951)

Offices of state senator and tax commissioner are incompatible. Offices of state senator and tax commissioner are incompatible under common law principles and cannot be held by same person. AGO 28 (3-12-1951)

Legislator who increases salary of chairman of industrial insurance commission cannot be appointed to such office in same year. Member of legislature which increases salary of chairman of industrial insurance commission cannot be appointed to such office within same year. AGO 108 (10-22-1951)

Legislator who increases compensation of deputy county assessor cannot be appointed to such office during his term. Member of legislature which increases compensation of office of deputy county assessor cannot thereafter, during his term, accept appointment to such office. AGO 353 (11-24-1954)

Position of maintenance engineer and building inspector for school district is not civil office for profit. Position of maintenance engineer and building inspector for school district is not civil office of profit within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 8. AGO 62 (5- 17-1955)

Appointment of legislator who has resigned from legislature to any state civil office will not be rendered invalid by increase in emoluments of such office by next legislative session. Restriction imposed by Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits appointment of legislators to any state civil office of profit which was created or emoluments of which were increased during term for which such legislator was elected, must be strictly construed, and since restriction goes to appointment and not to incumbency, appointment of legislator who has resigned from legislature to any state civil office will not be rendered invalid by increase in emoluments of such office by next-succeeding legislative session, notwithstanding such session takes place during term for which such legislator was elected. AGO 25 (3-23-1959)

Legislator may not accept position in executive department the emoluments of which were increased by legislature during his term until 1 year after his term. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 8, relating to appointment of legislator to civil office of profit within state, legislator may not be appointed to position in executive department the emoluments of which were increased by legislature of which he was a member, until 1 year after his resignation from legislature or expiration of his term. AGO 95 (9-28-1959)

Legislator may seek election to civil office for profit created during his legislative term. Nev. Art. 4, § 8, relating to appointment of legislator to civil office of profit created during term such legislator served, does not prohibit any such legislator from seeking election to any such office. AGO 151 (4-8-1960)

Member of legislature may accept position in classified service or as superintendent of public instruction. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which forbids appointment of legislator to office which has been created or its emoluments increased during his term of office, member of legislature may accept position in classified service where salary schedule is established by personnel division of department of administration or as superintendent of public instruction where salary is set by state board of education. (But see Nev. Art. 3, § 1.) AGO 280 (11-24-1965)

Where statute was amended to change title of position without changing duties, no new position was created. Where NRS 385.310 et seq. were amended to change title of position to assistant superintendent of public instruction for administration, without changing duties, no new position was created within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits appointment of legislators to certain offices. AGO 293 (1-5-1966)

Sec: 9. Federal officers ineligible for state office; exceptions. No person holding any lucrative office under the Government of the United States or any other power, shall be eligible to any civil office of Profit under this State; Provided, that Post-Masters whose compensation does not exceed Five Hundred dollars per annum, or commissioners of deeds, shall not be deemed as holding a lucrative office.

Federal officers disqualified from serving as state attorney general. Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which disqualifies federal officers from state office, is not limited to legislative offices and includes the office of attorney general notwithstanding eligibility of "any elector" under Nev. Art. 5, § 19. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867)

U.S. District Attorney ineligible for office of Nevada attorney general. One who holds office of U.S. District Attorney on date of election of attorney general of State of Nevada is ineligible for latter office. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 9.) State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Where candidate for state attorney general mailed resignation from U.S. District Attorney Office day before election, he was not ineligible for office of attorney general. Where candidate for attorney general placed in mails day before election unconditional resignation from office of U.S. District Attorney, he was not ineligible for office of attorney general under Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which disqualifies federal officer from state office. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867)

Meaning of "eligible" as used in section. The word "eligible" in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which disqualifies federal officers from state office, means both incapable of being legally chosen and incapable of legally holding. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 566 (1867), cited, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, at 338, 31 Pac. 545 (1892), State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, at 173, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Offices of notary public and receiver of public money for U.S. land office are incompatible. Office of notary public is civil office of profit within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding any lucrative office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any "civil office of this state," and offices of notary public and receiver of public money in United States land office were incompatible under such provision. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

"Eligible" refers to officers who hold civil office by appointment as well as election. Word "eligible," as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which provides that no person holding any lucrative office under government of United States or any other power shall be eligible to any civil office of profit under this state, refers to officers who hold such civil office by appointment as well as by election. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

Notary public is civil office. Language of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding any lucrative office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any civil office of profit in this state, clearly includes office of notary public as civil office, and court could not speculate further as to what real intentions of drafters were. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

"Civil office" includes officers connected with the civil administration of government, not military officers. Words "civil office" as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any civil office of profit under this state, refer only to such officers as are connected with civil administration of government, and were doubtless to include all such, to the exclusion of military officers. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

Word "office" in section does not include president, trustees, executors or deputies of corporation. Sometimes "office" and "civil office" would include president and trustees of corporation, executors or deputies, but no such meaning could be attached to such words under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any "civil office" under this state. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

Makers of the constitution had power to include office of notary public as civil office within meaning of section. It was within power of makers of constitution, whether or not sufficient reason existed for their so doing, to include office of notary public as civil office within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, making persons holding any lucrative office under Federal Government or any other power ineligible to any civil office of profit in state. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, 31 Pac. 545 (1892)

State senator's acceptance of appointment as U.S. Army paymaster created vacancy in senator's office. State senator who accepted appointment as paymaster in United States Army became incapable of holding office of senator by provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 9. His acceptance was resignation of state office and created vacancy in such office. Election of successor was valid without issuance of writ of election as provided by statute because no session of legislature was to take place before next general election and because appointment of senator to United States post was of great public notoriety in his county. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)

Postmaster with annual income exceeding $500 prevented from acting as notary public. Postmaster with annual income in excess of $500 is prevented from acting as notary public by Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which prevents federal officer from holding "civil office of profit under this state." AGO (6-4-1900)

Reversed, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

U.S. Postmaster receiving more than $500 per year must resign before general election or cannot be chosen for justice of the peace. U.S. Postmaster receiving more than $500 per year may be nominated for justice of the peace, but if he has not resigned at time for general election, he cannot legally be chosen, nor can he legally hold office of justice of the peace, because of prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO (9-2-1910)

U.S. Postmaster whose compensation does not exceed $500 may serve as notary public. U.S. Postmaster is eligible to hold office of notary public only if compensation as Postmaster does not exceed $500 per year. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 9 and NRS 240.010.) AGO (11-8-1911)

Reversed, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Statute stating what an officer should be paid does not constitute an appropriation of that amount. Statute which states officer ". . . shall receive a salary not to exceed $1,800 per annum, and necessary traveling expenses, payable out of the general fund of the State of Nevada . . ." does not constitute an appropriation, and state controller cannot legally draw warrant on treasury for salary or expenses. AGO (4-17-1912)

Primary election is not election for state and county officers contemplated by section. Primary election is not such election for state and county officers as is contemplated by Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO 137 (8-26-1914)

Mail route contractor does not hold U.S. Government office. Star mail route contractor cannot be considered as holding "office" under U.S. Government within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, prohibiting United States officeholders from holding state offices. AGO 2 (1-6-1917)

District judge may not accept appointment as U.S. Commissioner. Nev. Art. 4, § 9, prohibits district judge from accepting appointment as United States Commissioner. AGO 211 (7-31-1918)

County commissioner is civil office of profit. County commissioner is "civil office of profit under this state" within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9; thus commissioner becomes ineligible for office if he accepts federal job. AGO 109 (12-27-1923)

Holder of lucrative office in U.S. Government is ineligible to serve as election officer. Person holding lucrative office under U.S. Government is ineligible to serve as election officer. AGO 316 (9-1-1928)

Acceptance of appointment as Special Assistant to Attorney General for $1 per year does not violate section. Acceptance of appointment as Special Assistant to the Attorney General in connection with Selective Service Act at $1 per year is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 9, which prohibits state officer from holding lucrative office under United States. AGO 367 M (12-17-1942)

Public officer inducted into Army is not U.S. Government officer within meaning of section. Public officer inducted into Army as private is not officer of U.S. Government within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO 1 (1-16-1943)

Public officer inducted into military who assigns his compensation and takes no part in conduct of his office is not holding civil office for profit. Public officer inducted into military service who assigns his compensation and takes no part in conduct of his office is not considered, during period of military service, as holding "civil office of profit within state" so as to disqualify him under Nev. Art. 4, § 9. AGO 1 (1-16-1943)

"Office" means public employment by appointment with tenure, emolument and duties. Word "office" in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, means public employment conferred by appointment with tenure, emolument and duties. Thus sheriff who merely contracts with U.S. Government to carry mail is not holding federal office so as to become ineligible to act as sheriff. AGO 302 (5-22-1946)

"Office" or "officer" does not include employee. Where word "office" or "officer" appears in Nevada constitution, it does not mean or include term employee. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 9) AGO 229 (12-11-1956), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Employee of U.S. may be appointed notary public. Word "office" in Nev. Art. 4, § 9, does not include employees. Thus employee of U.S. may be appointed notary public. (See also NRS 240.010.) AGO 229 (12-11-1956), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Federal officer ineligible to hold office of school district trustee where trustees are paid. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 9, prohibiting federal officer from holding civil office of profit under state, federal officer was ineligible to hold office of school district trustee in district where trustees are paid salary for attendance at meetings. See also AGO 229 (12-11-1956). AGO 670 (7-1-1970), but see AGO 5 (1-26-1971)

Federal employee may hold state civil office. Nev. Art. 4, § 9 does not preclude employee, as distinguished from officer, of federal government from holding civil office of profit with state or political subdivision, Federal employee may legally serve as school district trustee. AGO 5 (1-26-1971)

Secretary of state may appoint U.S. Postmaster to be notary public. Appointment by secretary of state of U.S. Postmaster to be notary public does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 9 because Postmaster is no longer holder of office of profit appointed by U.S. President but rather employee of Federal Government. (See also NRS 244.010.) AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Sec: 10. Embezzler of public money ineligible for office; disqualification for bribery. Any person who shall be convicted of the embezzlement, or defalcation of the public funds of this State or who may be convicted of having given or offered a bribe to procure his election or appointment to office, or received a bribe to aid in the procurement of office for any other person, shall be disqualified from holding any office of profit or trust in this State; and the Legislature shall, as soon as practicable, provide by law for the punishment of such defalcation, bribery, or embezzlement as a felony.

Section requires conviction of bribery before one is disqualified. Where defeated candidate for district attorney contested election of his opponent under statute which provided that elector could contest election of officer not eligible to hold such office, and alleged that defendant had offered to return portion of his salary if elected and offered to give bond guaranteeing such promise, but did not allege that defendant had been convicted of giving or offering bribe to procure election, demurrer was properly sustained, because Nev. Art. 4, § 10, requires that one be convicted before being disqualified for such offense. Egan v. Jones, 21 Nev. 433, 32 Pac. 929 (1893)

Sec: 11. Privilege of members: Freedom from arrest on civil process. Members of the Legislature shall be privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of the Legislature, and for fifteen days next before the commencement of each session.

Sec. 12. Vacancy. In case of the death or resignation of any member of the legislature, either senator or assemblyman, the county commissioners of the county from which such member was elected shall appoint a person of the same political party as the party which elected such senator or assemblyman to fill such vacancy; provided, that this section shall apply only in cases where no biennial election or any regular election at which county officers are to [be] elected takes place between the time of such death or resignation and the next succeeding session of the legislature.

Fact that legislature did not enact legislation for special election after repeal of provision for such election was significant in construing term "general election" in section. In construing term "general election" used in Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, it was at least significant that legislature promptly enacted legislation after adoption of original provision of that section of constitution which provided for special election to fill vacancy in office of state legislator, and that after such legislation was, by constitutional amendment of 1922, repealed by implication, no such legislation for special election was enacted. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940)

"General election" means election at which state senators are ordinarily elected. It was intention of legislature that term "general election" used in Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, means general election at which state senators are ordinarily elected. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940), cited, Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, at 502, 275 P.2d 376 (1954), AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

Vacancy in office of state senator is to be filled by appointment until next quadrennial election for that office. Where vacancy by resignation occurs in office of state senator, office is to be filled by election at next quadrennial election for that office, and vacancy is to be filled by appointment until that time, even though biennial general election occurs between time of resignation and next session of legislature, because term "general election," as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, pertaining to filling of vacancies in offices of state senator, means general election at which state senators are ordinarily elected. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940), cited, Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, at 502, 275 P.2d 376 (1954), AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

General election is when senators are ordinarily elected and not necessarily next biennial election. Fact that holding that term "general election" used in proviso of Nev. Art. 4, § 12, as amended 1922, means general election at which state senators are ordinarily elected and not necessarily next biennial general election would make operation of proviso remote would not make proviso a vain act, because it is enough that contingency could arise in which proviso would be operative under the holding. Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 107 P.2d 307 (1940)

Appointment to fill vacancy must be made from district in which vacancy occurs. Assemblymen of Nye County are to be elected by vote of electors of entire county. Appointment to fill vacancy in office must be made from assembly district in which vacancy occurs. AGO 5 (1-28-1955)

County commissioners may fill senate vacancy only if legislative session intervenes between vacancy and next general election. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 12, county commissioners, in filling vacancy occasioned by death or resignation of state senator, have power to appoint only if session of legislature intervenes between vacancy and next general election, and term of appointed senator can last only until next general election. AGO 84 (7-18-1955)

County commissioners may appoint qualified elector to fill legislative vacancy whether or not he is registered voter. Where person seeking appointment to fill vacancy in legislature meets all qualifications for electors as set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, county commissioners may appoint him whether he is registered voter or not. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)

Legislative vacancy shall be filled at general election unless legislative session convenes before general election. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 12, relating to filling of vacancies in legislature, board of county commissioners may fill any such vacancy only when legislative session convenes prior to general election; otherwise any such vacancy shall be filled at such election. AGO 166 (6-21-1960)

Sec: 13. Quorum; compelling attendance. A majority of all the members elected to each House shall constitute a quorum to transact business, but a smaller number may adjourn, from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each house may prescribe.

Sec: 14. Journal. Each House shall keep a journal of its own proceedings which shall be published and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall at the desire of any three members present, be entered on the journal.

[Amended in 1994. Proposed and passed by the 1991 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1993 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1994 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1991, p. 2573; Statutes of Nevada 1993, p. 2974.]

Provisions do not apply to committees of either house. Assembly resolution that suspended standing rule which required that all meetings of standing committee be open to public did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 15, because provisions of section do not apply to committees of either house. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. State Legislature, 104 Nev. 672, 765 P.2d 1142 (1988)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Adjournment from Thursday to Monday without consent of other house does not violate section. Adjournment from Thursday to following Monday without consent of other house is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 15, because such adjournment is considered as lasting only 3 days. AGO (1-27-1911)

Constitution does not require committee meetings to be open and public. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 15, relating to public legislative sessions, and NRS ch. 241, relating to open meetings of public agencies, do not require legislative committee meetings to be open and public. Houses of legislature or individual legislative committees may provide rules governing open and closed committee sessions. AGO 113 (2-1-1973)

Sec: 16. Bills may originate in either house; amendment. Any bill may originate in either House of the Legislature, and all bills passed by one may be amended in the other.

Sec: 17. Act to embrace one subject only; title; amendment. Each law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter, properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only; but, in such case, the act as revised or section as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.

Example of sufficient connection between statute’s title and subject of section. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, there was sufficient connection between statute entitled ". . . an act to create counties and establish the boundaries thereof," and provision which required one county to pay $15,000 to another in connection with change in boundaries. Humboldt County v. County Comm’rs, 6 Nev. 30 (1870), cited, State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, at 443 (1880), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 238, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 241, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Only principal subject embodied in law need be expressed in title. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, it is necessary to express in title only principal subject embodied in law, and matters properly connected therewith need not be mentioned. Humboldt County v. County Comm’rs, 6 Nev. 30 (1870), cited, State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, at 443 (1880), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 238, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 412, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 241, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Title may be considered in construing statute. Title of statute (see Nev. Art. 4, § 17) may be considered in construing statute. Torreyson v. Board of Examiners, 7 Nev. 19 (1871), cited, A Minor Girl v. Clark County Juvenile Court Servs., 87 Nev. 544, at 548, 490 P.2d 1248 (1971), Thompson v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 100 Nev. 352, at 354, 683 P.2d 17 (1984), see also O’Donnell v. Perry, 100 Nev. 356, 683 P.2d 12 (1984), Roberts v. University of Nevada Sys., 104 Nev. 33, 752 P.2d 221 (1988), AGO 91-6 (5-23-1991), AGO 95-24 (12-31-1995)

Details of legislative act need not be specifically stated in title. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith which subject shall be expressed briefly in title, does not require that details of legislative act be specifically stated in title, but allows inclusion of matter germane to subject and adapted to accomplishment of object in view. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874), cited, State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 344, 10 Pac. 901 (1886)

Provisions for recording fees and penalties for neglect of duty by recorder were properly connected with act regulating marks and brands of stock. Provisions for recording fees and penalties for willful neglect of duty by recorder in act entitled "an act to regulate marks and brands of stock" were matters properly connected with purpose and enforcement of act, and could properly be included in act under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874)

Purpose of section is to prevent misleading of legislature and public. Purpose of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject which shall be expressed briefly in title, is to prevent combination of subjects which have no proper relation, and which could not be carried separately, in order that legislature and public will not be misled. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874), cited, Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194, at 201 (1881), State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 344, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, at 390, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 237, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 405, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, at 258, 52 Pac. 274 (1898)

Provisions of act that bore no relation to title of act were void. Where act entitled "an act to regulate marks and brands of stock" included penalties for unlawful killing of stock, such provisions bore no proper relation to regulation of marks and brands and were void under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227 (1874), cited, State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, at 253 (1875), State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, at 30 (1880), State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913), distinguished, Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 284, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407 (1909), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Statute entitled as supplementary to another act did not violate section. Statute entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled ‘An act concerning crimes and punishments,’ " did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, because statute to which it was supplementary concerned subject of crimes and related matter of punishments, and both were briefly expressed in title. State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439 (1880), cited, State ex rel. School Trustees v. County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, at 102, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), State v. Ceja, 53 Nev. 272, at 281, 298 Pac. 658 (1931)

Where title fairly indicates subject of statute and affords clue to contents, constitutional requirements are satisfied. Where title of statute truly and fairly indicates in general terms the subject of statute, nothing is contained in statute which is not suggested by its title, and title affords clue to contents, statute fulfills requirements of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439 (1880)

Section is mandatory but should be liberally construed. Requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, that each law embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, is mandatory, but should be liberally construed. Purpose of such provision is to prevent surprise or fraud upon legislature by means of provisions in bills of which titles give no intimation, and to apprise the public of subjects of legislation under consideration. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27 (1880), cited, State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, at 102, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, at 308, 30 Pac. 896 (1883), State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 345, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), State ex rel. Dunn v. Humboldt County, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 407, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 473, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), on rehearing, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 111 Pac. 770 (1911), Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 450, 171 Pac. 511 (1918), In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, at 348, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), Ex parte Mantell & Raigen, 47 Nev. 95, at 107, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), dissenting opinion, In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 139, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

If two incongruous subjects are embraced in same act, whole act is void. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, if two incongruous subjects are embraced in same act, whole act is void, and even where only one subject is embraced in act, if its title has been unnecessarily made so restrictive as not to cover whole subject, such parts of act as are not included in title must fail. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27 (1880), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 407, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion at 412, State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913), In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937)

Statute aimed at suppressing opium dens did not embrace more than one subject in violation of section. Object of ch. 27, Stats. 1877, as amended by ch. 116, Stats. 1879, was suppression of places commonly known as opium dens. Provisions of statute do not embrace more than one subject in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27 (1880), cited, State v. On Gee How, 15 Nev. 184, at 187 (1880), State v. County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, at 102, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), State v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, at 345, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Statute relating to care of insane which provided loan to erect asylum was not in conflict with section. Statute relating to care of insane which provided for loan from state school fund to erect asylum was not in conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that each statute shall embrace but one subject. Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194 (1881), cited, Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 288, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 415, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 104, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), dissenting opinion, Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Calif. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Where different steps of act are minor parts of same general subject, act is not in conflict with section. Where different steps of act by which result is to be accomplished are not different subjects but minor parts of same general subject, act is not in conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject. Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194 (1881), cited, Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 288, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 415, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 104, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), dissenting opinion, Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Calif. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Statute which authorized transfer of surplus money from certain funds to others did not violate section. Statute which authorized county to transfer surplus money from bond interest and sinking fund to school fund, and from courthouse bond fund to general fund, although it covered transfer of money from two different funds, embraced only subject of transfer of surplus money from one fund to another, and therefore did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. Board of County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Statute which directed transfer of surplus money from two different funds embraced only one subject and did not violate section. Statute entitled "An Act to authorize the county commissioners of Storey County to transfer certain funds," which directed transfer of surplus money from two different funds, contained nothing which was not suggested by title and embraced only subject of transfer of surplus money from one fund to another, and therefore did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. Board of County Comm’rs, 17 Nev. 96, 28 Pac. 122 (1882), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Statute fixing salaries of county officers embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith and did not violate section. Statute entitled "An act fixing salaries of the various county officers in the several counties of this state, and other matters relating thereto," which contained section authorizing county commissioners to transfer from general fund to salary fund sufficient sums to meet all warrants drawn against salary fund, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, because statute embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and subject was briefly expressed in title. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, 30 Pac. 896 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 416, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 312, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Where act to redistrict state was not as briefly expressed as it might have been but was not misleading, act did not violate section. Although title "An act to redistrict the State of Nevada, prescribe the number and salaries of district judges, and fix the places of holding courts" was not as briefly expressed as it might have been, act did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title. Object of act was to redistrict state, and additions made to such object in title were not misleading, because they related to matters which were germane to redistricting of state. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), cited, State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 474, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Where details of act are unnecessarily expressed in title, legislature not prohibited from including details germane to act not named in title. Where some of details of act are unnecessarily expressed in title, Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, does not prohibit legislature from including in provisions of act other details not named in title which are germane to subject of act, and adapted to accomplishment of object in view. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 Pac. 901 (1886)

Where all matters embraced in act to redistrict state were adapted to secure such object, act did not violate section. Act entitled "An act to redistrict the State of Nevada, prescribe the number and salaries of district judges, and fix the places of holding courts" did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which declares that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, because act had but one general object, that of redistricting state, and all matters embraced in act were adapted to secure such object. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 10 Pac. 901 (1886), cited, State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, at 390, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, at 286, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 239, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 416, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 312, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Amendatory act cannot include any other subject than that embraced in act to be amended. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, amendatory act cannot include any other subject than that embraced in act to be amended, and matter properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Title of act to be amended must be referred to in amendatory act and amended act must be reenacted and published at length. In order to comply with provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, not only must title of act to be amended be referred to in amendatory act, but sections as amended must be reenacted and published at length. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887)

Where act attempted to amend two separate acts and court could not determine which portion of amendment would have passed without other, entire amendatory act declared void. Where act which attempted to amend two separate acts, one relating to salaries of certain state officers, and other relating to salaries of justices of supreme court, violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, and it was evident that one portion of amendatory act was especially designed as inducement for passage of other, and court could not determine, from inspection of act, which portion, if either, would have been passed without other, it was duty of court to declare entire amendatory act void. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887)

Act which attempted to amend one act regulating salaries of state officers and another act regulating salaries of justices of the supreme court declared void. Where legislature passed act fixing salaries of justices of supreme court and act reducing and regulating salaries of certain state officers and attaches of state government, act passed during subsequent session entitled "An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act reducing and regulating the salaries of certain state officers, justices of the supreme court and attaches of the state government,’ " violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 408, 41 Pac. 145 (1895)

Amendatory act which did not properly refer to act sought to be amended violated provision that no law be amended by reference to its title only. Where legislature passed act entitled "An act reducing and regulating the salaries of certain state officers and attaches," subsequent act entitled "An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act reducing and regulating the salaries of certain state officers, justices of the supreme court and attaches,’ " did not properly refer to act sought to be amended, and violated provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, that no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only, which does not authorize legislature to dispense with reference to title of act sought to be amended. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 12 Pac. 832 (1887), distinguished, State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, at 491, 151 Pac. 944 (1915)

Legislature could include different kinds of businesses that bore no relation to each other in act fixing closing time for saloons and gaminghouses. Act entitled "An act fixing the time for the opening and closing of saloons and gaminghouses" did not embrace more than one subject in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Subject, which is briefly and correctly expressed in title, is closing of certain kinds of licensed businesses during certain hours. Within such subject the legislature could include different kinds of businesses which bear no relation to each other, except that they must all come within power of legislature to regulate, restrict or abolish. Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 416, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 474, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977), distinguished, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 407, 41 Pac. 145 (1895)

Act held unconstitutional where title was so narrow as to be misleading and act embraced more than one subject. Portions of act entitled "An act defining the duties of state controller" which sought to impose penalties against other officers for failure to remit collections to state controller were unconstitutional because title was so narrow as to be misleading and act embraced more than one subject in contravention of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Hoadley, 20 Nev. 317, 22 Pac. 99 (1889), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 408, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Purpose of title is to give notice of subject of law. Purpose of title is to give notice of subject of law. Title "An act defining the duties of state controller" sufficiently expresses its subject so far as it relates to duties of state controller, but is inadequate to give notice of provisions imposing penalties on other officers delinquent in settlements with state controller. State v. Hoadley, 20 Nev. 317, 22 Pac. 99 (1889), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 408, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 475, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Matters properly connected with subject need not be mentioned in title. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, matters properly connected with subject need not be mentioned in title, and if they are, it simply makes title unnecessarily prolix, but does not constitute connected matter a separate subject or otherwise invalidate law. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, at 283, 30 P.2d 284 (1934), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

One act consolidating two county offices and fixing salaries of officers therein was not prohibited. Fixing of salaries of officers in, and consolidation of two offices of, certain county were not separate, distinct, independent propositions, having no connection with each other, which had been thrown together in same bill, and act containing such provisions did not come within mischief against which Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each law to one subject, was directed. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892)

Liberal rules of construction sustaining laws not coming within spirit and meaning of constitutional prohibition are necessary. As there is scarcely subject of legislation that cannot be divided into various heads, connection between which may be controversial, and seldom has validity of law been seriously questioned without claim of conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject, adoption of liberal rules of construction to sustain laws not coming within spirit and meaning of such constitutional prohibition is necessary. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, dissenting opinion at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

One object of provision was to prevent uniting several independent disconnected matters in one act. One of the objects of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, was to prevent uniting in one act of several independent, disconnected matters, because such unification makes possible the mustering of sufficient strength to pass act by obtaining support of all interested in each matter. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892)

Objections should be grave and conflict with constitution great before judiciary should disregard enactment on ground it embraces more than one subject. Objections should be grave, and conflict between statute and Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, should be palpable before judiciary should disregard legislative enactment upon sole ground that it embraces more than one subject. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Calif. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 241, 75 P.2d 727 (1938), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Only subject of act must be stated in title. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, it is only subject of act which must be stated in title, and matters properly connected with that subject need not be mentioned. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Object of section was to prevent fraud and surprise upon legislature and the people. Object of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each act to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, was to prevent uniting in one act of several independent and disconnected matters, and to prevent fraud and surprise upon members of legislature and the people. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Section should be construed to correct evil against which it is directed but not to thwart honest efforts at legislation. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each law to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, should be construed so as to correct evil against which it is directed, but at same time so as not needlessly to thwart honest efforts at legislation. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 404, dissenting opinion at 410, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Statute which defined embezzlement but did not attempt to amend another statute relating to embezzlement by certain persons was constitutionally valid. Although statute which amends other statutes without reenacting or publishing them at length, as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 17, would be absolute failure, ch. 76, Stats. 1887 (cf. NRS 205.300), defining embezzlement as appropriation of property for any purpose other than that for which it was entrusted, was not attempted amendment of BH § 4634 or 4635 (cf. NRS 205.305 and 205.300), relating to embezzlement by clerks, servants, apprentices and bailees, and was constitutionally valid. State v. Trolson, 21 Nev. 419, 32 Pac. 930 (1893)

Statute defining embezzlement and fixing punishment embraced only one subject. Ch. 76, Stats. 1887 (cf. NRS 205.300), defining embezzlement and fixing punishment for such crime, embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith and did not contravene Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Trolson, 21 Nev. 419, 32 Pac. 930 (1893)

Where title of amendatory act mentioned only one section of former act but actually amended two former sections, amendment of such two additional sections held unconstitutional. Where title of act stated it was act to amend one particular section of former act, but body of amendatory act also purported to amend two additional sections of former act, such two additional sections were unconstitutional under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting each law to one subject and requiring that title express subject. Ex parte Hewlett, 22 Nev. 333, 40 Pac. 96 (1895), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 405, distinguished at 412, 41 Pac. 145 (1895)

There is wide difference between liberal construction and nullification. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject, which shall be expressed in title, is to be liberally construed, to end that there shall be no unnecessary hampering of legislation, but there is wide difference between liberal construction and nullification. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 474, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Subject of act must be stated in title. Subject of act must be subject stated in title, and Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject and requiring that subject be expressed in title, does not say that all matters connected with purposes or objects of act may be contained in act, but only matter connected with subject stated in title. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

Title of act that was evasive in both letter and spirit of section embraced very evil against which section was directed. Act requiring county recorders to subscribe to one newspaper, and boards of county commissioners to print all legal advertising in such paper, but whose title merely indicated it was to amend act for purchase and preservation of newspapers, was evasive in both letter and spirit of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject, which shall be expressed in title, and embraced very evil against which that provision was directed. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Pac. 372, at 376, 136 Pac. 100 (1913), State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), distinguished, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Object of section was to defeat "log-rolling" legislation. Object of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, restricting laws to one subject, which shall be expressed in title, was to defeat "log-rolling" legislation, or combining in one act of incongruous and distinct subjects, and to prevent fraud upon members of legislature and general public by covering up, under innocent titles, vicious and harmful provisions, of which titles gave no hint. State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), cited, State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

Act incorporating town of Reno did not violate section. In proceeding in nature of quo warranto to determine constitutionality of act incorporating town of Reno, it was held that such act did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that each law enacted by legislature embrace but one subject, because the various provisions contained in act were reasonably and properly related to one another, and constituted integral parts of one general subject. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 Pac. 274 (1898), cited, State v. Lincoln County Power Dist. No. 1, 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941)

Where portions of act that covered subject not expressed in title were severable from act, act was not violation of section. Where first section of act provided for disincorporation of city, which was subject expressed in title, additional sections creating unincorporated town and providing for its government and payment of claims against city, if unrelated, were severable, and act was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899)

Law providing for removal of officers was not exempt from section. It was never intended that laws enacted by virtue of Nev. Art. 7, § 4, requiring that legislature provide for removal of officers, could be enacted differently from method prescribed for enactment of laws generally, and such law must comply with requirements of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, limiting each law to one subject and matter properly connected with it and requiring that subject be expressed in title. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875 (1905), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Where title of act related to elections, provisions relating to removal of officials contained in act violated constitutional limitation. Subject of removal of public officials from public office has no proper connection with that of their election within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, limiting each law to one subject and matter properly connected with it and requiring that subject be expressed in title, so that where act was entitled An act relating to elections, provisions included in such act which provided procedure for removal of public officers violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875 (1905), distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 472, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

Matter of election contests has proper connection with subject of elections within meaning of provision. Matter of election contests, as opposed to that of removal of public officials from office, has proper connection with subject of elections within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, limiting each law to one subject and matter properly connected with it and requiring that subject be expressed in title, and inclusion of provisions for such contests in act entitled "An act relating to elections," did not violate Nev. Art 4, § 17. Bell v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875 (1905), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 286, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Statute which included matter not in title of act was void and admission of prejudicial testimony under such statute amounted to reversible error. In prosecution for murder, where testimony not admissible under any other phase of law was admitted under statute which provided that verified transcript of testimony given at preliminary examination before committing magistrate was admissible on trial of case, and statute was void as in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, because it included matter not embraced in title of act, admission of such testimony was so prejudicial to defendant that it amounted to reversible error. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353, 96 Pac. 1057 (1908)

Section was violated where one statute attempted to amend another by simply referring to it. Where statute provided that transcript of testimony taken at preliminary examination before committing magistrate was admissible in evidence on trial of case, as prescribed by another statute which provided that by consent of parties, such testimony could be reduced to writing and used by either party on trial, but only under certain specified circumstances, former statute attempted to amend latter simply by referring to it, and therefore violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, under which no law may be amended by reference to its title only, but section as amended must be reenacted and published at length. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353, 96 Pac. 1057 (1908)

Section violated where subject matter of act was neither embraced in title of act nor germane to subject matter defined in title. Where act entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of stenographers upon the hearing of preliminary examinations before committing magistrates, and to regulate the compensation thereof" contained provision that verified transcript of testimony given at such hearings was admissible in evidence on trial of case, such provision violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, under which each law enacted by legislature must embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject must be briefly expressed in title, because subject matter of such provision was neither embraced in title of act, nor germane to subject matter defined in title. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 353, 96 Pac. 1057 (1908), distinguished, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, at 472, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909)

No necessity for separate designations in title for all different provisions of act relating to generic subject of banking. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in title, there was no necessity for requiring separate acts or even separate designations in title for all different provisions of act relating to generic subject of banking, even though title designated only one of matters with which others were properly connected. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 284, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, at 219, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, at 61, 146 Pac. 756 (1914), Turner v. Fogg, 39 Nev. 406, at 410, 159 Pac. 56 (1916), Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 442, 171 Pac. 511 (1918)

Where statute embraces more than one subject, part properly connected with title is valid, remainder may be unconstitutional. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that "each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith," where statute embraces more than one subject, part of statute which is properly connected with title is valid, although remainder may be held unconstitutional. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), cited, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 284, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Section is mandatory. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith is mandatory. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 31 Nev. 456, 103 Pac. 407, 105 Pac. 567 (1909), cited, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 284, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, at 348, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 198, 295 Pac. 770 (1931)

Statute dealing exclusively with subject of fees which public officers may charge for official services did not violate section. Act entitled "An act to regulate fees and compensation for official and other services in the State of Nevada" which prescribed fees and compensation for services allowable to various state officers including sheriff and constable, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, because act dealt exclusively with subject of fees which public officers may charge for official services and compensation which they may receive for services rendered in their official capacity. Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Part of act concerning public schools prohibiting house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse did not violate section. In act entitled "An act concerning public schools, and repealing certain acts relating thereto," inclusion of sections which made it illegal to keep house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), cited, State ex rel. Eggers v. Esser, 35 Nev. 429, at 435, 129 Pac. 557 (1913), Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, at 218, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, at 60, 146 Pac. 756 (1914), In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 140, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 98, 227 P.2d 206 (1951)

Writ of habeas corpus denied person convicted under statute prohibiting house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse. In habeas corpus proceedings instituted by person convicted under statute, which was part of act concerning public schools, making it illegal to keep house of ill fame within 800 yards of schoolhouse, where such statute was not superseded by RL § 6510 (cf. NRS 201.380), enacted same day as part of crimes and punishment act, making it illegal to keep house of ill fame within 400 yards of schoolhouse, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, and did not deprive petitioner of any vested rights given him by city ordinance regulating maintenance of houses of ill fame, writ of habeas corpus was denied. In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Statute which did not amend another yet covered same subject matter was in pari materia with other statute. Method for amending statutes is provided by Nev. Art. 4, § 17. RL § 4833 (cf. NRS 2.090), which provides that appeal may be taken from granting of or refusal to grant injunction was not enacted as amendment to previous acts and was therefore in pari materia with RL § 5329 (cf. N.R.A.P. 3A(b)), which provides that appeals could be taken from district court to appellate court in certain specified situations. State ex rel. Pacific Reclamation Co. v. Ducker, 35 Nev. 214, 127 Pac. 990 (1912)

Tax provision that was germane to act concerning public schools did not violate constitution. Provision levying tax for support of public schools was germane to act "concerning public schools" and did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that act comprise one subject only which shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Eggers v. Esser, 35 Nev. 429, 129 Pac. 557 (1913)

Provisions in general appropriation act which repeal or amend existing general laws are unconstitutional as not germane to title. Provisions in general appropriation act which purport to repeal or amend existing general laws of state are unconstitutional and void as not being germane to title under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in title. State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Act relating to marriage and divorce which prescribed residence necessary for divorce jurisdiction did not violate section. Act entitled "An act relating to marriage and divorce," and prescribing residence necessary to give court jurisdiction in divorce action, does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, because length of residence required before parties apply for divorce necessarily pertains to divorce, and therefore is matter connected with title of act. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914)

Act does not violate section if all matters dealt with relate to subject expressed in title and anything properly connected therewith. Although act deals with numerous matters, if all of matters dealt with relate to subject of act briefly expressed in its title and anything properly connected therewith, act does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914)

Where section of act was amended by statute then reenacted at length, no merit to contention that reenactment should have specified that amended version was reenacted. Where sec. 1 of act of 1875 amended sec. 22 of act of 1861, and act of 1913 reenacted at length, in compliance with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, the language designated as sec. 22 in act of 1861, act of 1913 amended act of 1875, and there was no merit in contention that act of 1913 should have specified that sec. 1, instead of sec. 22, was amended, because from title so stating and language used, it was apparent that by act of 1913 the legislature intended to amend act of 1875. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), cited, Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, at 175, 183 Pac. 387 (1919), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 220, 221, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

Clerical errors should be disregarded and legislative intention should govern. Where sec. 1 of act of 1875 amended sec. 22 of act of 1861, and act of 1913 reenacted at length, in compliance with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, the language designated as sec. 22 in act of 1861, that section was amended by act of 1913, and even if act of 1875 repealed sec. 22 and act of 1913 should have specified that sec. 1, not sec. 22, was amended, this would be only clerical error and section reenacted at length would still be one amended, because clerical errors should be disregarded and legislative intention should govern. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), cited, In re Counts, 39 Nev. 61, at 69, 153 Pac. 93 (1915), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 220, 221, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

No constitutional violation where title gave notice of what act sought to create and notice of powers and duties of thing created. Act entitled "An act to create a board of county commissioners in the several counties of this state, and to define their duties and powers," did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provided that each law enacted shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title, because title gave notice of what the act sought to create and secondarily gave notice of powers and duties conferred on thing created. McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, 146 Pac. 756 (1914), cited, Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 450, 171 Pac. 511 (1918), In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 139, 253 Pac. 671 (1927)

Provision for emergency loans by county contained in act on reduction of county tax rate did not violate constitution. RL § 3831 (cf. NRS 354.430 and 354.618) and RL § 3832, providing for making by county of emergency loans and repayment of such loans, contained in act "relating to county government and the reduction of the rate of county taxation," were sufficiently related to title of such act to comply with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title. First Nat’l Bank v. Nye County, 38 Nev. 123, 145 Pac. 932 (1914), cited, Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 450, 171 Pac. 511 (1918), concurring opinion, In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, at 139, 253 Pac. 671 (1927)

Complete and independent acts held not to fall within section and may change prior statutes without referring to them. Where legislature seeks to amend act, it must comply with Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that act as revised or section as amended shall be reenacted or republished at length, but subsequent, complete and independent acts are held almost universally not to be within terms of such constitutional provision and may modify or change prior statutes without referring to them. State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, 151 Pac. 944 (1915), cited, Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 208, at 217, 106 P.2d 751 (1940), Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, at 269, 428 P.2d 371 (1967)

Section did not apply where act regulating salaries of certain state employees was complete in itself and not amendatory. Act regulating salaries of certain state employees, which lowered salary of chief engineer of public service commission, was complete in itself and was not amendatory of previous act establishing powers of public service commission and providing for hiring of expert engineer and his salary. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that revised acts or amended sections be reenacted at length did not apply, and demurrer was sustained to petition for writ of mandamus to compel controller to pay such engineer higher salary. State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, 151 Pac. 944 (1915), cited, Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 208, at 217, 106 P.2d 751 (1940)

Act regulating primaries, conventions and nomination of party candidates was not void for containing more than one subject in title. Act entitled "An act regulating nomination of candidates by political parties, providing for holding of primaries and conventions, and regulating manner of nominating candidates by petition," was not void for containing more than one subject in violation of provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Turner v. Fogg, 39 Nev. 406, 159 Pac. 56 (1916)

Where statute related solely to subject of removal, challenge to court jurisdiction to remove sheriff from office on ground statute’s title violated constitution was without merit. In certiorari proceedings to review jurisdiction of district court to enter judgment removing county sheriff from office, contention that title of statute under which removal proceedings were held violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each act shall embrace but one subject which shall be briefly expressed in title, was without merit because statute related solely to subject of removal, even though it provided three distinct methods therefor. Gay v. Tenth Judicial Dist. Court, 41 Nev. 330, 171 Pac. 156, 173 Pac. 885 (1918), cited, Hawkins v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 248, at 253, 216 P.2d 601 (1950)

Contention that title of workmen’s compensation act violated constitution was untenable. In action by Nevada industrial commission against county to collect premiums alleged to be due under workmen’s compensation act, contention that title violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that every law shall embrace but one subject which shall be expressed in title, because it did not mention counties was untenable, and overruling of general demurrer was affirmed. Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, 171 Pac. 511 (1918)

Statute allowing electors in military to vote in accordance with repealed act held constitutional. Statute which provided that electors engaged in military service could vote in accordance with act approved May 14, 1899, which had been repealed, did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that no law shall be revised or amended by its title only, and order overruling demurrer to complaint to enjoin secretary of state and lieutenant governor from complying with provisions of statute was reversed. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 Pac. 375 (1918)

Statute reviving repealed statute was not amendment or revision within meaning of constitution. "Amendment" is alteration effecting change in draft, or form, or substance of law already enacted or of bill proposed for enactment. Statute reviving former statute which had been repealed was not amendment or revision within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which prohibits amendment or revision of existing law by reference to title only. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 Pac. 375 (1918)

Revival of repealed statute by title was not within constitutional prohibition. Term "revive" as applied to legislative proceedings means reconference of validity, force and effect. Although revision or amendment by title only is prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 17, such prohibition does not extend to revival, and revival of repealed statute by title was not within constitutional prohibition. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 Pac. 375 (1918)

Title of act relating to organization and government of irrigation districts did not violate section. Title of ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS 539.010 et seq.), relating to organization and government of irrigation districts, contained but one general subject, organization of irrigation districts, and was not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that every act shall embrace but one subject. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), State v. Lincoln County Power Dist., 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941)

Section is mandatory but should be liberally construed. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, though mandatory, should be liberally construed. In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), cited, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 99, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Purpose of section is to prevent undesirable legislation through trickery or inattention. Purpose of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, providing that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which shall be briefly expressed in title, is to prevent inconsiderate or undesirable legislation through trickery or inattention. In re Cerfoglio, 44 Nev. 343, 195 Pac. 96 (1921), cited, Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, at 99, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

To extent body of act was broader than its title it was unconstitutional. Where legislature passed act, title of which stated it was act to regulate issuance and revocation of licenses for businesses in unincorporated cities and towns, but body of act referred also to businesses outside of incorporated cities and towns, body of act was broader than title, and to this extent act was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace only one subject and matters properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Abelman v. Douglass, 46 Nev. 121, 208 Pac. 422 (1922)

Statute held void where purpose or scope could not be ascertained from title. In proceeding in habeas corpus, where petitioners sought to be discharged on grounds that statute under which they were held was unconstitutional and void, act, which attempted to incorporate National Prohibition Act, was held void under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that each law shall embrace but one subject which shall be briefly expressed in title, because it could not be ascertained from title of act what purpose or scope was without referring to another document. Ex parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, 216 Pac. 509 (1923), cited, State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, at 240, 75 P.2d 727 (1938)

Provision of statute properly connected with subject matter of act as expressed in title. Provisions of sec. 4, ch. 201, Stats. 1925 (cf. NRS 533.505), regulating use of watering places in connection with grazing livestock on public range, are properly connected with subject matter of regulating use of water for livestock, as expressed in title of ch. 201, Stats. 1925 (cf. NRS 533.485-533.510), because right to use water for watering livestock in this state depends for its value on public range. Title does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17. In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), cited, Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Section must be given liberal construction. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requiring that laws shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, must be given liberal construction. In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), cited, State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, at 197, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, at 283, 30 P.2d 284 (1934), McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 98, 227 P.2d 206 (1951), Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Statute not void for failure to refer to certain act where such act was neither amended nor affected. Section of statute relative to licensing and regulation of real estate brokers which made possession of proper license essential element of cause of action for broker’s compensation was not unconstitutional as violative of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, for failure of title of act to refer to civil practice act because civil practice act was neither amended nor affected. Whiddett v. Mack, 50 Nev. 289, 258 Pac. 233 (1927)

Statute violated section where it did not mention imposition of criminal penalties in title. Statute entitled "An act to provide for the inspection of hides, providing compensation therefor, and other matters relating thereto," which provided criminal penalties for sale or purchase of beef without first having hides and carcasses inspected, marked and stamped, violated Nev. Art. 4, § 17, because there was nothing in title of act which suggested intention to make it unlawful and punishable as felony to offer for sale or to sell or purchase beef, except upon compliance with all provisions of act. State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), cited, In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), A Minor Girl v. Clark County Juvenile Court Servs., 87 Nev. 544, at 548, 490 P.2d 1248 (1971)

Rule of liberal construction cannot be extended to point of nullification of section. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that title of act embrace but one subject and matter properly related thereto, must be liberally construed lest meritorious legislation be declared void, but rule of liberal construction cannot be extended to point of nullification, and statute which made sale or purchase of beef unlawful unless hides and carcasses were first inspected, marked and stamped was unconstitutional where general subject expressed in title was inspection of hides. State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), cited, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 519, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, at 754, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988)

Test is whether title misleads public and legislature as to subjects embraced in act. Application of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that title of act embrace but one subject, and matter properly related thereto, depends upon whether title is of such character as to mislead public and members of legislature as to subjects embraced in act, and this test was not met where general subject expressed in title was inspection of hides, and act made it unlawful to sell or purchase beef without first having hides and carcasses inspected. State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), cited, In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 222, 246 P.2d 805 (1952), Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, at 754, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988)

Information against defendant for selling uninspected beef dismissed on ground title of statute did not conform to constitutional requirements. Information against defendant for violation of statute which made it unlawful for any person to sell beef without first having hide and carcass inspected, marked and stamped was dismissed on demurrer, on ground that statute entitled "An act to provide for the inspection of hides, providing compensation therefor, and other matters relating thereto," did not conform to requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, that every law enacted by legislature could embrace but one subject, and matter properly related thereto, which subject must be expressed in title. State v. Payne, 53 Nev. 193, 295 Pac. 770 (1931), cited, In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, at 305, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 222, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

Only principal subject of statute need be expressed in title. Only the principal subject of statute need be expressed in its title, and if connected matter which is embodied in statute is mentioned in title, it does not constitute such matter separate subject invalidating statute under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which restricts scope of each statute to one subject and matters properly connected therewith. State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, 24 P.2d 313 (1933)

Statute not void where section of it consisted of matter induced by and properly connected with single subject of act. Statute which provided for severance of portion of county and its annexation to another, and in following section provided that county offices held by officers residing in severed portion were to become vacant, was not unconstitutional as being in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, because latter section consisted of matter induced by subject of severance and annexation and was matter properly connected with that single subject. State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, 24 P.2d 313 (1933)

Where superfluous title does not render connected matter a separate subject, statute not void. Where title of statute, although unduly prolix, does not make connected matter of statute separate subject, it does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, as embracing more than one subject. Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P.2d 284 (1934)

Statute enabling county to construct water storage facilities not void under section. Where, in order to enable county to construct water storage facilities, statute was enacted authorizing county commissioners to issue bonds of county, to deliver such bonds to county water conservation district, and to collect tax for their payment, and title of statute, in addition to expressing such purpose and enumerating such powers, declared that statute was not subject to any other act relating to bond issues, such title did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Writ of habeas corpus issued to petitioner charged with possession of narcotics under statute whose title did not indicate that possession was to be penalized. Petitioner, imprisoned under information charging him with unlawful possession of narcotics, was entitled to writ of habeas corpus where statute making such possession crime was in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that each law enacted by legislature embrace but one subject, which subject shall be briefly expressed in title. Title, which read "An act defining and relating to narcotic drugs, and to make uniform the law with reference thereto," did not indicate that regulatory legislation was intended or that possession was to be penalized as one means of regulation. In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), cited, State v. Economy, 61 Nev. 394, at 403, 130 P.2d 264 (1942)

Statute void for failure to set forth subject in title could not be validated by subsequent amendment to correct title. Where statute was void under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, for failure to set forth subject of act in title, act could not be made valid by subsequent amendment to title to correct defect. If law so conflicts with constitution as to be void, there is nothing to amend. In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), cited, State v. Economy, 61 Nev. 394, at 403, 130 P.2d 264 (1942)

Liberal construction of constitution should not be overworked with result that statute becomes higher law. Provisions of constitution should be liberally construed, but doctrine of liberal construction should not be overworked with result that statute becomes higher law, and where title of act relating to narcotic drugs did not indicate that regulatory legislation was intended or that possession of narcotics was to be penalized, second part of title which stated "and to make uniform the law with reference thereto," did not remedy defect under Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Even if title had referred to some particular law covering subject, such reference would not have satisfied constitutional requirement. In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, 64 P.2d 346 (1937)

Requirement that subject of act be expressed in title is mandatory and cannot be satisfied by presumption of public knowledge. Where title of statute which made possession of narcotics unlawful failed to set forth subject sought to be legislated upon in such manner as fairly to give notice of actual enactment, as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 17, such defect was not cured by fact that it was commonly known that it had been public policy of state to prohibit use and possession of narcotic drugs by unqualified persons, and that legislature and public could not have been misled by title. Requirement that subject of act be briefly expressed in title is mandatory, and cannot be satisfied by presumption of knowledge. In re Medeiros, 57 Nev. 301, 64 P.2d 346 (1937), cited, State v. Economy, 61 Nev. 394, at 403, 130 P.2d 264 (1942)

Statute not void where title embraced but one subject and other matters stated were merely incident to real subject and not misleading or confusing. Title of ch. 165, Stats. 1933 (cf. NRS ch. 706), declares purpose and policy of legislature and enumerates means of execution provided in statute, and title embraces but one subject, "the purpose and policy of the legislature relative to use of the public highways of the state in the carrying of persons and property thereon in motor vehicles," as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 17, and other matters stated are merely incident to real subject and in no way misleading or confusing. Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, 75 P.2d 727 (1938), cited, State v. Lincoln County Power Dist., 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 222, 246 P.2d 805 (1952), Westinghouse Beverage Group v. Department of Taxation, 101 Nev. 184, at 190, 698 P.2d 866 (1985)

Statute not void where provision making it unlawful to operate as carrier without certificate of convenience was germane to subject of regulation of transport on public highways. In action to enjoin operation of motor carrier without certificate of convenience and necessity, where it was contended that sec. 7, ch. 165, Stats. 1933 (cf. NRS 706.386), making it unlawful to operate as carrier of intrastate commerce without certificate, covered matter not embraced in title of act in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, real subject of act was purpose and policy relating to use of public highways for transport of persons and property, section in question was germane to this subject, and enumeration of other subordinate matters in title was surplusage. Tonopah & G.R.R. v. Nevada-Cal. Transp. Co., 58 Nev. 234, 75 P.2d 727 (1938), cited, State v. Lincoln County Power Dist., 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 222, 246 P.2d 805 (1952), Westinghouse Beverage Group v. Department of Taxation, 101 Nev. 184, at 190, 698 P.2d 866 (1985)

Nevada Irrigation District Act is independent in itself and does not purport to be amendatory. NCL § 8042 (cf. NRS 539.693 and 539.695), which provides continuing lien until payment of assessments levied by irrigation district and thereby impliedly amends general revenue law. NCL §§ 6449 and 6462 (cf. NRS 361.590 and 361.595), in that property sold for taxes remains subject to such assessment lien, does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, prohibiting statutory amendment except by reenactment and publication of amendment at length, because Nevada Irrigation District Act is independent, complete act in itself and in no way purports to be amendatory. Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 202, 96 P.2d 201 (1939)

Statute complete in itself and not amendatory may modify existing statute and not violate section. Statute which is original and complete in itself and not of amendatory character, although it may modify some other existing statute, does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that no law shall be amended unless reenacted and published at length. Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 202, 96 P.2d 201 (1939)

Statute authorizing creation of power districts did not embrace more than one subject in violation of section. Ch. 72, Stats. 1935, which authorizes creation of power districts, does not embrace more than one subject and is not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. State v. Lincoln County Power Dist., 60 Nev. 401, 111 P.2d 528 (1941), cited, McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 97, 227 P.2d 206 (1951)

Statute providing for issuance and retirement of bonds and levy of tax for hospital did not embrace more than one subject in title. Special statute providing for issuance of bonds, levy of tax and retirement of bonds for county hospital purposes did not embrace in its title more than one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947)

Housing authorities law does not violate section. Housing authorities law, 1943, NCL §§ 5470.01-5470.25 (cf. NRS 315.140 et seq.), does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be briefly expressed in title. McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, 227 P.2d 206 (1951), cited, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, at 334, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973)

Amendatory act not void where it quoted title of original act and set forth amended section. Where title of amendatory act quoted title of original act, and body of amendatory act set forth amended section showing amendatory language, amendatory act did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law shall embrace one subject expressed in title, and that no law shall be amended by reference to its title only. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

Not necessary that entire act be reengrossed where section is added or amended. Legislative practice is to amend act by rewriting one or more sections of act, and it is not necessary under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that act as amended shall be reenacted and published at length, that entire act be reengrossed where section is added or amended which may affect entire act. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, 246 P.2d 805 (1952)

County Economic Development Revenue Bond law did not violate section. County Economic Development Revenue Bond law (see NRS 244A.669 et seq.) did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that each law enacted by legislature shall embrace but one subject which shall be briefly expressed in title. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973), cited, Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, at 511, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

Amendatory statute relating to crimes against slot machines concerned one general subject. Statute which amended NRS 465.080 and whose title included "changes relating to crimes against slot machines and vending machines; increasing the penalty for certain crimes against slot machines; authorizing gaming licensees to detain and question persons suspected of swindling" concerned but one general subject which was indicated by the title, as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 17. Sheriff, Clark County v. Miller, 93 Nev. 509, 569 P.2d 401 (1977)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.

Where part of statute is void because its subject matter is not in title, remainder of statute is valid. Although part of statute is void because its subject matter is not expressed in title, remainder of statute is valid and stands alone. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Statute repealing former statute by implication need not express such repeal in its title. It is not necessary that statute which repeals former law by implication specifically express such repeal in its title. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Statute complete in itself which repeals all inconsistent acts by implication is not amendatory. Statute which is complete in itself and which by implication repeals all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with its provisions is not amendatory statute within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that amended statute be reenacted and published at length. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909), cited, Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, at 269, 428 P.2d 371 (1967)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Provision for secretary of state’s fee in extradition proceedings was void as outside scope of title of act regulating proceedings in criminal cases. Provision for secretary of state’s fee in extradition proceedings in act entitled "An act to regulate proceedings in criminal cases in this state" is outside scope of title of act and thus void under Nev. Art. 4, § 17. AGO (7-24-1912)

Intended amendment of prior law is void unless such intent expressed in title. Act which is intended to be amendment of prior law is unconstitutional if such intent is not properly expressed in title. AGO 21 (3-25-1913)

Amendment is valid where new matter introduced is within general scope of old. Amendment is valid where legislative intent is manifest and new matter introduced in amended section is within general scope of the old. AGO 232 (9-27-1918)

Section will be interpreted in reasonable sense. To facilitate proper legislation, Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which provides that title of act must embrace but one subject, will not be interpreted in strict, narrow or technical sense, but in reasonable sense. AGO 41 (4-1-1919)

Act amending four separate laws is incapable of having sufficient comprehensive title. Act amending four separate and distinct laws is incapable of having sufficient comprehensive title. Therefore, separate acts should be written to amend each law. AGO 5 (3-2-1921)

Statute regulating activity outside unincorporated cities but whose title read inside unincorporated cites was void. Statute written to regulate billiard halls "outside unincorporated cities and towns" but title of which reads regulation of billiard halls in unincorporated cities and towns is null and void under Nev. Art. 4, § 17. AGO 64 (9-9-1921)

Provision outside scope of title has no legal effect. Provision relating to establishment of commissioner districts in act entitled "An Act fixing the salaries of certain officers of Humboldt County . . ." has no legal effect as it is without scope of title. AGO 110 (4-13-1922)

Erroneous recital of title to act amended is immaterial so long as sufficient for identification. Where title of amendatory act recites title of act amended, and such recital is erroneous, error is immaterial so long as reference to amended act is sufficient for identification. AGO 13 (2-1-1923)

Subject matter of act must be expressed in title. Subject matter embodied in legislative act must be expressed in title. AGO 17 (2-17-1923)

Amendatory provisions must be expressed in title. Amendatory provisions in legislative act must be expressed in act’s title. Otherwise they are rendered invalid by Nev. Art. 4, § 17. AGO 235 (4-29-1926)

Provision for payment of reporter of supreme court void because not embraced in title. Nev. Art. 4, § 17, requires that each law enacted by legislature embrace only one subject and that subject matter of bill appear in the title. That part of statute which provided for payment of salary to official reporter of supreme court was void because not embraced in title. AGO 328 (3-30-1929)

Statute may be valid even if title is broader than act itself. Statute may be valid although title is broader than act itself, if legislature’s intent can be determined from body of act. AGO 47 (7-31-1931)

Statute entitled "fees" that imposes tax is unconstitutional. Statute entitled "Fees of County Clerk," but which actually imposes tax, is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 17. AGO 150 (12-6-1934)

Failure to include county officers in title to act providing pay periods for state and county officers did not render act void. Failure to embrace county officers in title of statute providing semimonthly pay periods for state and county officers does not result in unconstitutionality under Nev. Art. 4, § 17, which requires that each law embrace only one subject and that subject matter of bill appear in title. AGO 315 (7-18-1941)

1. Every bill, except a bill placed on a consent calendar adopted as provided in subsection 4, must be read by sections on three several days, in each House, unless in case of emergency, two thirds of the House where such bill is pending shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule. The reading of a bill by sections, on its final passage, shall in no case be dispensed with, and the vote on the final passage of every bill or joint resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays to be entered on the journals of each House. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, a majority of all the members elected to each house is necessary to pass every bill or joint resolution, and all bills or joint resolutions so passed, shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective Houses and by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the Assembly.

2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each house is necessary to pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any form, including but not limited to taxes, fees, assessments and rates, or changes in the computation bases for taxes, fees, assessments and rates.

3. A majority of all of the members elected to each house may refer any measure which creates, generates, or increases any revenue in any form to the people of the State at the next general election, and shall become effective and enforced only if it has been approved by a majority of the votes cast on the measure at such election.

4. Each House may provide by rule for the creation of a consent calendar and establish the procedure for the passage of uncontested bills.

[Amended in 1976 and 1996. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1973 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1975 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1976 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1973, p. 1946; Statutes of Nevada 1975, p. 1900. The second amendment was proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the 1994 and 1996 general elections.]

Signature of assistant secretary of senate was sufficient compliance with section. Signature of assistant secretary of senate was sufficient compliance with requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 18, that all bills be signed by secretary of senate. State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1 Pac. 186 (1883)

Courts cannot look beyond enrolled bill to ascertain terms of law. Courts cannot look beyond enrolled bill to ascertain terms of law. Fact that it is signed by proper officers of each house, approved by governor, and filed in office of secretary of state, is conclusive as to passage of act as enrolled, and is only evidence thereof. State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1 Pac. 186 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Sutherland v. Nye, 23 Nev. 89, at 101, 42 Pac. 866 (1895), State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, at 80, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899), State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, at 100, 64 Pac. 466 (1901), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 291, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), State ex rel. Bartlett v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 245, at 248, 141 Pac. 988 (1914)

Object of signature requirement is for authentication. Object of requirement contained in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, relative to signing of bills and joint resolutions, is to furnish evidence that paper thus attested has been, by proper processes of each house, clothed with force of law which should be taken as authentication and proves itself upon inspection. State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1 Pac. 186 (1883), cited, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 291, 119 Pac. 770 (1911)

Signature requirements are mandatory. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 18, requiring signing of bills and joint resolutions by presiding officers of respective houses and by secretary of senate and clerk of assembly, are mandatory. There is no other evidence of passage of bill or joint resolution by legislature which can be considered by courts. State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1 Pac. 186 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Sutherland v. Nye, 23 Nev. 99, at 101, 42 Pac. 866 (1895), State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, at 80, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899), State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, at 100, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Section should be construed with reference to customs in legislative bodies at time of its adoption. Provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 18, relating to passage and signing of bills and resolutions, should be construed with reference to customs in legislative bodies at time of its adoption, and with consideration for construction deliberately given it by legislative and executive departments immediately after its adoption. Under such construction, signature of assistant secretary of senate on bill was sufficient. State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1 Pac. 186 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Springmeyer v. Brodigan, 35 Nev. 35, at 39, 126 Pac. 680 (1912), In re Ming, 42 Nev. 472, at 493, 181 Pac. 319 (1919), Smith v. Southern Pac. Co., 50 Nev. 377, at 382, 262 Pac. 935 (1928), Davis v. Davis, 54 Nev. 267, at 273, 13 P.2d 1109 (1932), State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 123, at 126, 27 P.2d 537 (1933), Seaborn v. Wingfield, 56 Nev. 260, at 269, 48 P.2d 881 (1935), Board of School Trustees v. Bray, 60 Nev. 345, at 357, 109 P.2d 274 (1941)

Enrolled bill properly signed and delivered to secretary of state must be accepted by courts as conclusive evidence of regular enactment. Enrolled bill signed by proper officers and deposited with secretary of state must be accepted by courts as conclusive evidence of regular enactment, and validity of bill enacted to disincorporate city could not be questioned in quo warranto proceedings to determine whether board of county commissioners was lawfully governing unincorporated town created by bill on ground that procedures required by Nev. Art. 4, § 18, had not been followed in enacting bill. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899), cited, State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, at 100, 64 Pac. 466 (1901), In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 291, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), State ex rel. Bartlett v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 245, at 248, 141 Pac. 988 (1914)

Indiana constitution was not authority for proposition that act passed over veto of governor need not be signed. Where Indiana constitution provided that act passed over veto of governor at same session of legislature in which act originated should "be a law," and was silent as to act so passed at subsequent session, Indiana constitution was not authority for proposition that act vetoed by governor and passed over his veto at next session of legislature, as provided in Nev. Art. 4, § 35, need not be signed by legislative officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, because Nev. Art. 4, § 35, states that act so passed shall become law, thereby presupposing subsequent presentation and signing of act. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Framers intended that act passed over governor’s veto should not be effective unless properly signed by required legislative officers. By providing in Nev. Art. 4, § 35, that if, after final adjournment of legislature, governor does not within specified time file bill which he has vetoed with secretary of state, bill shall "be a law," and that if he does so file such bill, it shall be placed before next session where, if approved over veto, it shall "become a law," framers of constitution intended that act vetoed by governor, and passed over his veto at next session of legislature, should not be effective unless subsequently signed by legislative officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Indiana constitution did not support contention that act vetoed by governor, reconsidered and passed over veto at next legislative session, did not require signature of proper legislative officers to become effective. Where provision in Indiana constitution which corresponds to Nev. Art. 4, § 18, relating to passage of bills by legislature, was found in article devoted to legislative department, and provision which corresponds to Nev. Art. 4, § 35, relating to presentation of bills to governor, was found in article devoted to executive department, such provisions of Indiana constitution did not support contention that act vetoed by governor, reconsidered at next session of legislature, as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 35, and there passed over his veto, need not be signed by legislative officers specified in Nev. Art. 4, § 18. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35 should be read and construed together. Because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35, are both found in article of constitution devoted to legislative department of state government, where construction of either section is necessary, the two sections should be read and construed together. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Historically, legislature has construed provision to mean bill passed over governor’s veto was not effective without subsequent attestation by officers. Fact that at many sessions of legislature following adoption of constitution, bills which had been passed at preceding session, vetoed by governor, reconsidered and passed over veto were again attested by officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, showed that legislature construed Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35, to mean that bill so passed was not effective without subsequent attestation, and such long-continued and contemporaneous construction placed by coordinate branch of government upon matter of procedure in such branch was entitled to be given great weight by court in construing the sections. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Fact that officers did not uniformly place their attestation on bill did not mean construction given provision by legislature was without force. Where legislature, by its repeated action, construed Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35, to mean that bills passed at preceding session, vetoed by governor, reconsidered and passed over veto were not effective without attestation by officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, fact that such officers often inserted over their signatures history of action taken, and did not uniformly place their attestation upon face of bill, did not mean that construction given the sections by legislature was without force, because substance of constitution should not be sacrificed to matter of form where form is not essence. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Enrolled bill authenticated by proper signatures is only conclusive evidence that it has been legally enacted. Last clause of Nev. Art. 4, § 18, which requires that all bills or joint resolutions passed by majority of members of each house of legislature be signed by presiding officers of respective houses and by secretary of senate and clerk of assembly, is mandatory, and enrolled bill so authenticated is only and conclusive evidence that it has been legally enacted. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901), cited, In re Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283, at 291, 119 Pac. 770 (1911), State ex rel. Bartlett v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 245, at 248, 141 Pac. 988 (1914)

Majority of elected members is necessary for bill passage. Majority of members elected, not merely members present, is necessary for passage of bill or joint resolution. AGO (2-16-1911)

If speaker of house does not sign bill it cannot become law. Requirements of Nev. Art. 4, § 18, are mandatory; thus, if speaker of house fails to sign bill, such bill cannot become law. AGO 24 (3-25-1913)

Bill not signed by speaker does not become law even if governor fails to veto it in 10 days. Bill which has not been signed by speaker of assembly does not become law even though governor fails to veto it within 10 days after legislature has adjourned. AGO 32 (4-1-1913)

Purpose of section is to prevent passage of bill without majority vote by full membership. Purpose of Nev. Art. 4, § 18, is to prevent bill being passed unless it receives majority vote based on full membership. However, if bill receives less than such majority vote and legislature declares it passed, it is doubtful whether courts could declare such action unconstitutional. AGO 19 (2-10-1919)

Section 19. Manner of drawing money from treasury. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

Not necessary that fund out of which appropriation is to be drawn be named in appropriation act. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 19, which provides that no money shall be drawn from treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, it is not necessary that fund out of which appropriation is to be made be named in appropriation act, because usually, if not always, other acts or constitution show from which fund the money appropriated is to be drawn. State ex rel. Keith v. Westerfield, 23 Nev. 468, 49 Pac. 119 (1897), cited, State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, at 377, 136 Pac. 100 (1913)

Section did not justify state controller’s refusal to draw warrant in payment for chairs and carpet for supreme court. Where bailiff of supreme court, as ordered by court, purchased chairs and carpet for court after board of capitol commissioners refused to do so, purchase price of articles constituted current and contingent expense under statute which made appropriation for current expenses, telegraph, postal and contingent, of supreme court. Therefore, Nev. Art. 4, § 19, which prohibits withdrawal of money from treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, did not justify refusal of state controller to draw warrant in payment of chairs and carpet. State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 Pac. 689 (1902)

Language in any act showing legislature intended to authorize fixed expenditure is valid authorization. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 19, providing that no money shall be drawn from treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, language in any act which shows that legislature intended to authorize expenditure which fixes amount, and which indicates the fund, is sufficient to create valid authorization. State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers, 29 Nev. 469, 91 Pac. 819 (1907), cited, State ex rel. Norcross v. Eggers, 35 Nev. 250, at 257, 128 Pac. 986 (1912), State ex rel. Mighels v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 364, at 369, 136 Pac. 104 (1913), State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, at 243, 453 P.2d 421 (1969), State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, at 18, 824 P.2d 276 (1992)

Portion of statute that failed to prescribe maximum limit for traveling expenses held void. Portion of statute providing that chairman and members of state industrial and publicity commission should be allowed necessary mileage and traveling expenses was void under Nev. Art. 4, § 19, providing that no money shall be drawn from state treasury except under appropriations made by law, because act failed to prescribe maximum limit for traveling expenses. State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers, 29 Nev. 469, 91 Pac. 819 (1907), cited, King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, at 569, 200 P.2d 221 (1948), State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, at 243, 453 P.2d 421 (1969)

If will of legislature is apparent, no specific words of appropriation are necessary nor must expenditures be authorized by general appropriation act. Nev. Art. 4, § 19, which provides that no moneys shall be drawn from treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, requires that expenditures shall first be authorized by legislature, but no particular words of appropriation are necessary nor must all expenditures be authorized by general appropriation act, so long as will of legislature is apparent. State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers, 29 Nev. 469, 91 Pac. 819 (1907), cited, State ex rel. Fowler v. Eggers, 33 Nev. 535, at 538, 112 Pac. 699 (1910), State ex rel. Norcross v. Eggers, 35 Nev. 250, at 257, 128 Pac. 986 (1912), State ex rel. Mighels v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 364, at 369, 136 Pac. 104 (1913), State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, at 243, 453 P.2d 421 (1969)

Meaning of "state treasury." "State treasury," used in Nev. Art. 4, § 19, has well-understood meaning, which does not include special fund. State ex rel. Beebe v. McMillan, 36 Nev. 383, 136 Pac. 108 (1913)

Matching of local appropriations. Statute which provided that ". . . there is hereby annually appropriated, out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, a sum equal to the total appropriations of the several counties for the support of county agricultural and home economics extension work as provided in section three of this act, but shall not be greater in any year than the proceeds of one cent of the state tax rate; . . ." constituted valid appropriation under Nev. Art. 4, § 19, and writ of mandamus issued to compel state controller to pay claims made pursuant to such statute. Norcross v. Cole, 44 Nev. 88, 189 Pac. 877 (1920)

Degree of certainty required. Where statute purported to appropriate money for specific purpose without naming specific amount, but provided method by which exact amount to be expended could be ascertained, there was valid appropriation under Nev. Art. 4, § 19, because "that is certain which is capable of being made certain." Norcross v. Cole, 44 Nev. 88, 189 Pac. 877 (1920)

Section was never intended to bar protection of citizens from misuse of power of eminent domain. Nev. Art. 4, § 19, which provides that no money shall be drawn from state treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, was never intended to be bar to protection of citizens against abuse or misuse of power of eminent domain by appropriating citizen’s property and remitting him to successive legislatures for compensation. Heidenreich v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 76 Nev. 249, 352 P.2d 249 (1960)

Court order directing state controller to pay appointed attorneys for representation of accused murderer was improper. Order of district court directing state controller and state treasurer to pay claims for $750 to two court-appointed counsel for work done in preparation of defense of indigent accused murderer was improper because Nev. Art. 4, § 19, and NRS 227.160, 227.170 and 227.330 indicate that payment by state treasurer shall not be made unless authorized by law and in consequence of appropriation, and here there was no specific appropriation for claim. Payment from general fund would have been improper because there was no statute indicating legislative intent to authorize such expenditure. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421 (1969), cited, In re of Two Minor Children, 95 Nev. 225, at 232, 592 P.2d 166 (1979)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Use of technical words in appropriation not necessary. Use of technical words in making appropriation is not necessary. Any words may be used so long as legislature manifests clear intent that money be drawn from particular fund for particular purpose. Thus appropriation from general fund of sum equal to 1 percent of war claims to be collected from United States is valid appropriation. AGO (4-27-1903)

Controller may not draw warrant without specific appropriation. State controller may not legally draw warrant on state treasury unless there is unexhausted specific appropriation to meet the warrant, and statute stating amount of salary and allowing travel expenses does not constitute appropriation. AGO (6-10-1907)

Legislature may appropriate money for person injured on state capitol premises. Legislature has power to appropriate money for relief of person injured while on premises of state capitol. AGO (4-27-1911)

No refunds from state possible before legislative appropriation. No refunds from state can be made prior to legislative action as no money can be drawn from state treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. AGO 244 (11-26-1918)

Public money disbursed only upon valid appropriation. Public moneys may only be disbursed pursuant to valid appropriation of legislature. AGO 126 (4-28-1920)

Money appropriated for specific purpose may be used only for that purpose. Money appropriated for specific purpose may be used only for that purpose. AGO 38 (6-19-1931), cited, AGO B-2 (7-22-1940), AGO 1 (1-4-1955)

Appropriation for agricultural society cannot be used to advertise Nevada resources at California state fair. Appropriation for support of agricultural society cannot be used to pay for exhibit advertising Nevada resources at California state fair. AGO 52 (8-31-1931)

Appropriation requires money in fund applicable to designated purpose. To constitute appropriation there must be money in fund applicable to designated purpose. AGO 153 (12-21-1934)

Failure of legislature to appropriate full salary fixed by statute does not defeat officer’s right to full salary. Failure of legislature to appropriate, in general appropriation bill, full amount of salary fixed by statute does not defeat right of state officer to full statutory salary. AGO 279 (5-5-1939)

State board of military auditors cannot purchase land without express appropriation. State board of military auditors cannot purchase land and construct armory thereon, if legislature has made no express appropriation therefor. AGO A-37 (9-23-1939)

National Guard cannot lease airbase without statutory authority and appropriation. National Guard cannot lease airbase in absence of express statutory authority and appropriation therefor. AGO 396 (12-4-1946)

Authorization for clerical assistance cannot be construed as appropriation. Where statute gives state officer authority to employ clerical assistance, but legislature fails to make appropriation therefor, statute authorizing clerical assistance cannot be construed as appropriation as no stated amount of money is set forth. AGO 760 (5-25-1949)

Where legislature authorizes salary for position but fails to make appropriation salary should be paid out of general fund. Where statute provides for salary for veterans’ service commissioner, but legislature fails to make appropriation therefor, statute setting forth amount of salary should be construed as appropriation and salary should be paid out of general fund. AGO 760 (5-25-1949)

Appropriation adopted by both houses but never presented to governor is invalid. Joint resolution appropriating money from highway fund, adopted by both houses but never presented to governor for signature, does not become law; thus, appropriation is invalid under Nev. Art. 4, § 19. AGO 85 (7-25-1951)

Statute reducing appropriation from state general fund to agency by amount receipts of agency exceed projections by legislature may be constitutionally applied to University of Nevada. Statute setting forth authorized expenditures for various agencies of state and requiring that when agency’s actual receipts from sources other than state general fund exceed amount projected by legislature, appropriation to that agency from general fund must be reduced by amount of excess, could be constitutionally applied to University of Nevada System. Authority vested in board of regents by Nev. Art. 11, §§ 4 and 7, must be viewed in conjunction with authority of legislature under Nev. Art. 4, § 19, and Art. 11, § 6, to appropriate money for support of university from state general fund upon presentation of budgets in manner required by law. AGO 80-7 (3-18-1980)

Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace and of constables, and fixing their compensation;

For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors;

Regulating the practice of courts of justice;

Providing for changing the venue in civil and criminal cases;

Granting divorces;

Changing the names of persons;

Vacating roads, town plots, streets, alleys, and public squares;

Summoning and impaneling grand and petit juries, and providing for their compensation;

Regulating county and township business;

Regulating the election of county and township officers;

For the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, and township purposes;

Providing for opening and conducting elections of state, county, or township officers, and designating the places of voting;

Providing for the sale of real estate belonging to minors or other persons laboring under legal disabilities;

Giving effect to invalid deeds, wills, or other instruments;

Refunding money paid into the state treasury, or into the treasury of any county;

Releasing the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation, association, or person to the state, or to any county, town, or city of this state; but nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the power of the legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and fees of county officers, to authorize and empower the boards of county commissioners of the various counties of the state to establish and regulate the compensation and fees of township officers in their respective counties, to establish and regulate the rates of freight, passage, toll, and charges of railroads, tollroads, ditch, flume, and tunnel companies incorporated under the laws of this state or doing business therein.

Statute creating new county and naming county officers until next general election was not violation of section. Statute creating new county and naming certain persons county officers until next general election, though special and local, is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits enactment of special and local laws in certain enumerated cases or Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires general laws in all cases not enumerated where such laws can be made applicable. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), distinguished, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 442 (1882), State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, at 420, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 21 Nev. 517, at 525, 527, 34 Pac. 870 (1893), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Section does not invalidate statute creating new county and naming county officers until next general election. Provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special or local laws regulating election of county and township officers, does not invalidate statute creating new county and naming certain persons county officers until next general election, because election of county officers is left under general election laws. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), distinguished, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 442 (1882), State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, at 420, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 21 Nev. 517, at 525, 527, 34 Pac. 870 (1893), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Statute requiring county clerk to transfer records of pending actions to county clerk of new county did not violate section. Statute requiring county clerk of existing county to transfer records of pending actions to county clerk of new county, created entirely from territory of such existing county by act which becomes effective after act transferring records, is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits local or special laws regulating practice of courts or providing for changing venue in civil or criminal cases. State ex rel. Hooten v. McKinney, 5 Nev. 194 (1869)

Meaning of "venue" as used in section. As used in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, the term "venue" means county wherein action is brought and jury is to be obtained. State ex rel. Hooten v. McKinney, 5 Nev. 194 (1869)

Transfer of pending action to another locality in same territorial area which comprised single county when complaint was filed did not violate section. Transfer of pending action from one locality to another within same territorial area which comprised single county when complaint was filed does not constitute change of venue or regulation of practice of courts within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits local or special laws on such subjects. State ex rel. Hooten v. McKinney, 5 Nev. 194 (1869)

Section does not prevent law authorizing levy of special or local tax. Provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local or special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes does not prevent passage of law authorizing or directing levy of special or local tax. Prohibition was intended to prohibit local or special laws regulating manner or mode of assessing and collecting taxes, and does not apply to legislation imposing or authorizing imposition of a tax. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283 (1869), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 117, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 88, 177 P.2d 682 (1947)

Law regulating conduct of county affairs is unconstitutional. Law which prescribes rule to govern business of county or orders or directs management of such business is regulation of that business, whether it is limited and temporary law intended to secure particular end or object or general and permanent law regulating conduct of all county affairs, and such law is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which declares that legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating county and township business. Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68 (1871), cited, Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91, at 95, 102, 35 Pac. 885 (1894), McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, at 97, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), distinguished, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Statute allowing claim against county and designating manner of payment was unconstitutional special law. Statute which allowed preexisting claim against county, designated manner of its payment and directed drawing of county warrants, was special law regulating county business and was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating county and township business. Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68 (1871), cited, Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91, at 95, 102, 35 Pac. 885 (1894), McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, at 97, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), distinguished, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Policy of section is local management of local affairs. Policy of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating county and township business, is local management of local affairs, regulated by general laws of uniform operation throughout the state. Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68 (1871)

Framers recognized cases would arise requiring passage of local or special laws. In enacting Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which provide that laws shall be general where general laws can be made applicable, framers of constitution recognized that cases would arise in ordinary course of legislation requiring local or special laws to be passed in instances where general laws might be applicable to subject but not to particular case. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, at 142 (1876), State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, at 253, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 314, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 21, 22, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, at 96, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 118, 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 353, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Legislative intent behind section. Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, were intended to prohibit legislature from passing any local or special law in any of cases enumerated in sec. 20, and to limit passing of other local or special laws in all other cases where general law would be applicable, that is, where general law would be adapted to wants of the people, would be suitable to just purposes of legislation, or would effect object sought to be accomplished. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 444 (1882), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 21, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, at 96, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 353, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Where other sections of statute were severable, section providing for removal of county seat was not rendered invalid. Where first section of statute provided for removal of county seat, and was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which require that laws be general where general laws can be made applicable, other sections providing for transfer of records and other details were severable and, even if invalid, did not invalidate first section. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873)

Law may be special and not local or local and not special. Adoption of view that law may be special and not local, or local and not special, is necessary to give full meaning and significance to the words "special" and "local" as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special or local laws on some subjects. Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212 (1874)

Act creating county "redemption fund" was neither violation of section nor impairment of obligation of contracts. Act creating "redemption fund" in particular county, directing that all moneys be paid into such fund which before had been paid into general fund and providing special procedure for redemption of county indebtedness out of the new fund, was neither impairment of obligation of contracts nor violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special and local laws regulating county business. Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212 (1874), cited, Odd Fellows Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Quillen, 11 Nev. 109, at 115 (1876), Thompson v. Turner, 24 Nev. 292, at 293, 53 Pac. 178 (1898), State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, at 69, 99 Pac. 855 (1909), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 97, 177 P.2d 677 (1947)

"Special law" defined. Special law, within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, is law which applies only to individual or to number of individuals selected from class to which they belong. It is law which affects individuals only and not class, one which imposes special burdens, or confers peculiar privileges upon one or more persons in no wise distinguished from others of same category. State v. California Mining Co., 15 Nev. 234 (1880), cited, Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, at 309, 30 Pac. 896 (1883), Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, at 399, 32 Pac. 437 (1893), Ex parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 43, at 52, 99 Pac. 700 (1909), State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 56, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 67 Nev. 173, at 191, 216 P.2d 985 (1950), Southwest Gas Corp. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 40, at 42, 449 P.2d 259 (1969)

Special law for collection of state, county and township taxes was void. Statute which purported to ratify and approve action of any district attorney who had consented to entry of judgment, without statutory penalty, in any action for recovery of property taxes delinquent prior to particular date was special law for collection of state, county and township taxes, and was void under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21. State v. California Mining Co., 15 Nev. 234 (1880), cited, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 438 (1882), State v. California Mining Co., 16 Nev. 449, at 450 (1882), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Taxes on property of persons in same class must be assessed and collected under same general laws. Nev. Art. 4, § 20, relating to local or special laws, requires that property of persons belonging to same class be assessed and taxes thereon collected under same general laws. State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432 (1882)

Meaning of "for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes." As used in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, relating to local and special laws, the words "for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes," mean with respect to, or with regard to, such assessment and collection. State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432 (1882)

Statute which remitted penalty for nonpayment of taxes in some cases was prohibited special act. Where general act provided penalty for nonpayment of property taxes, statute which remitted penalty in some cases, but not in all, was special act in regard to collection of taxes and was prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 20, relating to local and special laws. State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432 (1882)

Fees of county officers collected for services do not constitute tax within meaning of section. Where two county officers sought writ of mandamus to compel payment of their claims for compensation based upon statutes which fixed salary of county officers, and contended that later statute upon same subject which provided for payment of such salary out of fees collected from persons requiring services of county officers was void under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits passage of local or special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for county purposes, writ was denied, because fees of county officers which are collected for public services do not constitute tax under Nev. Art. 4, § 20. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885)

Under section, fees, salaries and compensation of county officers do not relate to assessment and collection of taxes. Neither fees, salaries nor compensation of county officers is named or necessarily implied in provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits legislature from passing any local or special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes, because fees, salaries and compensation would not generally be understood as relating to assessment and collection of taxes. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), cited, State ex rel. McNamee v. Spinner, 22 Nev. 213, at 217, 37 Pac. 837 (1894), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Each county tax rate is fixed without reference to rate established in other counties. Neither Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits passage of local or special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes, nor Nev. Art. 10, § 1, which requires that legislature provide for uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, should be construed as prohibition upon power of legislature to delegate authority to county commissioners to fix rate of taxation for county purposes in the several counties, because such taxation has never been uniform throughout state, and rate is fixed in each county without reference to rate established in other counties. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), cited, Comstock Mill & Mining Co. v. Allen, 21 Nev. 325, at 331, 31 Pac. 434 (1892), State ex rel. McNamee v. Spinner, 22 Nev. 213, at 217, 37 Pac. 837 (1894), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Section was intended to apply only to laws regulating method of assessing and collecting taxes. Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits passage of local or special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes, was intended to apply only to laws which regulate method of assessing and collecting taxes for purposes of general revenue, and hence did not prohibit enactment of statute which regulated compensation of county officers in the several counties for all services and ex officio services required of them by law, because statute did not impose tax for revenue purposes, but simply required payment of reasonable compensation for services performed by such officers. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), cited, Comstock Mill & Mining Co. v. Allen, 21 Nev. 325, at 331, 31 Pac. 434 (1892), McNamee v. Spinner, 22 Nev. 213, at 217, 37 Pac. 837 (1894), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, at 402, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925)

Framers of constitution did not intend section to restrict power of legislature to regulate fees and compensation of county officers. Where examination of debates at constitutional convention relating to Nev. Art. 4, § 20, revealed that question whether legislature should be prohibited from passing local or special laws regulating compensation of county officers was fully discussed and fairly presented, and that all clauses relating to such subject were excluded in expressing will of convention, it became conclusive that members did not intend to place any restrictions upon power of legislature to regulate fees and compensation of county officers by any of provisions enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), cited, Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910)

Enactment of law applicable within certain classification of counties based upon voting population is not prohibited. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting enactment of local and special laws in certain cases, and Nev. Art. 4, § 21, requiring laws to be uniform and of general application, do not prohibit enactment of law which is applicable within certain classification of counties, based upon voting population, if in its operation and effect the law is so framed as to apply in future to all counties coming within class mentioned, and classification is based on real and substantial grounds. State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, 15 Pac. 783 (1887), cited, Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, at 86, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev. 339, at 341, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972), Reid v. Woofter, 88 Nev. 378, at 380, 498 P.2d 361 (1972), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 264, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981), distinguished, McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950)

Statute applicable to all saloons and gaming houses within certain class and of uniform operation throughout state was not special or local act. Statute fixing time for opening and closing of saloons and gaming houses which applied to all saloons and gaming houses throughout state which came within class mentioned in the act, and as to such classes and places of business was of uniform operation throughout state, was not local or special act prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 20. Ex parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, 21 Pac. 322 (1889), cited, Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, at 350, 75 Pac. 1 (1904)

Act requiring state board to assess railroad property while all other property was assessed by county assessors did not violate section. Statute which required that state board assess railroad property, while all other property was assessed by county assessors, was general law not violative of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting special laws for assessment and collection of taxes, because it applied to all railroads within state, which constituted distinct class of property concerning which it was proper to adopt different assessment plan from that applicable to other kinds of property. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437 (1893)

Courts cannot interfere so long as classification is not based on unreasonable distinction between same kinds of property. In determining whether legislation violates Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local or special laws for assessment and collection of taxes, so long as classification is not based upon invidious or unreasonable distinction with reference to same kinds of property, courts cannot interfere. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437 (1893)

Law authorizing county sheriff to appoint night watchman was prohibited local and special law. Although former act authorizing sheriff of Eureka County to appoint night watchman attempted to create an office, in action by one appointed under act, it was immaterial whether plaintiff was officer or employee, as act was local and special and offended Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local and special laws regulating county business. Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91, 35 Pac. 833 (1894), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

No restrictions on legislature on subject of compensation of county and township officers. Amendment to Nev. Art. 4, § 20, providing that nothing in such section should be construed to restrict power of legislature to regulate compensation and fees of county and township officers removed all restrictions upon legislature to enact legislation on subject of compensation of county and township officers. State ex rel. McNamee v. Spinner, 22 Nev. 213, 37 Pac. 837 (1894)

Statute which regulated business of county was void. Statute which constituted one county a municipal corporation, and provided for its government by exercise of sweeping powers, such as right to hold both real and personal property, and to receive bequests, gifts and donations of property, either in fee simple or in trust for charitable or other purposes, was both local and special, and, because it unquestionably regulated business of county, it was invalid as in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which forbids local and special laws regulating county business. Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 289 (1896), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Law granting one county comparitively large and varied powers was local and special act and also violated constitutional requirement of system of uniform county government throughout state. In comparison with laws governing all of other counties in state, statute which constituted one county a municipal corporation with large and varied powers, such as right to have seal and to hold both real and personal property, either within or without the municipality, was in conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which forbids local and special laws regulating county business, and Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish system of county government which shall be uniform throughout state. Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 289 (1896), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Where second section of statute was severable if it violated prohibition on special and local acts, first section was not invalidated. Where first section of act disincorporated city, and second section established unincorporated town with same boundaries as city, but general law provided that boundaries of towns should be fixed by boards of county commissioners, second section was severable and, if violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit special laws in certain cases, did not invalidate first section. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899)

Court will not consider objection to constitutionality of statute by person whose rights it does not affect. Court will not consider objection to constitutionality of statute by person whose rights it does not affect, and person who was not creditor of city could not challenge constitutionality of act disincorporating city on grounds that provisions made for audit and payment of claims against city were special legislation prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, and impaired obligation of contracts under Nev. Art. 1, § 15. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899), cited, In re Goddard, 44 Nev. 128, at 134, 190 Pac. 916 (1920), Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, at 312, 202 Pac. 802 (1922), Doolittle v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 54 Nev. 319, at 321, 15 P.2d 684 (1932)

Special act disincorporating city and providing that unincorporated town take the place of city in all judicial proceedings did not violate section. Special act disincorporating city, and providing that all judicial proceedings by or against city could be continued by or against unincorporated town created by act, was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit special laws in certain cases, although general act, sec. 1, ch. 48, Stats. 1881 (cf. NRS 269.140), provided that actions by unincorporated towns should be maintained by county commissioners, because special act did not prevent compliance with general act by substitution. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899)

Act providing 8-hour day for men working in mines was valid exercise of police power. Secs. 1-4, ch. 10, Stats. 1903 (cf. NRS 608.200), providing for 8-hour day for men working in mines, smelters, and mills for reduction of ores is valid exercise of police power of state and is not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which provide that in all cases where general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation. Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1 (1904), cited, In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, at 112, 85 Pac. 453 (1906), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Prohibition on any bank officer receiving deposits if he knows bank insolvent is not violation of section. Secs. 1 and 2, ch. 184, Stats. 1907 (cf. NRS 668.045), making it crime for any bank officer to receive deposits if he knows bank is insolvent, is not unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting enactment of special laws for punishment of crimes and misdemeanors, or on ground that it is class legislation, because prohibition does not apply where basis of classification is reasonable. Ex parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 43, 99 Pac. 700 (1909), cited, Ex parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, at 85, 100 Pac. 134 (1909), Ex parte Smith, 33 Nev. 466, at 473, 111 Pac. 930 (1910), Nevada Industrial Comm’n v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, at 448, 171 Pac. 511 (1918)

Act authorizing certain county to issue bonds to build courthouse and jail was not violation of section. Act authorizing particular county to issue bonds to build courthouse and jail was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local or special laws regulating county business, or Nev. Art. 4, §§ 21 and 25, requiring that county governments be uniform and that all laws be general and of uniform operation throughout state, and writ of mandamus was granted to compel issuance of bonds. State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, 99 Pac. 855 (1909), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 22, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), In re Dotta, 38 Nev. 1, at 4, 143 Pac. 305 (1914), Buck v. Boerlin, 45 Nev. 131, at 134, 198 Pac. 556 (1921), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 335, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

Special act upon subject which could have been covered by general act was unconstitutional. That 1903 act authorizing board of county commissioners of particular county to provide that certain prisoners be confined in branch county jail instead of county jail was special act upon subject which could be covered by general act, and therefore unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21 and 25, was demonstrated by fact that in 1907 legislature passed such general act, sec. 1, ch. 136, Stats. 1907 (cf. NRS 211.090), which authorized county commissioners of the several counties to provide that certain prisoners be confined in branch county jail instead of county jail. Wolf v. County of Humboldt, 32 Nev. 174, 105 Pac. 286 (1909), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Statute authorizing particular county commissioners to imprison certain prisoners in branch county jail instead of county jail was unconstitutional. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating, inter alia, county or township business, Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that in all cases enumerated in sec. 20 all laws shall be general and operate uniformly throughout state, and Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which provides that legislature shall establish system of county and township government which shall be uniform throughout state, statute was unconstitutional which authorized board of county commissioners of particular county to provide for imprisonment of certain prisoners in branch county jail instead of county jail. Wolf v. County of Humboldt, 32 Nev. 174, 105 Pac. 286 (1909), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

General law fixing uniform compensation for all officers in every county cannot be enacted. Act regulating fees for official services in state which provided that it did not apply to or affect fees of officers of any county where total vote did not exceed 800 did not violate Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit certain local and special laws and provide that wherever possible all laws shall be general and operate uniformly throughout state, because general law fixing uniform compensation for all officers in every county cannot be enacted as it would result in inadequate compensation in sparsely populated counties and excessive compensation in populous counties. Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), cited, Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, at 230, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Where emergency conditions existed, removal of county seat by special act when general law for removal was in effect was not violation of section. Although general law for removal of county seats was in effect, special act providing for removal of county seat was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which require that all laws be general where general laws can be made applicable, where emergency conditions existed, including destruction of county court house by fire, and, in action by taxpayer residing in existing county seat, injunction to restrain board of county commissioners from removing county seat was properly denied. Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), cited, In re Dotta, 38 Nev. 1, at 4, 143 Pac. 305 (1914), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 117, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Law directing attorney general to act for state in particular case is not law regulating practice of courts. Statute which directs attorney general to act for state in particular case is not law regulating practice of courts, and hence is not violative of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass special laws regulating practice of courts. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 37 Nev. 55, 139 Pac. 505, 142 Pac. 627 (1914)

Act authorizing attorney general to intervene on behalf of state in any action concerning receivership of certain bank did not attempt to regulate court practice. Statute which authorized attorney general to intervene and proceed on behalf of state in any action then pending concerning receivership of certain bank did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass special laws regulating practice of courts, because statute did not attempt to regulate court practice or to vacate orders of trial court, but rather prescribed a practice which, so far as it pertained to courts, was general one regulated by statutes and court rules applicable to other litigants under similar conditions. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 37 Nev. 55, 139 Pac. 505, 142 Pac. 627 (1914)

Any special act attempting to grant divorces is void. Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass special laws granting divorces, would render void any special act attempting to grant divorce, as divorces were granted by parliament and state legislatures prior to adoption of such constitutional provisions in this and other states. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914)

Legislature considers power to fix rates for common carriers or utilities vested in itself, not courts. Courts are precluded by constitution from performing legislative functions. Power of legislature to fix rates for common carriers or public service utilities is recognized by Nev. Art. 4, § 20, as legislative. Legislature by creating commissions to fix such rates and limiting courts in their review has demonstrated that it considers such power to be vested in itself by constitution. Garson v. Steamboat Canal Co., 43 Nev. 298, 185 Pac. 801, 1119 (1919), cited, Degiovanni v. Public Service Comm’n, 45 Nev. 74, at 79, 197 Pac. 582 (1921)

Statute pertaining to district court proceedings to confirm organization of irrigation districts was not special law regulating court practice. Secs. 19 and 20, ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS 539.565 and 539.567), pertaining to proceedings in district court to confirm organization of irrigation districts, did not conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits legislature from passing local or special laws regulating practice of courts of justice. Such sections do not confer special privilege, and are general in application. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), In re Lovelock Irr. Dist., 51 Nev. 215, at 220, 273 Pac. 983 (1929)

Statute authorizing particular county to sell bonds for purchase of power and phone line was constitutional. Statute authorizing particular county to sell bonds in order to purchase power and telephone line was not unconstitutional as being in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits enactment of local or special laws regulating county business, or of secs. 21 or 25 thereof, which require that system of county government be uniform and that where general law can be made applicable all laws shall be general, and petition for writ of prohibition to prevent county officers from proceeding with purchase was denied. Buck v. Boerlin, 45 Nev. 131, 198 Pac. 556 (1921)

Statute authorizing county commissioners to regulate and license vehicles for hire was not violation of section. Statute authorizing boards of county commissioners to regulate and issue licenses to motor vehicles for hire was not violative of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, as attempt to regulate county affairs by local or special law, because law was general law and applied to all counties and all motor vehicles for hire without discrimination, and fact that diverse results might flow from execution of power did not make enactment local law to regulate county affairs. Ex rel. Ginnochio v. Shaughnessy, 47 Nev. 129, 217 Pac. 581 (1923), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 96, 227 P.2d 206 (1951)

Statute authorizing payment of claim of individual against county was unconstitutional special statute. Although legislature may in some circumstances enact local and special statutes, it may not in any of cases specified in Nev. Art. 4, § 20. Statute authorizing payment of claim of individual against county was special statute undertaking to regulate county business and was unconstitutional. McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950)

Special statutes relating to county business which cannot be made general in application are not authorized. Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that in cases where general law can be made applicable all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state, is not to be construed together with Nev. Art. 4, § 20, as authorizing special statutes relating to county business which cannot be made general in application, and special statute authorizing claim of individual against county was void. McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950)

Mandatory special law for person to recover claim against county was unconstitutional. Where legislature passed special law for benefit of person wishing to recover claim against county, if such statute were construed as mandatory it was unconstitutional, because Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibits local or special laws regulating county business, and if it merely authorized payment of claim, county commissioners by refusing such claim exercised their discretion, and claimant could not recover amount of claim in civil action. McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950)

Legislature reserved power to pass special laws relating to fees and salaries of county and township officers. During convention which formulated Nevada constitution, motion was made and adopted which amended originally proposed provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, by removing restriction against legislature which would have prohibited it from passing local and special laws pertaining to county and township officers and their fees and salaries, and legislature was not denied power to pass such laws, and subsequent amendment of that section expressly reserving such power to legislature only stated right which legislature would have had if there had been no such reservation. Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), cited, State v. Lincoln County Power Dist., 60 Nev. 401, at 405, 111 P.2d 528 (1941)

Power to legislate salaries of township officers. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, right to legislate upon question of salaries of township officers was legislative. Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925)

Statute which empowered board of county commissioners to fix compensation of township officers was unlawful delegation of power. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 1, legislative authority of Nevada is vested in legislature, and, although Nev. Art. 4, § 20, provided that legislature had power to establish and regulate compensation of township officers, statute which empowered board of county commissioners to fix compensation of township officers was unlawful delegation of power, and duly elected, qualified and acting constable was entitled to be paid monthly salary of $150 under local act of legislature enacted a number of years before, rather than $125 pursuant to action of board of county commissioners under more recent act. Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), cited, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 411, at 413, 264 Pac. 696 (1928), distinguished, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 237, at 245, 255 Pac. 1073 (1927)

Legislature not prevented from delegating power to fix compensation of township officers to county commissioners. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting certain local and special laws, do not prevent legislature from delegating to the various boards of county commissioners power to fix compensation of township officers. Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 237, 255 Pac. 1073 (1927), cited, Ritts v. Humboldt Co., 50 Nev. 247, at 247, 255 Pac. 1076 (1927)

Nevada Irrigation District Act does not violate section. Nevada Irrigation District Act, ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS ch. 539), does not violate Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, prohibiting local and special laws and requiring that laws be of uniform application. In re Lovelock Irr. Dist., 51 Nev. 215, 273 Pac. 983 (1929), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Section is the only constitutional provision in Nevada relating to change of venue. Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits legislature from passing local of special laws providing for changing the venue in civil and criminal cases is only constitutional provision in Nevada relating to change of venue. State ex rel. Elsman v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 52 Nev. 379, 287 Pac. 957 (1930)

Section requiring elector approval of municipal bonds was neither local nor special law. Statute which required that issuance of bonds by municipality be approved by majority of electors involved who were not real property owners, as well as by majority of electors involved who were owners of real property, was neither local nor special law, because it operated over whole state, and equally upon all within classes into which it divided qualified electors, and therefore did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits passage of special laws in certain enumerated cases, or Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state wherever possible. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)

General rule that if statute is special or local and comes within cases enumerated in section it is unconstitutional. Under provisions such as Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which forbids passage of local or special laws in certain enumerated cases, and Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state wherever possible, it is general rule that if statute is either special or local, or both, and comes within any of cases enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, such statute is unconstitutional, whereas if statute is local or special or both, but does not come within any of such enumerated cases, its constitutionality depends upon whether general law can be made applicable. Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), cited, Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 87, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 67 Nev. 173, at 191, 216 P.2d 985 (1950), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978)

Statute authorizing issuance of county bonds by county commissioners was not law regulating county business. Where statute was enacted authorizing board of county commissioners to issue $500,000 worth of county bonds, deliver them to county water conservation district, and collect tax for their payment, all in order to enable county to take advantage of offer by United States to advance $1,000,000 for water storage project, even if such statute was either special or local, or both, it was not law regulating county business or for assessment and collection of taxes for county purposes within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which forbids passage of local or special laws in such cases. Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), cited, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 335, 580 P.2d 460 (1978), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Writ of mandamus issued where special statute for issuance of county bonds did not violate section. In mandamus proceeding to compel issuance of county bonds for hospital purposes under special statute, where it appeared that bonds were for valid public purpose and statute did not violate provisions of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, regulating special legislation, peremptory writ of mandamus was issued. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Tests of constitutionality were whether special act fell within enumerated categories of legislation and whether general law could be made applicable. In mandamus proceeding to compel issuance of county bonds for hospital purposes, tests of constitutionality to be applied to special act authorizing issue were whether it fell within any of enumerated categories of special legislation prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 20, and if not, whether general law could be made applicable, as required wherever possible by Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, at 83, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 518, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Special statute not prohibited where it related only to one project and had no general application. Special statute which authorized issuance of bonds for county hospital purposes, levy of a tax, and redemption of bonds, was not local or special law regulating county business within prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, because it related only to single project and had no general application. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 88 Nev. 582, at 586, 503 P.2d 454 (1972), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 335, 580 P.2d 460 (1978), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Special statute which authorized tax to retire bonds but did not affect general procedure of tax assessment and collection was not prohibited. Special statute which authorized issuance of bonds for county hospital purposes and levy of tax to retire them, but did not affect general procedures of assessment and collection, was not local or special law for assessment and collection of taxes within prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 20. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 335, 580 P.2d 460 (1978), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

General rule that constitutionality of special or local statute that does not fall within enumerated categories depends on whether general law can be made applicable. As general rule, if statute is special or local, or both, and comes within one or more of categories enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which restricts legislative power, such statute is unconstitutional, and if statute is special or local and does not come within any of such categories, its constitutionality depends upon whether general law can be made applicable. McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), cited, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977)

Act establishing commissioner districts in specific county and providing for election of county commissioners was prohibited special law. Act which established commissioner districts in specified county and provided for election of members of board of county commissioners in such districts was special law which regulated county and township business, and as such was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), cited, State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, at 34, 38, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), Hanson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 75 Nev. 27, at 30, 333 P.2d 994 (1959), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute establishing county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void. Statute which established county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void as local and special law not uniform in application as required by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), cited, State ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev. 339, at 342, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Act providing for taxation of agricultural land on basis of its use rather than value was unconstitutional special law. Act which provided that agricultural land should be taxed on basis of its use under certain conditions rather than on basis of value was unconstitutional, because Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibits special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes, Nev. Art. 4, § 21, provides that all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state, and Nev. Art. 10, § 1, contains clear constitutional mandate that legislature provide uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation and secure just valuation for taxation of all property. Boyne v. State ex rel. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964), distinguished, List v. Whisler, 99 Nev. 133, at 140, 660 P.2d 104 (1983)

Statute providing for election of justices of the peace was not prohibited special law even though applicable to only one township. NRS 4.020, subsec. 3, (and cf. NRS 0.050), providing for election of two justices of the peace in townships having population of 100,000 or more was not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit special and local laws and require that general laws have uniform application, although in fact statute applied to only one township at time it was enacted, because if there were other townships within classification it would have also applied to them. Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), cited, Reid v. Woofter, 88 Nev. 378, at 380, 498 P.2d 361 (1972), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 263, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

City ordinances and special charters are exempt from prohibition against special laws. In prosecution for violation of city ordinance, contention of petitioner that claimed violation should have been prosecuted in name of State of Nevada because of prohibition of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, against special laws was without merit because Nev. Art. 8, § 1, allows special charters and thus exempts city ordinances and such charters from prohibition against special laws and because city charter provided for prosecution in name of city. McGill v. Chief of Police of City of Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 307, 454 P.2d 28 (1969), cited, Williams v. Municipal Judge of City of Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 425, at 428, 456 P.2d 440 (1969)

Statute which authorized creation of trust for public functions was not local or special law. Former NRS ch. 242B, which authorized creation of express trust for furtherance of public functions and allowed governmental subdivision to be beneficiary thereof, was not local or special law prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 20, because it was statewide in application and did not purport to regulate county business. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 88 Nev. 582, 503 P.2d 454 (1972), cited, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, at 334, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973)

County Economic Development Bond Law was not prohibited local or special law. County Economic Development Revenue Bond Law (see NRS 244A.669 et seq.) was not local or special law prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 20, because it was statewide in application and may be utilized by all counties in state without classification. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973)

Tahoe Regional Planning Compact was not prohibited local or special law. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (see NRS 277.190 et seq.) was not local or special law prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, because compact was enacted to achieve regional goals in conserving natural resources of entire Lake Tahoe Basin and thus did not violate Nev. Art. 19, § 4, which reserves to registered voters of each county and municipality powers of initiative and referendum as to local, special and municipal legislation. State ex rel. List v. County of Douglas, 90 Nev. 272, 524 P.2d 1271 (1974), cited, State ex rel. List v. County of Douglas, 92 Nev. 114, at 115, 546 P.2d 235 (1976)

Sections of statute which applied specifically to Clark County and provided for election of commissioners from commissioner districts were void as local or special legislation. Sections 163 to 168, inclusive, ch. 648, Stats. 1975, which applied specifically to Clark County and to no other county in state and provided, among other things, for election of 11 commissioners from seven commissioner districts as part of plan for partial consolidation of certain local government functions, were void because they constituted local or special legislation violative of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, in absence of emergency situation justifying special legislation. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), cited, Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977)

Statute which sought to govern election in single designated county violated provisions against special or local laws. Where statute which endeavored to govern election of county commissioners in single, designated county having population in excess of 200,000 was special law violative of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, but it was clear that legislature intended that statutes governing such elections in smaller counties should not apply and that in counties with population of 200,000 or more number of county commissioners should be seven, supreme court ordered at-large election of seven county commissioners because time did not permit necessary redistricting for election from individual districts. Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute to enable Reno and Sparks to finance public improvements with tax increment districts violated law against special and local laws even though statute was not within cases enumerated in section. Statute passed to enable only the cities of Reno and Sparks to develop and finance certain public improvements through use of tax increment districts was special and local legislation, but since it was not within cases enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, constitutionality depended upon whether general law could be made applicable. In this situation, because problems of deterioration of downtown areas were not unique to Reno and Sparks and were not emergency circumstances requiring legislative interference by special legislation, general law could be made applicable and therefore special and local law violated Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, 566 P.2d 415 (1977)

Statute permitting county commissioners in any county whose population is 200,000 to issue general obligation bond for hospital project without voter approval did not violate section. Provision in NRS 450.290 empowering board of county commissioners in any county having population of 200,000 or more to issue general obligation bonds for any hospital project without voter approval did not constitute special or local legislation violative of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21. Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), cited, Clark County v. City of Las Vegas, 94 Nev. 74, at 76, 574 P.2d 1013 (1978), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978) County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 264, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Section does not prohibit law "relating to," "concerning" or "pertaining to" county business. Washoe County Airport Authority Act (ch. 474, Stats. 1977), designed to transfer ownership and administration of airport from City of Reno to newly created airport authority, did not violate provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local or special laws regulating county and township business because provision prohibits only "regulating" county business by special law and does not prohibit such law "relating to," "pertaining to," or "concerning" county business. City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

District court erred in declaring statute relating to establishment of metropolitan police department unconstitutional as special law. District court erred in declaring former NRS 280.100, relating to establishment of metropolitan police departments, unconstitutional as special legislation (see Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21) on ground that as originally enacted it had required compliance on July 1, 1973, in each county having specified population, because legislature had amended statute in 1979 to delete date. If original insertion of date into statute rendered it unconstitutional, its deletion by amendment cured defect. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute making mandatory consolidation of law enforcement agencies of county and county seat held constitutional. Provision in former NRS 280.100 making consolidation of law enforcement agencies of county and county seat mandatory in counties having population of 200,000 or more was not unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21 and 25, where population limitation (1) was prospectively applicable to all counties and county seats which might come within it, (2) was rationally related to subject matter and expressed purpose (see NRS 280.010) of NRS ch. 280, and (3) did not create odious, absurd or bizarre distinctions. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute did not merely "affect" county business and was properly found to violate constitution. Trial court found unconstitutional parts of ch. 682, Stats. 1985, purporting to transfer powers of planning, zoning, land division and building inspection from respondent county to appellant unincorporated town. On appeal, appellant argued that statute merely "affects" county business, but does not regulate it and therefore does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 20. Court found that powers purportedly vested by statute are broad and ongoing and substantially alter power structure of county. They do not relate only to single item or project of county business, as do statutes previously held to merely "affect" county business. Trial court properly determined that statute offended Nev. Art. 4, § 20. Town of Pahrump v. County of Nye, 105 Nev. 227, 773 P.2d 1224 (1989)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.

Statute providing for adjudication of vested water rights does not violate section. Statute providing for adjudication of vested water rights does not violate either Nev. Art. 4, § 20, or Nev. Art. 4, § 21, as it applies equally and uniformly to every stream and water user in state, and because placement of water rights in class by themselves is based on real and substantial difference between water rights and other classes of property. Bergman v. Kearney, 241 Fed. 884 (D. Nev. 1917)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Criminal statute applicable only to certain counties is unconstitutional. Criminal statute applicable only to counties having certain population at previous U.S. census is special class legislation and thus unconstitutional. AGO (3-17-1891)

Legislature cannot delegate authority to fix compensation of justices of the peace and constables. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, legislature is prohibited from fixing compensation of justices of the peace and constables except by general law. Thus legislature cannot delegate to county commissioners authority to fix such compensation, as this would result in different compensation in different counties, rather than generally applicable law which constitution requires. AGO 18 (2-21-1923)

Statute directing payment of fixed salaries to justices of the peace did not violate section. Statutes directing payment of salaries to de facto justices of the peace do not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 20, inasmuch as such statutes are not attempt to fix salaries, but are merely authority to pay salaries which are already fixed. AGO 178 (4-15-1925)

Act providing for compromise, adjustment or release of debt to state is general law. Act to provide for compromise, adjustment or release of indebtedness of persons to state is general law as distinguished from special act. AGO 294 (1-30-1928)

Statute authorizing county commissioners to operate power system is local act regulating county business. Statute authorizing commissioners of Mineral County to operate power system is of doubtful validity as it is local act regulating county business. AGO 32 (5-26-1931)

"General law" defined. General law is one which applies to class of persons rather than to mere individual or number of individuals within class. AGO 115 (8-24-1933)

Legislation which discriminates between members of class is unconstitutional. Legislation which creates certain class of persons, then discriminates between members of this class, is unconstitutional. AGO 115 (8-24-1933)

Constable’s salary must be fixed by general law. Salary of constable must be fixed by general law rather than special act. AGO A-2 (2-8-1939)

Legislature may not enact special statute fixing salary of justice of the peace. Legislature is powerless to enact special statute fixing salary of justice of the peace. AGO A-6 (3-14-1939)

Act authorizing agreements between counties and cities concerning fire protection districts is valid. Act authorizing cooperative agreements between counties and cities concerning fire protection districts is not invalid as local or special law, for although some counties and parts of counties cannot receive its benefits, act does apply equally to all parts of state. AGO 175 (11-25-1944)

Tax on right to bring particular action in state court is unconstitutional. Tax on right to bring particular action in state court is discriminatory and unconstitutional. AGO 425 (2-28-1947)

Legislature may not authorize waiver of payment of taxes in particular case. Legislature may not authorize waiver of payment of taxes in particular case since Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibits enactment of local or special laws respecting assessment and collection of taxes. AGO 427 (3-6-1947)

Statute consolidating offices of constable and deputy sheriff in only one county is unconstitutional. Statute consolidating offices of constable and deputy sheriff in only one county is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 20. AGO 714 (12-31-1948)

Legislature may not pass local or special laws in any enumerated case. Legislature may not pass local and special laws in any of cases enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, even though general law would be inapplicable under Nev. Art. 4, § 21. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Law does not require that election of assemblymen be uniform throughout state. Nothing in Nevada law requires that election of assemblymen be entirely uniform throughout state. Thus, special laws relating to such elections are constitutional. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Act creating commissioner districts in Clark County violated section. Special act creating county commissioner districts in Clark County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special or local legislation regulating county business. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Act creating commissioner districts in Washoe County violated section. Special act creating county commissioner districts in Washoe County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special or local legislation regulating county business. AGO 905 (4-11-1950)

Legislature has power to regulate fees of county officers by special and local acts. Legislature has power to regulate fees of county officers by special and local acts. AGO 922 (5-23-1950)

County commissioners elected under act subsequently declared unconstitutional can serve as de facto officers until election of new officers. Where county commissioners are elected under act which is subsequently declared unconstitutional, commissioners are de facto officers and can serve as such until new commissioners elected at soonest election qualify for office. AGO B 935 (7-7-1950)

Combining of governing bodies of Carson City and Ormsby County not permitted. Constitution does not permit governing bodies of Ormsby County and Carson City to be combined. AGO 26 (3-5-1951)

Statute regulating office hours of Clark County officers is invalid. Statute regulating office hours of county officers of Clark County is invalid special legislation. AGO 244 (4-9-1953)

Special gas tax on Nye County violates section. Sec. 36, ch. 381, Stats. 1955, providing for special gas tax for Nye County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, in that it regulates county business and levies tax on county by special law. AGO 222 (11-16-1956)

Statute providing for election of five commissioners in counties whose population is more than 50,000 did not violate section. Former NRS 244.013, which provided for election of five county commissioners in counties having 50,000 or more population, was reasonable legislative classification not in derogation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits passage of local or special laws by legislature regulating election of county and township offices. AGO 151 (4-8-1960)

Statute directing Clark County to issue bonds for construction of sports and convention facility did not violate section. Statute directing Clark County, acting through Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, to issue bonds to support construction of sports complex and convention facility (see ch. 582, Stats. 1977) is local law which does not violate Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21. It does not regulate county business, and legislature’s finding that general law could not be made applicable must be presumed valid in absence of clear, convincing and undoubted evidence to contrary. Further, validity of local legislation is not limited to emergencies and mandatory requirements of statute do not affect validity. AGO 215 (7-12-1977)

Sec: 21. General laws to have uniform application. In all cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State.

Section does not apply to expenses of legislature. Requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, that laws be general and of uniform application does not apply to legislation relating to expenses of legislature. State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15 (1869), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Clear violation required. Although the court has final authority to determine whether general law can be applicable in particular situation under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires that laws be general where general laws can be made applicable, court will not declare special or local law unconstitutional unless it is clear violation of that section. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23, at 28 (1871), Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, at 338 (1873), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 20, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 351, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Designating officers of new county. Statute creating new county and naming certain persons county officers until next general election, though special and local, is not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits enactment of special and local laws in certain enumerated cases or Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires general laws in all cases not enumerated where such laws can be made applicable. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), distinguished, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 442 (1882), State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, at 420, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 21 Nev. 517, at 525, 527, 34 Pac. 870 (1893), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Organization of new county. It is doubtful that general law could be made applicable to organization of newly created counties, and, where legislature provided for organization of new county by statute local and special in nature, court could not say that question was so free from doubt that statute violated provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires general laws in all cases in which they can be made applicable. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), distinguished, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432 (1882), State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, at 420, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 21 Nev. 517, at 525, 527, 34 Pac. 870 (1893), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Meaning of "applicable." Law to be "applicable" in sense in which that word is used in Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires general rather than special or local laws where general laws can be made applicable, must best subserve interests of people of state, or such class or portion as particular legislation is intended to affect. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 20, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 332, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

Court will not declare special or local law unconstitutional unless clear violation of that section. Although court has final authority to determine whether general law can be applicable in particular situation under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires that laws be general where general laws can be made applicable, court will not declare special or local law unconstitutional unless it is clear violation of that section. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23, at 28 (1871), Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, at 338 (1873), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 20, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 351, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Act providing for organization of new county did not violate section. It is doubtful that general law could be made applicable to organization of newly created counties, and, where legislature provided for organization of new county by statute local and special in nature, court could not say that question was so free from doubt that statute violated provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires general laws in all cases in which they can be made applicable. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), distinguished, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432 (1882), State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, at 420, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 21 Nev. 517, at 525, 527, 34 Pac. 870 (1893), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Law to be applicable must best subserve interests of people of state, or such class or portion as particular legislation is intended to affect. Law to be "applicable" in sense in which that word is used in Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires general rather than special or local laws where general laws can be made applicable, must best subserve interests of people of state, or such class or portion as particular legislation is intended to affect. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 20, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 332, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

General law must meet just purposes of legislation to be applicable. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which prohibits local and special laws where general laws can be made applicable, general law, to be applicable, must meet just purposes of legislation, and be calculated to subserve as well as any other interests of the people, or particular class affected. Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871)

Legislature may pass local or special law in proper case. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which prohibits local or special laws where general laws can be made applicable, special or local legislation is to be avoided so far as is practicable, but legislature may pass local or special law in proper case. Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871), cited, In re Estate of Sticknoth, 7 Nev. 233 (1872), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 177 P.2d 677 (1947)

In absence of showing that general law could have been made applicable to removal of certain county seat, special or local law will be upheld. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which prohibits local or special laws where general laws can be made applicable, legislature must decide whether or not general law can be made applicable, and that decision may be reviewed by courts, but it is presumed that legislature is correct, and, in absence of showing that general law could have been made applicable to removal of particular county seat, special or local law providing for such removal will be upheld. Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871), cited, Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, at 338 (1873), State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 443 (1882), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 20, 24, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 351, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 100, 177 P.2d 677 (1947)

When framers adopted this section they adopted judicial decision of state from which section was borrowed. When framers of constitution adopted Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which prohibits local or special laws where general laws can be made applicable, they adopted judicial decision of state from which it was borrowed which holds that it is competent for courts to inquire whether general law can be made applicable to subject matter of local or special law enacted by legislature, but they cannot be presumed to have adopted that part of the decision which holds that removal of county seats can be made subject of general law, for that was simply exercise of court’s judgment, and not constitutional interpretation or construction. Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871)

Statute excluding Negroes, Mongolians and Indians from public schools held unconstitutional. Statute which provided that "Negroes, Mongolians and Indians shall not be admitted into the public schools, . . ." was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires that laws be general and of uniform operation where general laws can be made applicable. State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 (1872) (concurring opinion), cited, Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, at 338 (1873)

Framers recognized cases would arise requiring passage of local or special laws. In enacting Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which provide that laws shall be general where general laws can be made applicable, framers of constitution recognized that cases would arise in ordinary course of legislation requiring local or special laws to be passed in instances where general laws might be applicable to subject but not to particular case. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, at 142 (1876), State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, at 253, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 314, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 21, 22, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, at 96, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 118, 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 353, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Legislative intent behind section. Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, were intended to prohibit legislature from passing any local or special law in any of cases enumerated in sec. 20, and to limit passing of other local or special laws in all other cases where general law would be applicable, that is, where general law would be adapted to wants of the people, would be suitable to just purposes of legislation, or would effect object sought to be accomplished. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 444 (1882), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 21, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, at 96, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 353, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

General law should always be construed as applicable where all people of state have interest in its subject. No general rule can be laid down to determine validity of any local or special law under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, but general law should always be construed as applicable in case where subject is one in which entire people of state have interest. Where only portion of people are affected, validity of special law depends on facts of particular case. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 21, 115 Pac. 177 (1911)

Question of whether general law can be made applicable is ultimately for courts to determine. Question whether or not general law can be made applicable, within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, is first one for legislature but finally for courts to determine. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 351, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Where other sections of statute were severable, section providing for removal of county seat was not rendered invalid. Where first section of statute provided for removal of county seat, and was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which require that laws be general where general laws can be made applicable, other sections providing for transfer of records and other details were severable and, even if invalid, did not invalidate first section. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873)

Validity of local or special law is presumed until shown beyond reasonable doubt that general law applies. Where local or special law has been passed, its validity under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, is presumed until facts are presented showing beyond any reasonable doubt that general law is applicable, and statute providing for removal of particular county seat was upheld in absence of such showing in action to enjoin removal. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322 (1873), cited, State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, at 238, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), State ex rel. Norcross v. Board of County Comm’rs, 22 Nev. 399, at 411, 41 Pac. 145 (1895), Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 21, 115 Pac. 177 (1911)

Statute requiring medical degree or 10 years of practice to practice medicine is not violation of section or privileges and immunities clause of U.S. Constitution. Statute which requires medical degree or 10 years of practice immediately preceding enactment of statute as prerequisite to practice of medicine is not violation of privileges and immunities clause of U.S. Art. IV, § 2, or of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that laws shall be general where general laws can be made applicable. Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323 (1875)

Object of section. Object of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that laws shall be general where general laws can be made applicable, is to prevent unfair discrimination between citizens, and to secure to everyone enjoyment of same privileges which are enjoyed by others in similar circumstances. Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323 (1875), cited, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 444 (1882)

Statute authorizing issuance of bonds for funding county debt does not violate section. Statute authorizing issuance of bonds for funding indebtedness of a county is not repugnant to Nev. Art. 4, § 21, requiring enactment of general law when such law is applicable. Odd Fellows Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Quillen, 11 Nev. 109 (1876), cited, Thompson v. Turner, 24 Nev. 292, at 293, 53 Pac. 178 (1898), State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, at 69, 99 Pac. 855 (1909), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 97, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), see also City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

Special laws creating municipal corporations are not prohibited. Special laws creating municipal corporations are not prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires all laws to be general and of uniform operation throughout state where general law can be made applicable. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 22, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Statute which purported to approve action of any district attorney who consented to entry of judgment without penalty in action for delinquent taxes was void. Statute which purported to ratify and approve action of any district attorney who had consented to entry of judgment, without statutory penalty, in any action for recovery of property taxes delinquent prior to particular date was special law for collection of state, county and township taxes, and was void under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21. State v. California Mining Co., 15 Nev. 234 (1880), cited, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 438 (1882), State v. California Mining Co., 16 Nev. 449, at 450 (1882), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

"Special law" defined. Special law, within meaning of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, is law which applies only to individual or to number of individuals selected from class to which they belong. It is law which affects individuals only and not class, one which imposes special burdens, or confers peculiar privileges upon one or more persons in no wise distinguished from others of same category. State v. California Mining Co., 15 Nev. 234 (1880), cited, Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, at 309, 30 Pac. 896 (1883), Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, at 399, 32 Pac. 437 (1893), Ex parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 43, at 52, 99 Pac. 700 (1909), State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 56, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 67 Nev. 173, at 191, 216 P.2d 985 (1950), Southwest Gas Corp. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 40, at 42, 449 P.2d 259 (1969)

Statute regulating compensation of county officers for all services and ex officio services required of them was not prohibited. Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that where general law can be made applicable, laws should be general and of uniform operation throughout state, did not prohibit enactment of statute which regulated compensation of county officers in several counties of state for all services and ex officio services required of them by law, because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to fix and graduate such compensation by population, or amount of fees collected, so as to make general law which would be applicable to every county in state. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), cited, Comstock Mill & Mining Co. v. Allen, 21 Nev. 325, at 331, 31 Pac. 434 (1892), State ex rel. McNamee v. Spinner, 22 Nev. 213, at 217, 37 Pac. 837 (1894), Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, at 313, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, at 402, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925)

Enactment of law applicable within certain classification of counties based upon voting population is not prohibited. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting enactment of local and special laws in certain cases, and Nev. Art. 4, § 21, requiring laws to be uniform and of general application, do not prohibit enactment of law which is applicable within certain classification of counties, based upon voting population, if in its operation and effect the law is so framed as to apply in future to all counties coming within class mentioned, and classification is based on real and substantial grounds. State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, 15 Pac. 783 (1887), cited, Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, at 86, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev. 339, at 341, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972), Reid v. Woofter, 88 Nev. 378, at 380, 498 P.2d 361 (1972), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 264, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981), distinguished, McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950)

Where second section of statute was severable if it violated prohibition on special and local acts, first section was not invalidated. Where first section of act disincorporated city, and second section established unincorporated town with same boundaries as city, but general law provided that boundaries of towns should be fixed by boards of county commissioners, second section was severable and, if violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit special laws in certain cases, did not invalidate first section. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899)

Special act disincorporating city and providing that unincorporated town take the place of city in all judicial proceedings did not violate section on local and special laws. Special act disincorporating city, and providing that all judicial proceedings by or against city could be continued by or against unincorporated town created by act, was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit special laws in certain cases, although general act, sec. 1, ch. 48, Stats. 1881 (cf. NRS 269.140), provided that actions by unincorporated towns should be maintained by county commissioners, because special act did not prevent compliance with general act by substitution. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899)

Court will not consider objection to constitutionality of statute by person whose rights it does not affect. Court will not consider objection to constitutionality of statute by person whose rights it does not affect, and person who was not creditor of city could not challenge constitutionality of act disincorporating city on grounds that provisions made for audit and payment of claims against city were special legislation prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, and impaired obligation of contracts under Nev. Art. 1, § 15. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 56 Pac. 1008 (1899), cited, In re Goddard, 44 Nev. 128, at 134, 190 Pac. 916 (1920), Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, at 312, 202 Pac. 802 (1922), Doolittle v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 54 Nev. 319, at 321, 15 P.2d 684 (1932)

Statute providing 8-hour day for men working in mines was valid exercise of police power. Secs. 1-4, ch. 10, Stats. 1903 (cf. NRS 608.200), providing for 8-hour day for men working in mines, smelters, and mills for reduction of ores is valid exercise of police power of state and is not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which provide that in all cases where general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation. Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1 (1904), cited, In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, at 112, 85 Pac. 453 (1906), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Statute which awards attorney’s fee to one who recovers damages for unlawful trespass of livestock upon his land is valid. Sec. 2, ch. 31, Stats. 1893 (cf. NRS 568.300), which awards attorney’s fee to one who recovers damages for unlawful trespass of livestock upon his land, is proper police regulation tending to prevent trespass, tortious acts and breaches of peace, to encourage settlement and home building, to protect important industries, to increase population and taxable property, to decrease crime, and consequently to promote welfare of state, and therefore such statute is not in conflict with equal protection clause of U.S. 14th amendment, with Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires that all laws be general and of uniform operation throughout state, or with any other provision of state constitution. Pyramid Land & Stock Co. v. Pierce, 30 Nev. 237, 95 Pac. 210 (1908), cited, Ansolabehere v. Laborde, 73 Nev. 93, at 99, 310 P.2d 842 (1957)

Act authorizing certain county to issue bonds to build courthouse and jail was not violation of section. Act authorizing particular county to issue bonds to build courthouse and jail was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local or special laws regulating county business, or Nev. Art. 4, §§ 21 and 25, requiring that county governments be uniform and that all laws be general and of uniform operation throughout state, and writ of mandamus was granted to compel issuance of bonds. State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, 99 Pac. 855 (1909), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 22, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), In re Dotta, 38 Nev. 1, at 4, 143 Pac. 305 (1914), Buck v. Boerlin, 45 Nev. 131, at 134, 198 Pac. 556 (1921), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 335, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

Statute authorizing particular county commissioners to imprison certain prisoners in branch county jail instead of county jail was unconstitutional. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating, inter alia, county or township business, Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that in all cases enumerated in sec. 20 all laws shall be general and operate uniformly throughout state, and Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which provides that legislature shall establish system of county and township government which shall be uniform throughout state, statute was unconstitutional which authorized board of county commissioners of particular county to provide for imprisonment of certain prisoners in branch county jail instead of county jail. Wolf v. County of Humboldt, 32 Nev. 174, 105 Pac. 286 (1909), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Special act upon subject which could have been covered by general act was unconstitutional. That a 1903 act authorizing board of county commissioners of particular county to provide that certain prisoners be confined in branch county jail instead of county jail was special act upon subject which could be covered by general act, and therefore unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21 and 25, was demonstrated by fact that in 1907 the legislature passed such a general act, sec. 1, ch. 136, Stats. 1907 (cf. NRS 211.090), which authorized county commissioners of the several counties to provide that certain prisoners be confined in branch county jail instead of county jail. Wolf v. County of Humboldt, 32 Nev. 174, 105 Pac. 286 (1909), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

General law fixing uniform compensation for all officers in every county cannot be enacted. Act regulating fees for official services in state which provided that it did not apply to or affect fees of officers of any county where total vote did not exceed 800 did not violate Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit certain local and special laws and provide that wherever possible all laws shall be general and operate uniformly throughout state, because general law fixing uniform compensation for all officers in every county cannot be enacted as it would result in inadequate compensation in sparsely populated counties and excessive compensation in populous counties. Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304, 107 Pac. 890 (1910), cited, Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, at 230, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Where emergency conditions existed, removal of county seat by special act when general law for removal was in effect was not violation of section. Although general law for removal of county seats was in effect, special act providing for removal of county seat was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which require that all laws be general where general laws can be made applicable, where emergency conditions existed, including destruction of county courthouse by fire, and, in action by taxpayer residing in existing county seat, injunction to restrain board of county commissioners from removing county seat was properly denied. Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), cited, In re Dotta, 38 Nev. 1, at 4, 143 Pac. 305 (1914), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 117, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Statute requiring 1 year residency for court to have jurisdiction to grant divorce was not in conflict with section. Provision in sec. 1, ch. 10, Stats. 1913 (cf. NRS 125.020), that where, at time cause of divorce accrues, parties are not both bona fide residents of state, no court shall have jurisdiction unless one of parties has been bona fide resident of state for not less than 1 year preceding commencement of action, applies same throughout state to all persons under similar circumstances, and is not in conflict with requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, that wherever possible all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230 (1914), cited, Davis v. Davis, 54 Nev. 267, at 273, 13 P.2d 1109 (1932), State ex rel. Hoffman v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 68 Nev. 333, at 335, 232 P.2d 397 (1951)

Legislative authorization of construction of high school by special act did not violate section. Where general school act was in effect which provided means for establishing county high schools without further legislative action, and legislature thereafter authorized construction of high school by special act, such act was not contrary to provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires that laws be of general and uniform operation. In re Dotta, 38 Nev. 1, 143 Pac. 305 (1914), cited, Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 97, 177 P.2d 677 (1947)

Act authorizing particular county to sell bonds for purchase of power and phone line was constitutional. Statute authorizing particular county to sell bonds in order to purchase power and telephone line was not unconstitutional as being in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits enactment of local or special laws regulating county business, or of secs. 21 or 25 thereof, which require that system of county government be uniform and that where general law can be made applicable all laws shall be general, and petition for writ of prohibition to prevent county officers from proceeding with purchase was denied. Buck v. Boerlin, 45 Nev. 131, 198 Pac. 556 (1921)

Statute requiring county commissioners to regulate and license vehicles for hire was general law of uniform operation. Statute which required that boards of county commissioners enact ordinances to regulate licensing and operation of motor vehicles for hire was general law of uniform operation throughout state under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, even though each county was required to complete act by enacting ordinances. Ex rel. Ginnochio v. Shaughnessy, 47 Nev. 129, 217 Pac. 581 (1923), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 96, 227 P.2d 206 (1951)

Statute authorizing claim of individual against county was void. Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that in cases where general law can be made applicable all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state, is not to be construed together with Nev. Art. 4, § 20, as authorizing special statutes relating to county business which cannot be made general in application, and special statute authorizing claim of individual against county was void. McDermott v. County Comm’rs, 48 Nev. 93, 227 Pac. 1014 (1924), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950)

Statute relating to use of water for livestock had uniform application and did not violate section. Ch. 201, Stats. 1925 (cf. NRS 533.485 et seq.), relating to use of water for watering livestock, being general in its terms, applying to every person in similar circumstances, and operating uniformly throughout state, does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 21, requiring that laws be general and of uniform operation. In re Calvo, 50 Nev. 125, 253 Pac. 671 (1927), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Nevada Irrigation District Act does not violate section. Nevada Irrigation District Act, ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS ch. 539), does not violate Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, prohibiting local and special laws and requiring that laws be of uniform application. In re Lovelock Irr. Dist., 51 Nev. 215, 273 Pac. 983 (1929), cited, Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Act requiring elector approval of municipal bonds was neither local nor special law. Statute which required that issuance of bonds by municipality be approved by majority of electors involved who were not real property owners, as well as by majority of electors involved who were owners of real property, was neither local nor special law, because it operated over whole state, and equally upon all within classes into which it divided qualified electors, and therefore did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits passage of special laws in certain enumerated cases, or Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state wherever possible. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)

Presumption that legislature had reasonable basis for deciding that general act would not be applicable. Where, in order to enable county water conservation district to take advantage of offer by United States to advance $1,000,000 for water storage project, statute was enacted authorizing board of county commissioners to issue $500,000 worth of county bonds, and purpose of such statute was not simply to evade earlier statute relating to bond elections, it had to be presumed that legislature had reasonable basis for deciding that general act would not be applicable, and therefore former statute did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which requires that all laws be general and of uniform operation throughout state wherever possible. Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), cited, Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 93, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

General rule that constitutionality of special or local statute that does not fall within enumerated categories depends on whether general law can be made applicable. Under provisions such as Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which forbids passage of local or special laws in certain enumerated cases, and Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state wherever possible, it is general rule that if statute is either special or local, or both, and comes within any of cases enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, such statute is unconstitutional, whereas if statute is local or special or both, but does not come within any of such enumerated cases, its constitutionality depends upon whether general law can be made applicable. Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), cited, Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 87, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 67 Nev. 173, at 191, 216 P.2d 985 (1950), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978)

Court seldom goes contra to strong presumption that legislature has good reason for determining that general law is not applicable. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that in all cases enumerated in preceding section, and in all other cases where general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state, whether or not general law is or would be applicable is for court to decide, but in absence of showing to the contrary, court seldom goes contra to very strong presumption that legislature has good reason for determining that general law is not or would not be applicable in some particular case. Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Courts determine whether general law can be made applicable to certain situation. Nev. Art. 4, § 21, requires that where general law can be made applicable laws shall be uniform throughout state, and question whether general law can be made applicable to particular situation is one for courts to determine. Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Statute fixing time limit for improvement bonds violated section. NCL § 1382, which fixes time limit for improvement bonds at 10 years, did not meet test of applicability of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that where general law can be made applicable laws shall be uniform throughout state, where it was not adapted to serve needs of people of city for improvements different and more costly than those authorized by general municipal bond law. Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Tests of constitutionality were whether special act fell within enumerated categories of legislation and whether general law could be made applicable. In mandamus proceeding to compel issuance of county bonds for hospital purposes, tests of constitutionality to be applied to special act authorizing issue were whether it fell within any of enumerated categories of special legislation prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 20, and if not, whether general law could be made applicable, as required wherever possible by Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, at 83, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 518, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Writ of mandamus issued where special statute for issuance of county bonds did not violate provision. In mandamus proceeding to compel issuance of county bonds for hospital purposes under special statute, where it appeared that bonds were for valid public purpose and statute did not violate provisions of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, regulating special legislation, peremptory writ of mandamus was issued. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Court presumed legislature had good reason for determining general statute did not apply. In mandamus proceeding to compel issuance of county bonds for hospital purposes under special law authorizing bond issue without submission to electorate, where general statute, ch. 95, Stats. 1933 (cf. NRS 350.020 et seq.), required submission, court presumed that legislature in enacting later special statute had good reason for determining that general statute did not apply, and refused to hold later statute unconstitutional as special law where general law could be made applicable, in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), cited, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), distinguished, County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

If fencing statute were construed to apply to only part of a ditch it would lack uniformity required by section. In action to require fencing of irrigation ditch, if fencing statute, NCL § 5630 (cf. NRS 455.010), were construed to apply to only part of a ditch to bring it within jurisdictional limit of justice’s court as required by statute, statute would be unconstitutional because it would lack uniformity of application required by Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Orr Ditch & Water Co. v. Justice Court, 64 Nev. 138, 178 P.2d 558 (1947)

Statute licensing business that supplied information to race horse books was not special law in violation of section. Statute which provided for licensing of business of supplying horse racing information to race horse books, although its application depended on receipt of information from sources outside state and upon exclusion of public utilities from its operation, was of general uniform operation and was not law of special operation in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, because although it did not operate upon every person in state, it did operate upon every person brought within relation and circumstances described in act. Dunn v. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 67 Nev. 173, 216 P.2d 985 (1950), cited, Cohen v. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 67 Nev. 199, at 200, 216 P.2d 998 (1950)

Act establishing commissioner districts in specific county and providing for election of county commissioners was prohibited special law. Act which established commissioner districts in specified county and provided for election of members of board of county commissioners in such districts was special law which regulated county and township business, and as such was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), cited, State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, at 34, 38, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), Hanson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 75 Nev. 27, at 30, 333 P.2d 994 (1959), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute establishing county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void. Statute which established county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void as local and special law not uniform in application as required by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), cited, State ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev. 339, at 342, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Equality guaranteed by equal protection clause. Equality guaranteed by equal protection clause of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, is equality under same conditions and among persons similarly situated. Boyne v. State ex rel. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964), cited, Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, at 241, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Tidvall v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 520, at 526, 539 P.2d 456 (1975), Sheriff, Clark County v. Williams, 96 Nev. 22, at 24, 604 P.2d 800 (1980)

Act providing for taxation of agricultural land on basis of its use rather than value was unconstitutional special law. Act which provided that agricultural land should be taxed on basis of its use under certain conditions rather than on basis of value was unconstitutional, because Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibits special laws for assessment and collection of taxes for state, county and township purposes, Nev. Art. 4, § 21, provides that all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout state, and Nev. Art. 10, § 1, contains clear constitutional mandate that legislature provide uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation and secure just valuation for taxation of all property. Boyne v. State ex rel. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964), distinguished, List v. Whisler, 99 Nev. 133, at 140, 660 P.2d 104 (1983)

Statute providing for election of justices of the peace was not prohibited special law even though applicable to only one township. NRS 4.020, subsec. 3, (and cf. NRS 0.050), providing for election of two justices of the peace in townships having population of 100,000 or more was not in violation of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, which prohibit special and local laws and require that general laws have uniform application, although in fact statute applied to only one township at time it was enacted, because if there were other townships within classification it would have also applied to them. Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), cited, Reid v. Woofter, 88 Nev. 378, at 380, 498 P.2d 361 (1972), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 263, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute directing county clerk to satisfy himself that applicant’s ministry is primarily one of service to his congregation, did not violate section. NRS 122.064, which directs county clerk to satisfy himself that applicant’s ministry is primarily one of service to his congregation, was not unconstitutional in violation of prohibition against special law in Nev. Art. 4, § 21, because statute was general law applying to all ministers and all county clerks and fact that county clerk exercised discretion under statute did not convert statute to special law because discretionary rulings are subject to court review under NRS 122.071. Paramore v. Brown, 84 Nev. 725, 448 P.2d 699 (1968), cited, AGO 94-14 (9-29-1994)

Tahoe Regional Planning Compact was not prohibited local or special law. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (see NRS 277.190 et seq.) was not local or special law prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, because compact was enacted to achieve regional goals in conserving natural resources of entire Lake Tahoe Basin and thus did not violate Nev. Art. 19, § 4, which reserves to registered voters of each county and municipality powers of initiative and referendum as to local, special and municipal legislation. State ex rel. List v. County of Douglas, 90 Nev. 272, 524 P.2d 1271 (1974), cited, State ex rel. List v. County of Douglas, 92 Nev. 114, at 115, 546 P.2d 235 (1976)

Denial of credit to indigent defendant for prior confinement and good time served would violate equal protection. Indigent defendant for whom bail had been set but who was financially unable to post bail was entitled to retroactive sentence credit under NRS 176.055 for period of confinement before his arrival at state prison, applicable in determination of maximum duration of term of imprisonment, minimum term, "good time" credits under former NRS 209.280 and 209.285 (cf. NRS 209.433 and 209.443), and eligibility for parole under NRS 213.120, because refusal of such credits would constitute invidious discrimination based on (1) financial status; and (2) denial of equal protection of laws in violation of U.S. 14th amendment and Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Anglin v. State, 90 Nev. 287, 525 P.2d 34 (1974), cited, Slack v. State, 90 Nev. 373, at 374, 528 P.2d 703 (1974), Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. 927, at 932, 604 P.2d 117 (1979), dissenting opinion, Gilbert v. State, 99 Nev. 702, at 707, 669 P.2d 699 (1983), Kuykendall v. State, 112 Nev. 1285, at 1286, 926 P.2d 781 (1996), distinguished, Dearing v. State, 90 Nev. 297, at 298, 525 P.2d 601 (1974), Ward v. State, 93 Nev. 501, at 503, 569 P.2d 399 (1977), McMichael v. State, 94 Nev. 184, at 193, 577 P.2d 398 (1978)

Nevada automobile guest statute violated equal protection. Nevada automobile guest statute (see former NRS 41.180), which barred any recovery by automobile guest passenger for injury attributable to negligent driving by his host, violated equal protection guarantees of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, and U.S. 14th amendment because different treatment and classification of automobile guest did not bear substantial and rational relation to statute’s purposes of protecting hospitality of host driver and preventing collusive law suits. Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975), cited, Batesel v. Schultz, 91 Nev. 553, at 554, 540 P.2d 100 (1975), Talk of the Town Bookstore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 466, at 472, 553 P.2d 959 (1976), State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, at 224, 660 P.2d 995 (1983), Turpel v. Sayles, 101 Nev. 35, at 39, 692 P.2d 1290 (1985)

Sections of statute which applied specifically to Clark County and provided for election of commissioners from commissioner districts were void as local or special legislation. Sections 163 to 168, inclusive, ch. 648, Stats. 1975, which applied specifically to Clark County and to no other county in state and provided, among other things, for election of 11 commissioners from seven commissioner districts as part of plan for partial consolidation of certain local government functions, were void because they constituted local or special legislation violative of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, in absence of emergency situation justifying special legislation. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), cited, Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976), Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, at 402, 566 P.2d 415 (1977)

Statute which sought to govern election in single designated county violated provisions against special or local laws. Where statute which endeavored to govern election of county commissioners in single, designated county having population in excess of 200,000 was special law violative of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21, but it was clear that legislature intended that statutes governing such elections in smaller counties should not apply and that in counties with population of 200,000 or more number of county commissioners should be seven, supreme court ordered at-large election of seven county commissioners because time did not permit necessary redistricting for election from individual districts. Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute to enable Reno and Sparks to finance public improvements with tax increment districts violated law against special and local laws even though statute was not within cases enumerated in provision. Statute passed to enable only cities of Reno and Sparks to develop and finance certain public improvements through use of tax increment districts was special and local legislation, but since it was not within cases enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, constitutionality depended upon whether general law could be made applicable. In this situation, because problems of deterioration of downtown areas were not unique to Reno and Sparks and were not emergency circumstances requiring legislative interference by special legislation, general law could be made applicable and therefore special and local law violated Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, 566 P.2d 415 (1977)

Statute permitting county commissioners in any county whose population is 200,000 to issue general obligation bond for hospital project without voter approval did not violate provision. Provision in NRS 450.290 empowering board of county commissioners in any county having population of 200,000 or more to issue general obligation bonds for any hospital project without voter approval did not constitute special or local legislation violative of Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21. Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), cited, Clark County v. City of Las Vegas, 94 Nev. 74, at 76, 574 P.2d 1013 (1978), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 264, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Contention that Washoe County Airport Authority Act violated section was rejected. In action brought by City of Reno to challenge constitutionality of Washoe County Airport Authority Act (see ch. 474, Stats. 1977) designed to transfer ownership and administration of airport from city to airport authority, contention that act violated prohibition in Nev. Art. 4, § 21, against enactment of local and special laws where general law can be made applicable was rejected. Existence of general laws in NRS chs. 495 and 496, providing for municipal and county ownership and administration of airports, was not determinative where legislature had expressly declared that because of special circumstances and conditions, several of which were enumerated in act, general law could not be made applicable. City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

Where statute specified rather than classified, it was unconstitutional. Where former provisions of NRS 280.201 prescribed exact formula for allocating expenses of metropolitan police department in counties having only one participating city while leaving development of formula to participating political subdivisions in counties having more than one participating city, statute specified rather than classified and was therefore unconstitutional as contravening Nev. Art. 4, § 21. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

District court erred in declaring statute relating to establishment of metropolitan police department unconstitutional as special law. District court erred in declaring former NRS 280.100, relating to establishment of metropolitan police departments, unconstitutional as special legislation (see Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21) on ground that as originally enacted it had required compliance on July 1, 1973, in each county having specified population, because legislature had amended statute in 1979 to delete date. If original insertion of date into statute rendered it unconstitutional, its deletion by amendment cured defect. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute making mandatory consolidation of law enforcement agencies of county and county seat held constitutional. Provision in former NRS 280.100 making consolidation of law enforcement agencies of county and county seat mandatory in counties having population of 200,000 or more was not unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21 and 25, where population limitation (1) was prospectively applicable to all counties and county seats which might come within it, (2) was rationally related to subject matter and expressed purpose (see NRS 280.010) of NRS ch. 280, and (3) did not create odious, absurd or bizarre distinctions. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute prohibiting action against architect or contractor more than 6 years after completion of project violated equal protection. Former provisions of NRS 11.205 which provided that no action could be commenced against architect or contractor more than 6 years after substantial completion of project, but did not provide same protection to owner or suppliers, violated equal protection guarantees of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, and U.S. 14th amendment because classification was without rational basis. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 660 P.2d 995 (1983), cited, Lavery v. Wolden, 104 Nev. 392, at 393, 760 P.2d 120 (1988), Elley v. Stephens, 104 Nev. 413, at 415, 760 P.2d 768 (1988), Nevada Power v. Metropolitan Dev. Co., 104 Nev. 684, at 686, 765 P.2d 1162 (1988), Allstate Ins. Co. v. Furgerson, 104 Nev. 772, at 774, 766 P.2d 904 (1988), Lotter v. Clark County, 106 Nev. 366, at 370, 793 P.2d 1320 (1990), Alsenz v. Twin Lakes Village, Inc., 108 Nev. 1117, at 1120, 843 P.2d 834 (1992), Armijo v. State, 111 Nev. 1303, at 1304, 904 P.2d 1028 (1995), distinguished, Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988)

Refusal of city to pay architect because he failed to present demand within time required by statute was not denial of due process or equal protection. Refusal of city to pay architect pursuant to their contract because architect failed to present demand within time required by NRS 268.020, was proper because statute does not violate provisions for due process and equal protection of laws of Nevada constitution (see Nev. Art. 1, § 8 and Nev. Art. 4, § 21). As legislature has never expressed intent that governmental and nongovernmental promisors be on equal footing, persons who voluntarily contract with governmental entity assume burden of complying with its procedures for satisfying claims. L-M Architects, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 100 Nev. 334, 683 P.2d 11 (1984), cited, Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. City of Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, at 500, 797 P.2d 946 (1990), distinguished, Frank Briscoe Co. v. County of Clark, 643 F. Supp. 93, at 101 (D. Nev. 1986)

Reasonable classification. NRS ch. 369A, which imposes tax on privilege of importing for sale at retail or selling at wholesale soft drinks or syrups or powders used to make soft drinks, did not deny certain dealers equal protection of law in violation of U.S. 14th amendment or Nev. Art. 4, § 21 on ground that statute allowed those companies which manufacture soft drinks and also sell them at retail to avoid paying tax or to establish artificially low price at wholesale and pay less, because it was undisputed that tax was being paid by those companies and there was no indication in record that they were attempting to evade payment. In addition, any abuses which might occur were matters for administrative action. Westinghouse Beverage Group v. Department of Taxation, 101 Nev. 184, 698 P.2d 866 (1985)

Statute requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets did not violate equal protection. NRS 486.231, which requires drivers and passengers of motorcycles to wear protective headgear when operating motorcycle on highway, did not violate provisions of U.S. 14th amendment or Nev. Art. 4, § 21 guaranteeing equal protection of laws, because statute was rationally related to legitimate state interest in reducing severity of injuries to motorcyclists, protecting public from increased medical costs as result of accidents involving motorcycles and promoting safety on public highways. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022 (1985), cited, Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, at 1510, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Law requiring higher license fees for peddlers than solicitors not violative of equal protection. Distinction in municipal code between peddlers and solicitors requiring peddlers to pay substantially higher license fees did not violate equal protection guarantees of U.S. 14th amendment or Nev. Art. 4, § 21 because court could reasonably conceive of state of facts to support distinction between peddlers and solicitors that was rationally related to legitimate government purpose; i.e., peddlers present greater risk of fraudulent sales and any excess license fee paid by peddler may be allocated to increased police activity necessary to prevent fraud by peddlers. Edwards v. City of Reno, 103 Nev. 347, 742 P.2d 486 (1987), cited, Starlets Int’l, Inc. v. Christensen, 106 Nev. 732, at 735, 801 P.2d 1343 (1990), AGO 93-3 (3-19-1993)

Unreasonable restriction on ability of indigent to obtain waiver of filing fees may violate equal protection. In their petition for writs of mandamus, petitioners asserted that, as prisoners, they could not afford to pay costs necessary to obtain certificate of attorney required to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioners therefore argued that district court’s application of NRS 12.015 unconstitutionally denied them their right of access to courts. Unreasonable restriction on ability of indigent to obtain waiver of filing fees may violate equal protection clauses of U.S. 14th amendment and Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Court ordered respondent to refrain from enforcing NRS 12.015 insofar as it requires indigent persons to obtain, as condition to obtaining waiver of filing fees, certificate of attorney that indigent has meritorious cause of action or defense. Barnes v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2d 483 (1987), cited, Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, at 330, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991)

Statute not violative of equal protection. NRS 11.204, which exempts material suppliers from its limitations on liability, does not violate "equal protection clause" of Nevada constitution (see Nev. Art. 4, § 21) because there exists well developed body of products liability law and, therefore, rational basis for distinguishing owners, occupiers, architects and builders from manufacturers and material suppliers. Wise v. Bechtel Corp., 104 Nev. 750, 766 P.2d 1317 (1988), cited, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Furgerson, 104 Nev. 772, at 775, 766 P.2d 904 (1988), Lotter v. Clark County, 106 Nev. 366, at 370, 793 P.2d 1320 (1990)

Purpose for requiring statute must be general in nature. Trial court found unconstitutional parts of ch. 682, Stats. 1985, purporting to transfer powers of planning, zoning, land division and building inspection from respondent county to appellant unincorporated town. On appeal, court held that reasoning behind requiring that statute be general in nature is that when statute affects entire state, then it is more likely to receive adequate and thorough consideration from all members of legislature. If statute is localized, it is apt not to be considered seriously by those who are not affected by it. Legislative history of ch. 682, Stats. 1985, indicates that its passage was predicated on very events which Nev. Art. 4, § 21 intended to prevent. Trial court properly determined that statute offended Nev. Art. 4, § 21. Town of Pahrump v. County of Nye, 105 Nev. 227, 773 P.2d 1224 (1989)

On appeal from murder conviction and sentence of death, equal protection argument was rejected where statistics presented by defendant showing disparate treatment of white and black defendants failed to prove existence of purposeful discrimination or abuse of prosecutorial discretion in seeking death penalty. Defendant who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death challenged his conviction on ground that it violated equal protection of laws as guaranteed by U.S. 14th amendment (see Nev. Art. 4, § 21). Defendant’s contention was based on survey showing that district attorney’s office had sought death penalty in 80 percent of cases involving black defendant with no prior felony conviction whereas it had not sought death penalty in 80 percent of cases involving white defendant with prior felony conviction. Court rejected argument because, even assuming arguendo that statistics were accurate, statistics failed to prove existence of purposeful discrimination or that prosecutor’s discretion to seek death penalty had been abused. Lane v. State, 110 Nev. 1156, 881 P.2d 1358 (1994)

Enforcement of municipal zoning ordinance regulating adult entertainment businesses did not violate equal protection rights of respondent under circumstances. Respondent was adult entertainment business licensed to provide adult motion picture arcade. City amended municipal zoning ordinance regulating such businesses and provided that existing businesses which did not alter or modify type of business did not have to comply with new provisions of ordinance. After ordinance was amended, respondent modified business so that it offered nude show rather than adult motion picture arcade and city required respondent to comply with provisions of amended ordinance. Respondent challenged enforcement of ordinance on grounds that, because city had previously issued retroactive license to other similar establishment exempting it from complying with amended ordinance, enforcement of ordinance in present case violated respondent’s equal protection rights. Supreme court found that city did not enforce ordinance in violation of respondent’s equal protection rights because present case was factually and significantly distinguishable from case involving other establishment in that, unlike in respondent’s case, other establishment was retroactively licensed only because it had actually been approved for license before ordinance was amended and it did not alter or modify type of business offered after ordinance was amended. (See Nev. Art. 1, § 8 and Art. 4, § 21.) City of Las Vegas v. 1017 S. Main Corp., 110 Nev. 1227, 885 P.2d 552 (1994)

Provisions creating screening panel to review certain claims for medical malpractice do not violate equal protection. NRS 41A.009 and 41A.016, which prohibit filing of claim for medical malpractice against physician, hospital, or employee of hospital until it has been submitted to screening panel, do not deny claimants equal protection of law in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 21 on ground that actions for malpractice filed against other providers of health care are not subject to same requirement. Distinction is rationally related to legitimate governmental interest as legislature could have concluded that physicians and hospitals were more affected by difficulty in obtaining insurance, higher rates for insurance, and frivolous lawsuits than were other providers of health care. Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Provisions of chapter regulating solicitations by telephone do not violate equal protection. NRS ch. 599B did not violate defendant’s right to equal protection of law (see Nev. Art. 4, § 21) on ground that chapter arbitrarily and unconstitutionally discriminates against persons who provide information relating to sporting events because chapter is narrowly drawn to achieve legitimate and substantial state interest in protecting customers against fraud and loss. Erwin v. State, 111 Nev. 1535, 908 P.2d 1367 (1995)

Denial of right to appeal from order of summary eviction held unconstitutional. Provisions of JCRCP 106, which deny right to appeal from justices’ courts to district court to tenants who are subject to eviction under summary eviction proceedings, violate provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which require that all laws must be general and of uniform operation throughout state, and provisions of Nev. Art. 6, § 6, which state that district courts have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices’ courts. Lippis v. Peters, 112 Nev. 1008, 921 P.2d 1248 (1996)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.

Legislature may classify railroads for purpose of establishing rates. Neither Nev. Art. 4, § 21, nor equal protection clause of U.S. 14th amendment prohibit legislature from classifying railroads for purpose of establishing rates, so long as classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Statute providing for adjudication of vested water rights does not violate section. Statute providing for adjudication of vested water rights does not violate either Nev. Art. 4, § 20, or Nev. Art. 4, § 21, as it applies equally and uniformly to every stream and water user in state, and because placement of water rights in class by themselves is based on real and substantial difference between water rights and other classes of property. Bergman v. Kearney, 241 Fed. 884 (D. Nev. 1917)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Criminal statute applicable only to counties with certain population was unconstitutional. Criminal statute applicable only to counties having certain population at previous U.S. census is special class legislation and thus unconstitutional. AGO (3-17-1891)

"General law" defined. General law is one which applies to class of persons rather than to mere individual or number of individuals within class. AGO 115 (8-24-1933)

Legislation which discriminates between members of class is unconstitutional. Legislation which creates certain class of persons, then discriminates between members of this class, is unconstitutional. AGO 115 (8-24-1933)

Act authorizing cooperative agreements between counties and cities concerning fire protection districts not invalid as local or special law. Act authorizing cooperative agreements between counties and cities concerning fire protection districts is not invalid as local or special law, for although some counties and parts of counties cannot receive its benefits, act does apply equally to all parts of state. AGO 175 (11-25-1944)

Legislature may not pass local or special laws in any cases enumerated in provision. Legislature may not pass local and special laws in any of cases enumerated in Nev. Art. 4, § 20, even though general law would be inapplicable under Nev. Art. 4, § 21. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Law does not require election of assemblymen be entirely uniform throughout state. Nothing in Nevada law requires that election of assemblymen be entirely uniform throughout state. Thus, special laws relating to such elections are constitutional. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Special act creating commissioner districts in Clark County violated section. Special act creating county commissioner districts in Clark County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special or local legislation regulating county business. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Special act creating commissioner districts in Washoe County violated section. Special act creating county commissioner districts in Washoe County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits special or local legislation regulating county business. AGO 905 (4-11-1950)

Statute regulating hours of Clark County officers is invalid special law. Statute regulating office hours of county officers of Clark County is invalid special legislation. AGO 244 (4-9-1953)

Special gas tax for Nye County was unconstitutional. Sec. 36, ch. 381, Stats. 1955, providing for special gas tax for Nye County is special law where general law is applicable and therefore is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 21. AGO 222 (11-16-1956)

Special act granting retirement payments to certain unqualified persons is valid. Legislature has power to enact any legislation which does not contravene constitution. Thus special act granting retirement payments to certain unqualified persons is valid exercise of legislative power. AGO 279 (6-14-1957)

Ordinance providing different rate of contribution to retirement fund than general law was unconstitutional. City ordinance providing for different rate of contribution by city officer, employee to public employees’ retirement fund than that required by general law destroys uniformity of general law and is in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 21. AGO 397 (7-23-1958)

County ordinance providing different rate of contribution to retirement fund than general law violated section. County ordinance providing for different rate of contribution by county officer, employee to public employees’ retirement fund than that required by general law destroys uniformity of general law and is in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 21. AGO 397 (7-23-1958)

Regulation of dairy commission that had varied effect among regions of state violated section. Regulation of Nevada state dairy commission prohibiting extension of credit by distributors of dairy products beyond 15 days in southern Nevada, 30 days in eastern Nevada and 45 days in western Nevada violates Nev. Art. 4, § 21, requiring uniform operation of laws within state. AGO 104 (10-12-1959)

Statute which prohibits cheating on slot machines is law of general application. NRS 465.080, which prohibits cheating with respect to slot machines, is law of general application throughout state and, under Nev. Art. 4, § 21, if city or county ordinance materially amended or altered such general law, such ordinance would be inoperative. AGO 481 (1-18-1968)

Statute directing Clark County to issue bonds for construction of sports and convention facility did not violate section. Statute directing Clark County, acting through Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, to issue bonds to support construction of sports complex and convention facility (see ch. 582, Stats. 1977) is local law which does not violate Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20 and 21. It does not regulate county business, and legislature’s finding that general law could not be made applicable must be presumed valid in absence of clear, convincing and undoubted evidence to contrary. Further, validity of local legislation is not limited to emergencies and mandatory requirements of statute do not affect validity. AGO 215 (7-12-1977)

Sec: 22. Suit against state. Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution.

NEVADA CASES.

Statute which established procedure for bringing action against state for services authorized did not apply to official bond for which state was surety. Nev. Art. 4, § 22, provides that provisions for bringing of suit against state may be made, and where legislature enacted NCL § 9200 (cf. NRS 41.010), which established procedure for bringing of actions against state for services or advances authorized by law and for which appropriations had been made, such statute did not apply to suit on official bond for which state was surety, nor was it exclusive procedure for bringing action against state. Hill v. Thomas, 70 Nev. 389, 270 P.2d 179 (1954)

Section recognizes that rule of county or local district immunity did not originate with concept of sovereign immunity. Nev. Art. 4, § 22, by providing that provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against state, recognizes that rule of county or local district immunity did not originate with concept of sovereign immunity. Hardgrave v. State, 80 Nev. 74, 389 P.2d 249 (1964)

Meaning of "general law" as used in section. In Nev. Art. 4, § 22, which provides that provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against state, words "general law" mean general law passed by legislature. Hardgrave v. State, 80 Nev. 74, 389 P.2d 249 (1964)

Sec: 23. Enacting clause; law to be enacted by bill. The enacting clause of every law shall be as follows: "The people of the State of Nevada represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows," and no law shall be enacted except by bill.

Act was void where enacting clause was not in form required by section. Application for writ of mandamus to compel county recorder to transcribe and deliver records pursuant to act of legislature was denied where act was void because enacting clause was not in form required by Nev. Art. 4, § 23. State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250 (1875), cited, State ex rel. Stevenson v. Tufly, 20 Nev. 427, at 428, 22 Pac. 1054 (1890), distinguished, Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, at 422, 131 P.2d 516 (1942)

Certification by proper officers does not impart validity to act if it does not have proper enacting clause. Certification by proper officers of senate and assembly that act was properly passed does not impart validity to act if it does not have enacting clause in form required by Nev. Art. 4, § 23. State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250 (1875), cited, State ex rel. Stevenson v. Tufly, 20 Nev. 427, at 428, 22 Pac. 1054 (1890)

Section is mandatory. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 23, which prescribe form of enacting clause of every law are mandatory. Omission of words "senate and" from enacting clause of legislative act renders act void. State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250 (1875), cited, State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, at 39, 1 Pac. 186 (1883), State ex rel. Stevenson v. Tufly, 20 Nev. 427, at 428, 22 Pac. 1054 (1890), Nevada Highway Patrol Ass’n v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 107 Nev. 547, at 549, 815 P.2d 608 (1991), distinguished, Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, at 422, 131 P.2d 516 (1942)

Assembly concurrent resolution does not have force and effect of law because it does not contain enacting clause and is not presented to governor. Assembly concurrent resolution does not have force and effect of law because it does not contain enacting clause required by Nev. Art. 4, § 23, and is not presented to governor for his signature as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 35. Nevada Highway Patrol Ass’n v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 107 Nev. 547, 815 P.2d 608 (1991)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Joint resolution is void without enacting clause. Joint resolution adopted by both houses cannot become valid law if it does not contain enacting clause required by Nev. Art. 4, § 23. AGO 85 (7-25-1951)

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, no lottery may be authorized by this State, nor may lottery tickets be sold.

2. The State and the political subdivisions thereof shall not operate a lottery. The legislature may authorize persons engaged in charitable activities or activities not for profit to operate a lottery in the form of a raffle or drawing on their own behalf. All proceeds of the lottery, less expenses directly related to the operation of the lottery, must be used only to benefit charitable or nonprofit activities in this state. A charitable or nonprofit organization shall not employ or otherwise engage any person to organize or operate its lottery for compensation. The legislature may provide by law for the regulation of such lotteries.

[Amended in 1990. Proposed and passed by the 1987 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1989 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1990 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1987, p. 2468; Statutes of Nevada 1989, p. 2249.]

NEVADA CASES.

Act authorizing sale of admission tickets entitling holder to participate in raffle sanctioned lottery. Act which authorized association to sell tickets of admission to public gift concerts entitling holder to participate in distribution of awards by raffle with proceeds to be used to erect insane asylum, sanctioned lottery, regardless of its expressed charitable purpose of act or by what name drawings were called in act. (See NRS ch. 462, 462.105 and Nev. Art. 4, § 24.) Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101 (1874), cited, State ex rel. Murphy v. Overton, 16 Nev. 136, at 142 (1881)

Common law declared all lotteries to be public nuisances. English statute declaring all lotteries to be public nuisances, which remained in force at time of American declaration of independence, constituted part of common law of United States, and it was evident that this was understood by framers of Nevada constitution from language of Nev. Art. 4, § 24. Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101 (1874), cited, Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69, at 75 (1876), J.E. Burke & Co. v. Buck, 31 Nev. 74, at 79, 99 Pac. 1078 (1909), In re Pierotti, 43 Nev. 243, at 249, 184 Pac. 209 (1919), West Indies, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, 67 Nev. 13, at 19, 214 P.2d 144 (1950)

Act sanctioning lottery is unconstitutional. Nev. Art. 4, § 24, which provides that no lottery may be authorized by state, considered in light of common law rule that lotteries were public nuisances, implies that lotteries could be lawfully created only by authority of legislature, but since that authority was withheld, act sanctioning lottery is unconstitutional. Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101 (1874)

Determining whether act authorizes lottery is function of judiciary. Construction to be placed on act can be determined only by courts. Attempted exercise of this power by legislature, in providing that nothing in act authorizing raffle should be construed as authorizing lottery contrary to provisions of constitution (see Nev. Art. 4, § 24), was assumption of functions of judiciary in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and was disregarded by court. Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101 (1874)

Section prohibits both public and private lotteries. Nev. Art. 4, § 24, prohibits both public and private lotteries. State ex rel. Murphy v. Overton, 16 Nev. 136 (1881)

Legislature cannot authorize lottery. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 24, legislature cannot authorize any lottery and attempt to do so is void. State ex rel. Murphy v. Overton, 16 Nev. 136 (1881)

Act authorizing the sale of admission tickets and distribution of prizes by benevolent association held unconstitutional. Act which declared that it shall be lawful for Nevada Benevolent Association to give full public entertainments, to sell tickets of admission and to distribute among holders of such tickets personal property, real estate, things in action, demands or other valuables, and to regulate distribution of such property by raffle, provided $50,000 be paid into insane and charitable fund in state treasury upon conclusion of each entertainment, was held unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 24, which prohibits lotteries, in quo warranto proceeding initiated by attorney general. State ex rel. Murphy v. Overton, 16 Nev. 136 (1881)

Wide contrast between vice of lotteries and mischief of gambling. Legislature of Nevada has always drawn distinction between lotteries and unlawful gaming. Although chance is element of both, there is wide contrast between vice of lotteries which infests whole community and mischief or nuisance of gambling which is generally confined to few places or persons. Legislature is prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 24, from legislating upon lotteries, but is permitted by inherent powers to legislate upon gaming. In re Pierotti, 43 Nev. 243, 184 Pac. 209 (1919)

Section did not prohibit slot machine payoffs of cigars or drinks. Operation of nickel-in-the-slot machine for chance of winning cigars or drinks was not lottery as prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 24, and RL § 6494 (cf. NRS 462.010), and was exempted by proviso from statute making keeping of gambling devices public nuisance. Petitioner for writ of habeas corpus, who was arrested for operation of such device, was not charged with public offense and was discharged. In re Pierotti, 43 Nev. 243, 184 Pac. 209 (1919), cited, Johnston v. DeLay, 63 Nev. 1, at 11, 158 P.2d 547 (1945), Harrah’s Club v. State, 99 Nev. 158, at 161, 659 P.2d 883 (1983)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Punchboard is lottery. Punchboard, or chance board, is lottery, and as such is in violation of antilottery law. AGO 8 (1-29-1919)

Vending machines are not gambling devices or lotteries. Coin-operated vending machines, wherein lot or chance is eliminated in their operation, are not gambling devices or lotteries. AGO 50 (5-2-1919)

Punchboard is against law. Punchboard is lottery and, therefore, against law. It makes no difference if prize is given with each punch. It is distribution of prizes by chance of different values which brings scheme under statute regulating lotteries. AGO 90 (8-23-1919)

Punchboard is lottery. Punchboard is lottery. AGO 97 (10-29-1919), cited, AGO 94 (1-28-1922)

Distribution of real property by chance among persons who have paid consideration is prohibited lottery. Scheme involving prize of real property distributed by chance among persons who have paid some form of consideration is lottery prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 24 and NRS ch. 462, which apply to charities and members of private clubs as well as to other persons and entities. AGO 81-E (10-12-1981)

Punchboards are lotteries, not gambling games. Punchboards are lotteries prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 24 and NRS ch. 462. They are not gambling games, gaming devices or slot machines subject to provisions of NRS ch. 463 (Gaming Control Act). AGO 83-6 (6-29-1983)

Operation of lottery runner service violates section. Lottery runner service that for fee provides photostatic facsimiles of California lottery tickets to persons in Nevada with understanding that service will purchase actual California lottery tickets for those persons in conformity with facsimile tickets prepared by them, violates former NRS 462.030 (cf. NRS 462.260). Any form of advertisement by lottery runner service violates former NRS 462.040 (cf. NRS 462.280). Lottery runner service operated out of personal residence violates former NRS 462.050 (cf. NRS 462.290). Owner of bar, casino or other business violates former NRS 462.070 (cf. NRS 462.320) if he knows that lottery tickets are being sold to his patrons by lottery runner service. (See Nev. Art. 4, § 24.) AGO 88-18 (12-28-1988)

Sec: 25. Uniform county and township government. The Legislature shall establish a system of County and Township Government which shall be uniform throughout the State.

Statute applicable only to counties which cast total vote of more than 1,150 and less than 1,350 was unconstitutional. Statute which purported to apply only to counties which cast total vote of more than 1,150 and less than 1,350 at preceding general election was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish uniform system of county government, because in practical operation it was no different than designating particular counties by name. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 (1885), cited, State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, at 78, 15 Pac. 783 (1887), Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, at 86, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), dissenting opinion, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 264, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute classifying counties on basis of total vote cast at preceding election is unconstitutional. Statute which purports to classify counties on basis of total vote cast at preceding election is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish uniform system of county government, because such statute applies only to particular counties and could never affect any others. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 (1885), cited, State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, at 78, 15 Pac. 783 (1887), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Provision that treasurer of particular county shall be ex officio county assessor is unconstitutional. Statutory provision that treasurer of particular county shall be ex officio county assessor is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish uniform system of county government, and treasurer claiming office of assessor under such statute may be ousted from office of assessor in quo warranto proceedings. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 (1885), cited, State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, at 254, 9 Pac. 123 (1885), Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91, at 95, 99, 35 Pac. 833 (1894), Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 23 Nev. 226, at 231, 45 Pac. 289 (1896)

Statute applying to less than all counties must be based on actual differences and embrace all counties within class. In order to be unobjectionable under Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish uniform system of county government, provisions of statute applying to less than all counties must be based on actual differences, be appropriate to the classification, and embrace all counties within the class. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 (1885), cited, Turner v. Fish, 19 Nev. 295, at 296, 9 Pac. 884 (1886), State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, at 78, 15 Pac. 783 (1887), Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, at 86, 423 P.2d 401 (1967), dissenting opinion, Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Section does not require that all laws relating to counties be universal in operation. Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish uniform system of county government, does not require that all laws relating to counties be universal in operation. Statute applying to less than all counties would be unobjectionable if counties were fairly classified and statute applied to all counties within class. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 (1885), cited, State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, at 78, 15 Pac. 783 (1887), Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, at 399, 32 Pac. 437 (1893), Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, at 517, 569 P.2d 933 (1977)

Where portion of act that made treasurer of one county ex officio assessor violated section, other portions of act relating to compensation were not affected. Where portion of act fixing salaries of county officers in certain counties of state made treasurer of one county ex officio assessor, fact that act was declared to be in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish system of county government which shall be uniform throughout state, insofar as it established difference in government of one county from other counties, did not affect provisions of act which related to compensation of officers of such county other than treasurer. State ex rel. Williams v. Fogus, 19 Nev. 247, 9 Pac. 123 (1885)

Where matter connected with act may have conflicted with section, validity of other provisions of act were unaffected. Act fixing salaries of officers of and consolidating two county offices in certain county embraced but one subject, the salaries, and matter properly connected therewith, and although connected matter, consolidation, may have conflicted with Nev. Art. 4, § 25, as destroying uniform system of county government, it did not affect validity of provision fixing salary of one of officers. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, Ex parte Hewlett, 22 Nev. 333, at 335, 40 Pac. 96 (1895), In re Goddard, 44 Nev. 128, at 134, 190 Pac. 916 (1920), State ex rel. Abelman v. Douglass, 46 Nev. 121, at 125, 208 Pac. 422 (1922)

Where validity of provision of act fixing salary of county officer was in issue, court did not need to consider whether another portion of act conflicted with section. Where validity of provision of act fixing salary of county officer was issue in action, it was unnecessary for court to consider whether another but independent provision of same act consolidating two county offices contravened Nev. Art. 4, § 25, by destroying uniform system of county government. State ex rel. Dunn v. Board of Comm’rs, 21 Nev. 235, 29 Pac. 974 (1892), cited, State ex rel. Abelman v. Douglass, 46 Nev. 121, at 127, 208 Pac. 422 (1922)

Statute authorizing only sheriff of Eureka County to appoint night watchman violated section. Statute authorizing sheriff of Eureka County to appoint night watchman, which statute was intended to apply to Eureka County only, violated Nev. Art. 4, § 25, requiring that legislature establish uniform system of county government throughout state. Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91, 35 Pac. 833 (1894), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, at 226, 204 Pac. 880, 210 Pac. 401 (1922), McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, at 425, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), distinguished, Reid v. Woofter, 88 Nev. 378, at 381, 498 P.2d 361 (1972)

Law granting one county comparatively large and varied powers was local and special act and also violated constitutional requirement of system of uniform county government throughout state. In comparison with laws governing all of other counties in state, statute which constituted one county a municipal corporation with large and varied powers, such as right to have seal and to hold both real and personal property, either within or without the municipality, was in conflict with Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which forbids local and special laws regulating county business, and Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish system of county government which shall be uniform throughout state. Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 289 (1896), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

County governments must be alike in all essential particulars. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that legislature establish system of county government which shall be uniform throughout state, such governments must be alike in all essential particulars. Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 289 (1896)

Statute which created county not like other counties in form or substance was violation of section. Under statute which constituted one county a municipal corporation with large and varied powers, such as right to have common seal and to hold both real and personal property, either within or without municipality, county was not like other counties in state, either in form or substance. Therefore, statute violated Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires that uniformity exist in the several county governments. Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 289 (1896)

Act authorizing certain county to issue bonds to build courthouse and jail was not violation of section. Act authorizing particular county to issue bonds to build courthouse and jail was not violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, prohibiting local or special laws regulating county business, or Nev. Art. 4, §§ 21 and 25, requiring that county governments be uniform and that all laws be general and of uniform operation throughout state, and writ of mandamus was granted to compel issuance of bonds. State ex rel. Henderson Banking Co. v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, 99 Pac. 855 (1909), cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, at 22, 115 Pac. 177 (1911), In re Dotta, 38 Nev. 1, at 4, 143 Pac. 305 (1914), Buck v. Boerlin, 45 Nev. 131, at 134, 198 Pac. 556 (1921), Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, at 96, 177 P.2d 677 (1947), City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, at 335, 580 P.2d 460 (1978)

Special act upon subject which could have been covered by general act was unconstitutional. That a 1903 act authorizing board of county commissioners of particular county to provide that certain prisoners be confined in branch county jail instead of county jail was special act upon subject which could be covered by general act, and therefore unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21 and 25, was demonstrated by fact that in 1907 legislature passed such general act, sec. 1, ch. 136, Stats. 1907 (cf. NRS 211.090), which authorized county commissioners of the several counties to provide that certain prisoners be confined in branch county jail instead of county jail. Wolf v. County of Humboldt, 32 Nev. 174, 105 Pac. 286 (1909), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946)

Statute authorizing particular county commissioners to imprison certain prisoners in branch county jail instead of county jail was unconstitutional. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which provides that legislature shall not pass local or special laws regulating, inter alia, county or township business, Nev. Art. 4, § 21, which provides that in all cases enumerated in sec. 20 all laws shall be general and operate uniformly throughout state, and Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which provides that legislature shall establish system of county and township government which shall be uniform throughout state, statute was unconstitutional which authorized board of county commissioners of particular county to provide for imprisonment of certain prisoners in branch county jail instead of county jail. Wolf v. County of Humboldt, 32 Nev. 174, 105 Pac. 286 (1909), cited, Washoe County Water Conservation Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, at 120, 45 P.2d 779 (1935)

Act authorizing particular county to sell bonds for purchase of power and phone line was constitutional. Statute authorizing particular county to sell bonds in order to purchase power and telephone line was not unconstitutional as being in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 20, which prohibits enactment of local or special laws regulating county business, or of secs. 21 or 25 thereof, which require that system of county government be uniform and that where general law can be made applicable all laws shall be general, and petition for writ of prohibition to prevent county officers from proceeding with purchase was denied. Buck v. Boerlin, 45 Nev. 131, 198 Pac. 556 (1921)

Section violated where legislature abolished office of constable in only one county. Where legislature reduced salary of constable from $150 per month to $5 per year, action of legislature was not regulatory, but operated to abolish office of such constable, and was violative of Nev. Art. 4, § 25, guaranteeing uniform system of government throughout state, since office was not abolished in all other townships. Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, 204 Pac. 880, 210 Pac. 401 (1922), distinguished, Shamberger v. Ferrari, 73 Nev. 201, at 205, 314 P.2d 384 (1957)

Statute that abolished office of constable in only one township was void. Where plaintiff in action to recover for services as constable had been elected at salary of $150 per month, and thereafter the legislature reduced his salary to $5 per year, which in effect abolished office of constable in that township, statute was void because Nev. Art. 4, § 25, guarantees to people of state uniform system of township government throughout state, and office of constable was not uniformly abolished throughout state by statute. Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, 204 Pac. 880, 210 Pac. 401 (1922), cited, Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 411, at 414, 264 Pac. 693 (1928), distinguished, Shamberger v. Ferrari, 73 Nev. 201, at 205, 314 P.2d 384 (1957)

Act which established commissioner districts in specified county violated section. Act which established commissioner districts in specified county and provided for election of members of board of county commissioners in such districts was special law which regulated county and township business, and as such was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), cited, State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, at 34, 38, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), Hanson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 75 Nev. 27, at 30, 333 P.2d 994 (1959), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute establishing county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void. Statute which established county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void as local and special law not uniform in application as required by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), cited, State ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev. 339, at 342, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute providing that city attorney may not undertake defense of person charged with violation of state law was not unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial function. In proceeding for writ of prohibition to prevent trial judge from continuing certain criminal proceedings on ground that petitioner, city attorney, was precluded by former NRS 7.035 (cf. NRS 7.105), which provides that city attorney may not undertake defense of person charged with violation of state law, from continuing to defend indigent criminal defendant in the proceeding, writ of prohibition was granted and argument of respondent trial judge that former NRS 7.035 (cf. NRS 7.105) was unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial powers was without merit because Nev. Art. 4, § 25, provides that legislature shall establish county and township governments, and in defining duties of city attorney legislature was validly exercising constitutional mandate. Marfisi v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 445, 456 P.2d 443 (1969)

Statute prohibiting justices of the peace from solemnizing marriages in certain townships in populous counties did not violate section. NRS 122.080, which prohibits justices of the peace from solemnizing marriages in certain townships in populous counties did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires uniform system of county and township government, because classification of townships had reasonable basis and did not constitute unconstitutional denial of perquisites of office, because Nev. Art. 6, § 10, which prohibits other judicial officers from accepting fees, did not give justices of the peace any right to marriage fees or limit power of legislature under former provisions of Nev. Art. 6, § 8, to fix their powers, duties and responsibilities. Reid v. Woofter, 88 Nev. 378, 498 P.2d 361 (1972), cited, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, at 334, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973), Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 337, at 341, 580 P.2d 939 (1978), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, at 264, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

Statute making mandatory consolidation of law enforcement agencies of county and county seat held constitutional. Provision in former NRS 280.100 making consolidation of law enforcement agencies of county and county seat mandatory in counties having population of 200,000 or more was not unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21 and 25, where population limitation (1) was prospectively applicable to all counties and county seats which might come within it, (2) was rationally related to subject matter and expressed purpose (see NRS 280.010) of NRS ch. 280, and (3) did not create odious, absurd or bizarre distinctions. County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 97 Nev. 260, 628 P.2d 1120 (1981)

"System of government" as used in section consists of powers, duties and obligations placed upon political organization. Trial court found unconstitutional, parts of ch. 682, Stats. 1985, purporting to transfer powers of planning, zoning, land division and building inspection from respondent county to appellant unincorporated town. On appeal, court was not persuaded by appellant’s argument that statute did not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 25 because powers of planning, zoning and building which statute purported to transfer from respondent to appellant are not integral components of uniform system of government. Court has defined "system of government" as used in context of Nev. Art. 4, § 25 as consisting of powers, duties and obligations placed upon political organization. Town of Pahrump v. County of Nye, 105 Nev. 227, 773 P.2d 1224 (1989)

Zoning and planning fall within type of activities that section intended to regulate. Trial court found unconstitutional parts of ch. 682, Stats. 1985, purporting to transfer powers of planning, zoning, land division and building inspection from respondent county to appellant unincorporated town. On appeal, court held that because zoning and planning fall within powers, duties and obligations placed upon political organization, they are precisely type of activities that Nev. Art. 4, § 25 was intended to regulate. Because ch. 682, Stats. 1985, delegates these powers away from respondent to appellant in unique manner, one not utilized by other counties, it destroys uniformity of system of government among counties. Trial court correctly ruled that state violated Nev. Art. 4, § 25. Town of Pahrump v. County of Nye, 105 Nev. 227, 773 P.2d 1224 (1989)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Statute creating commissioner districts in one county violated section. Statute creating commissioner districts in one county and not applicable to other counties is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which provides that county government shall be uniform. AGO 15 (2-7-1923)

Statute consolidating offices of sheriff and assessor in one county violated section. Statute consolidating offices of sheriff and assessor in one county only is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires uniform system of county government. AGO 240 (6-17-1926)

Special act creating commissioner districts in Clark County violated section. Special act creating county commissioner districts in Clark County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires uniform system of county government throughout state. AGO 893 (3-21-1950)

Special act creating commissioner districts in Washoe County violated section. Special act creating county commissioner districts in Washoe County is violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 25, which requires uniform system of county government throughout state. AGO 905 (4-11-1950)

County commissioners elected under act subsequently declared unconstitutional can serve as de facto officers until election of new officers. Where county commissioners are elected under act which is subsequently declared unconstitutional, commissioners are de facto officers and can serve as such until new commissioners elected at soonest election qualify for office. AGO B 935 (7-7-1950)

Combining of governing bodies of Carson City and Ormsby County not permitted. Constitution does not permit governing bodies of Ormsby County and Carson City to be combined. AGO 26 (3-5-1951)

Sec: 26. Boards of county commissioners: Election and duties. The Legislature shall provide by law, for the election of a Board of County Commissioners in each County, and such County Commissioners shall jointly and individually perform such duties as may be prescribed by law.

Legislature may create or abolish any office not provided for in state constitution. Legislature is allowed to create or abolish any county offices not provided for in state constitution. State v. Tilford, 1 Nev. 240 (1865), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, at 224, 204 Pac. 880 (1922), State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 233, at 234, 235 (dissenting opinion), 29 P.2d 839 (1934)

Legislature may not abolish offices named in constitution without constitutional change. Where state constitution calls for election of certain county officers (see Nev. Art. 4, §§ 26 and 32), legislature cannot abolish named offices without constitutional change. State v. Tilford, 1 Nev. 240 (1865), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, at 224, 204 Pac. 880 (1922), State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 233, at 234, 235 (dissenting opinion), 29 P.2d 839 (1934)

Section is presumed to have been taken from California with judicial interpretations attached. Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which provides for boards of county commissioners, seems to have been adopted from California with substitution of word "commissioner" for "supervisor," and it may be presumed to have been taken with California judicial interpretations attached. State ex rel. Mason v. Board of County Comm’rs, 7 Nev. 392 (1872)

Exercise of judicial function by board of county commissioners held constitutional. Exercise of judicial function by board of county commissioners is not violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which provides for separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, because that section is limited by Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which provides that legislature shall prescribe duties of boards of county commissioners. State ex rel. Mason v. Board of County Comm’rs, 7 Nev. 392 (1872)

Legislature had power to classify counties according to population and provide number of county commissioners according to number of votes cast. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which makes it the duty of legislature to provide by law for election of board of county commissioners in each county, legislature had power to classify counties according to population and provide number of members of board according to number of votes cast. Classification could at any time be changed, and number of commissioners increased or decreased as legislature saw fit, without necessity of constitutional amendment. State ex rel. Copeland v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 337, 30 Pac. 1006 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Patterson v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, at 78, 80, 15 Pac. 783 (1887)

Statute providing for regulation and licensing of motor vehicles for hire by county commissioners was within limits allowed by section. Statute providing for regulation and licensing of motor vehicles for hire, and requiring boards of county commissioners to enact ordinances for licensing and regulation of vehicles, imposed administrative function and was within limits allowed by Nev. Art. 4, § 26, inasmuch as legislature had declared that use of public roads by operators of vehicles in service of the public was privilege for which they must pay and submit to regulation for protection of roads. Ex rel. Ginnochio v. Shaughnessy, 47 Nev. 129, 217 Pac. 581 (1923), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, at 403, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, at 352, 172 P.2d 158 (1946), McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 96, 227 P.2d 206 (1951), City of Las Vegas v. Mack, 87 Nev. 105, at 109, 481 P.2d 396 (1971)

County commissioners are administrative agencies of state and are required to perform duties prescribed by law under section. Boards of county commissioners are administrative agencies of state and are required by organic law to perform such duties as are prescribed by law under Nev. Art. 4, § 26, and they proceed by means of ordinances and resolutions duly passed and entered upon their records. Ex rel. Ginnochio v. Shaughnessy, 47 Nev. 129, 217 Pac. 581 (1923), cited, McLaughlin v. Housing Authority, 68 Nev. 84, at 96, 227 P.2d 206 (1951), City of Las Vegas v. Mack, 87 Nev. 105, at 109, 481 P.2d 396 (1971)

Requirement that legislature provide for election of county commissioners has no application in cases of emergency or special occasion. Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which requires that legislature provide by law for election of board of county commissioners in each county, has no application in cases of emergency or special occasion where such office has become vacant, and in such cases office may be temporarily filled by other means than that of election. State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, 24 P.2d 313 (1933)

Act establishing commissioner districts in specific county and providing for election of county commissioners was prohibited special law. Act which established commissioner districts in specified county and provided for election of members of board of county commissioners in such districts was special law which regulated county and township business, and as such was unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. McDonald v. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950), cited, State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, at 34, 38, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), Hanson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 75 Nev. 27, at 30, 333 P.2d 994 (1959), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Statute establishing county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void. Statute which established county commissioner districts in county was unconstitutional and void as local and special law not uniform in application as required by Nev. Art. 4, §§ 20, 21, 25 and 26. State ex rel. Bible v. Malone, 68 Nev. 32, 226 P.2d 277 (1951), cited, State ex rel. Pagni v. Brown, 88 Nev. 339, at 342, 497 P.2d 1364 (1972), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976), Colton v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 427, at 431, 552 P.2d 44 (1976)

Legislature was authorized to enact statute requiring election of commissioners at large in some counties. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which authorizes legislature to provide for election of county commissioners, legislature was authorized to enact 1961 amendment to NRS 244.050 which requires election of county commissioners at large in some counties regardless of fact that county might have previously created commissioner districts. Acree v. Valley, 78 Nev. 444, 375 P.2d 545 (1962)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Powers of county commissioners are derived exclusively from legislative acts. Boards of county commissioners are created by legislature pursuant to Nev. Art. 4, § 26, and their powers are derived exclusively from legislative acts. AGO 88 (11-12-1963)

Where county commissioner who holds liquor license is required to serve on county liquor board, he may withhold his vote where conflict of interest is involved. Under NRS 244.350, which designates board of county commissioners as members of county liquor board, and Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which requires county commissioners to perform such duties as may be prescribed by law, county commissioner who holds liquor license must serve on county liquor board but may withhold his vote where conflict of interest or his own license is involved. AGO 222 (5-6-1965)

Sec: 27. Disqualification of jurors; elections. Laws shall be made to exclude from serving on juries, all persons not qualified electors of this State, and all persons who shall have been convicted of bribery, perjury, foregery [forgery,] larceny or other high crimes, unless restored to civil rights; and laws shall be passed regulating elections, and prohibiting under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.

Contention that women are ineligible to serve as grand jurors was without merit. Indictment found by grand jury consisting partly of women was valid, and contention that women are ineligible under constitution to serve as grand jurors was without merit because under Nev. Art. 4, § 27, providing that all qualified electors may serve on juries, and Nev. Art. 2, § 1, conferring right of electorship upon women, women are qualified electors and may be grand jurors. Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706 (1918), cited, Caton v. Frank, 56 Nev. 56, at 64, 44 P.2d 521 (1935)

Sec: 28. Compensation of legislative officers and employees; increase or decrease of compensation. No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury as salary or compensation to any officer or employee of the Legislature, or either branch thereof, except in cases where such salary or compensation has been fixed by a law in force prior to the election or appointment of such officer or employee; and the salary or compensation so fixed, shall neither be increased nor diminished so as to apply to any officer or employee of the Legislature, or either branch thereof at such Session; Provided, that this restriction shall not apply to the first session of the Legislature.

NEVADA CASES.

Legislature may appropriate money as it sees fit except as limited by constitution. Legislature has power to appropriate money as it sees fit, except as limited by Nev. Art. 4, § 28, and Nev. Art. 8, § 9. State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15 (1869)

Controller justified in refusing to pay president pro tem amount for services fixed by statute passed at end of session. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 28, which provides that no compensation shall be paid to officers or employees of legislature, except where compensation has been fixed by law prior to election or appointment of officer or employee, state controller was justified in refusing to pay president pro tem of senate amount for services fixed by statute passed at end of session, even if president pro tem was considered only officer disassociated from his membership in senate. State ex rel. King v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 152 (1881)

Salaries of state officers need not have been settled by preexisting law. In order to come within terms of Nev. Art. 5, § 21, which provides that claims against state for salaries of officers fixed by law need not be presented to board of examiners before being passed upon by legislature, salaries of state officers need not have been settled by preexisting law, because if framers of constitution had intended such restriction they would have expressed it, as they did in Nev. Art. 4, § 28, which prohibits payment of salary of legislative officer or employee unless such salary was fixed by law in force prior to his election or appointment. State ex rel. Cutting v. LaGrave, 23 Nev. 387, 48 Pac. 370 (1897)

Framers recognized distinction between "officer" and "employee" as used in section. Recognition by constitutional convention of distinction between "officer" and "employee" in Nev. Art. 4, § 28, is evidence that it was aware of such distinction in Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits members of legislature from holding civil office of profit created during their term, and that it was intended to exclude mere employment from such prohibition. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 148 Pac. 551 (1915), cited, AGO 95-10 (6-12-1995)

Policy regarding changes in compensation during term of office. Changes in compensation during terms of office are not favored (cf. Nev. Art. 4, § 28, Nev. Art. 15, § 9 and NRS 266.450). If statute delegating authority to fix compensation is ambiguous, power to effect changes during terms of office will be denied. Cannon v. Taylor, 87 Nev. 285, 486 P.2d 493 (1971)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Sec: 29. Duration of regular and special sessions. [Repealed in 1958.]

Sec: 30. Homesteads: Exemption from forced sale; joint consent required for alienation; recording of declaration. A homestead as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife when that relation exists; but no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or for the payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said premises, or for the erection of improvements thereon; Provided, the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any process of law obtained by virtue of a lien given by the consent of both husband and wife, and laws shall be enacted providing for the recording of such homestead within the County in which the same shall be situated.

Declaration of homestead filed after attachment but before judgment is effective to exempt property from execution. Declaration of homestead filed after attachment is levied on homestead property, but before judgment is rendered, is effective to exempt property from execution, secs. 1 and 2, ch. 72, Stats. 1864-1865 (cf. NRS 115.010 to 115.040, inclusive). Hawthorne v. Smith, 3 Nev. 182 (1867), cited, Smith v. Stewart, 13 Nev. 65, at 70 (1878), Herndon v. Grilz, 112 Nev. 873, st 878, 920 P.2d 998 (1996), distinguished, Child v. Singleton, 15 Nev. 461, at 462 (1880)

After declaration of homestead, no levy of homestead property can be made except for classes mentioned in section. After declaration of homestead is made and filed, no levy upon or sale of homestead property can legally be made, except for those classes of debts mentioned in Nev. Art. 4, § 30. Hawthorne v. Smith, 3 Nev. 182 (1867), cited, Smith v. Stewart, 13 Nev. 65, at 70 (1878), Lachman v. Walker, 15 Nev. 422, at 425 (1880), Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Childress, 89 Nev. 272, at 272, 510 P.2d 1358 (1973), distinguished, Child v. Singleton, 15 Nev. 461, at 462 (1880)

Mortgage. Former sec. 2, ch. 72, Stats. 1865, to extent that it provided that no mortgage made for purpose of securing loan or other indebtedness upon homestead property is valid for any purpose, violated Nev. Art. 4, § 30, which provides that homestead exemption shall not apply to any process of law obtained by virtue of lien given by consent of both husband and wife. Dunker v. Chedic, 4 Nev. 378 (1868), cited, Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 251, at 256, 156 Pac. 439 (1916), distinguished, First Nat’l Bank v. Meyers, 39 Nev. 235, at 245, 246, 150 Pac. 308 (1916)

Husband and wife hold homestead as joint tenants except to extent constitution and statutes have modified such rights. Because of Nev. Art. 4, § 30, which prohibits alienation of homestead without joint consent of husband and wife, and sec. 2, ch. 72, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS 115.040), which requires declaration signed by both husband and wife for abandonment of homestead, homestead is not held by husband and wife strictly as joint tenants, but under sec. 1, ch. 72, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS 115.020), husband and wife do hold homestead as joint tenants except to extent that constitution and statutes have modified usual rights of such tenants. Smith v. Shrieves, 13 Nev. 303 (1878)

"Homestead" defined. Term "homestead as provided by law," as used in Nev. Art. 4, § 30, means only such homesteads as have been selected and declared as such in accordance with provisions of B § 186 et seq. (cf. NRS 115.010 et seq.). Child v. Singleton, 15 Nev. 461 (1880), distinguished, First Nat’l Bank v. Meyers, 39 Nev. 235, at 244, 150 Pac. 308 (1916), on rehearing, 40 Nev. 284, at 294, 161 Pac. 929 (1916)

Conditions upon which homestead may be granted have been left entirely to legislature. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 30, exempting homesteads from forced sale and prohibiting alienation without joint consent of husband and wife, conditions upon which homestead may be granted have been left entirely to legislature. Roberts v. Greer, 22 Nev. 318, 40 Pac. 6 (1895)

Where husband had given mortgage on community property without wife’s knowledge, wife who had filed homestead had superior rights to any equity of alleged mortgagee. In action by mortgagee against husband and wife to reform mortgage on community property given by husband alone, where wife had filed homestead declaration after execution of mortgage and without knowledge thereof, wife was not bound by intent of parties to mortgage to describe property correctly, and her homestead rights were superior to any equity of alleged mortgagee, being protected by Nev. Art. 4, § 30, which exempts homesteads from forced sale. Adams v. Baker, 24 Nev. 162, 51 Pac. 252 (1897)

Wife could assert her right of homestead in community property mortgaged by her husband even though no homestead declaration had been recorded. RL § 2160 (cf. former provision of NRS 123.230) gives husband management of community property, but provides he cannot mortgage homestead without his wife joining in, and was enacted by authority of former provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 31, to define property rights of wife and was not intended to protect homesteads at law under Nev. Art. 4, § 30, and RL § 2142 (cf. NRS 115.010, 115.020 and 115.030), but to protect homesteads in fact. Therefore, defendant wife could assert her right of homestead in community property mortgaged by her husband even though no homestead declaration had been recorded. First Nat’l Bank of Ely v. Meyers, 39 Nev. 235, 150 Pac. 308 (1916), cited, Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 251, at 252, dissenting opinion at 253, 156 Pac. 439 (1916), Porch v. Patterson, 40 Nev. 299, 161 Pac. 933 (1916), McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, at 38, 111 P.2d 537 (1941), Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 14, at 21, 278 P.2d 876 (1955)

Act of husband in executing mortgage on homestead without cooperation of his wife was void as violation of section. Where character of land as homestead was well known by reason of its occupancy by husband and wife and their children, act of husband in executing mortgage on such land without cooperation of his wife was void as in violation of Nev. Art. 4, § 30, which prohibits alienation of homestead without joint consent of husband and wife, and sec. 6, ch. 119, Stats. 1873, as amended by sec. 1, ch. 20, Stats. 1897 (cf. NRS 123.230), which provides that no mortgage or conveyance of homestead, whether or not declaration thereof has been filed, shall be valid unless executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife. First Nat’l Bank v. Meyers, 40 Nev. 284, 161 Pac. 929 (1916), cited, McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, at 38, 111 P.2d 537 (1941)

It is not necessary that homestead be selected and recorded in order to prevent its alienation by one spouse without consent of other. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 30, which provides that homestead, as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be alienated without joint consent of husband and wife, and that laws shall be passed for recording of such homestead, and sec. 1, ch. 72, Stats. 1865 (cf. NRS 115.020), which defines homestead, provides for its selection and recordation, and exempts such homestead from forced sale on execution, it is not necessary that homestead be selected and recorded in order to prevent its alienation by one spouse without consent of other. First Nat’l Bank v. Meyers, 40 Nev. 284, 161 Pac. 929 (1916), cited, McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, at 38, 111 P.2d 537 (1941)

Mortgage given to pay prior purchase money mortgage is "an obligation contracted for the purchase of said premises." Mortgage given to secure loan of money to pay and discharge prior purchase money mortgage is "an obligation contracted for the purchase of said premises" within Nev. Art. 4, § 30, relating to exempt homesteads. Segale v. Pagni, 50 Nev. 74, 250 Pac. 991 (1926)

Rule exempting homesteads from forced sale should be liberally construed but can only be applied where there is substantial compliance with section. Provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 30, and NCL §§ 3315-3323 (cf. NRS 115.010-115.080), exempting homesteads from forced sale under process of law, should be liberally construed, but rule of liberal construction can be applied only where there is substantial compliance with those provisions, and where declaration of homestead did not state that husband and wife were, at time of making declaration, residing with their family on premises, as required by NCL § 3315 (cf. NRS 115.020), and declarants did not in fact reside on premises, declaration did not constitute substantial compliance. McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, 111 P.2d 537 (1941)

To exempt homestead from forced sale declaration of homestead must be filed according to statute. To secure benefits of Nev. Art. 4, § 30, and NCL §§ 3315-3323 (cf. NRS 115.010-115.080), exempting homestead from forced sale under process of law, it is necessary that declaration of homestead be filed for record as provided in NCL § 3315 (cf. NRS 115.020). McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, 111 P.2d 537 (1941)

Protection of undeclared homestead against unilateral alienation by husband is limited to homestead comprising community property. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 30, which provides that homestead may not be alienated without joint consent of husband and wife, and NCL § 3360 (cf. NRS 123.230), which limits control of husband over community property by proviso that no conveyance of homestead, whether declared or not, is valid unless executed by both husband and wife, protection of undeclared homestead against unilateral alienation by husband is limited to homestead comprising community property. Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 14, 278 P.2d 876 (1955), cited, Allen v. Hernon, 74 Nev. 238, at 242, 328 P.2d 301 (1958)

Support of prior family. Where wife obtained judgment against husband for payment of child support, husband could not declare homestead pursuant to NRS 115.010 in order to exempt his home from execution on that judgment because, even though exceptions to exemption provided by that statute and Nev. Art. 4, § 30, were not applicable, husband was not type of debtor legislation was intended to protect and wife was not type of creditor against whom legislature sought to protect person claiming property as homestead. Breedlove v. Breedlove, 100 Nev. 606, 691 P.2d 426 (1984), cited, Phillips v. Morrow, 104 Nev. 384, at 385, 760 P.2d 115 (1988)

Homestead exemption could be disregarded under circumstances and sold to satisfy child support judgment. Where appellant, in divorce proceeding, was awarded house on condition that she pay husband $7,000 but never did so, respondent, previous wife of same husband, recorded child support judgment (see NRS 125B.140) as lien against house and 5 years later attempted to execute on house and appellant interposed homestead exemption (see Nev. Art. 4, § 30 and NRS 115.010) as defense, district court did not err in ruling that homestead exemption could be disregarded and appellant’s house sold to satisfy child support judgment, because balancing of equities favored respondent. Phillips v. Morrow, 104 Nev. 384, 760 P.2d 115 (1988)

When judgment lien and right to claim homestead exemption attach to property simultaneously, homestead right prevails. Where appellant’s right to claim homestead exemption in accordance with Nev. Art. 4, § 30 and NRS 115.010 and respondent’s judgment lien attached to property simultaneously, and where none of exceptions to homestead exemption listed in NRS 115.010 were applicable to appellant, appellant was entitled to claim homestead and was entitled to all protections afforded thereby. General rule is that when right to claim homestead exemption and judgment lien attach to property simultaneously, homestead right prevails. Herndon v. Grilz, 112 Nev. 873, 920 P.2d 998 (1996)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.

Tenant in common can declare homestead to extent of his interest in cotenancy. Tenant in common can declare homestead to extent of his interest in cotenancy and such interest will be exempt from forced sale. In re Swearinger, 23 Fed. Cas. 527 (No. 13683) (D. Nev. 1877)

Section applies where homestead is mortgaged to pay for improvements. Where homestead is mortgaged in order to secure money to pay for improvements thereon, exception in Nev. Art. 4, § 30, applies and mortgage may be foreclosed. Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Corbett, 6 Fed. Cas. 217 (No. 3058) (C.C.D. Nev. 1879)

Properly executed and recorded declaration of homestead, after judgment but before execution, exempts property from forced sale. Under ch. 72, Stats. 1865, as amended by ch. 131, Stats. 1879 (cf. NRS 115.020), properly executed and recorded declaration of homestead, subsequent to judgment but prior to execution, exempts property from forced sale. (See also Nev. Art. 1, § 14.) Nevada Bank v. Treadway, 17 Fed. 887 (C.C.D. Nev. 1883), cited, Herndon v. Grilz, 112 Nev. 873, at 878, 920 P.2d 998 (1996)

Homestead does not pass to trustee in bankruptcy. Under NCL § 3315 (cf. NRS 115.010, 115.020 and 115.030) and NCL § 8844 (cf. NRS 21.090), homestead is exempt from execution and, therefore, does not pass to trustee in bankruptcy, even though declaration of homestead is not filed until after bankruptcy has occurred and trustee has been appointed. Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622, 87 L. Ed. 1043, 63 S. Ct. 780, 145 A.L.R. 498 (1943)

Conveyance of undeclared homestead right as security for debt results in waiver of homestead as against grantee. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 30, and NRS 115.010, which exempt homesteads from forced sale, right of homestead is inchoate personal right which becomes effective only upon declaration by husband and wife or either of them. Purported conveyance by husband and wife of land and their undeclared homestead right as security for antecedent debt does not create right to declare homestead in their name, but results in waiver of homestead right as against grantee. I. H. Kent Co. v. Busscher, 277 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1960)

Wife’s interest in husband’s half of proceeds from sale of homestead did not prevent execution on husband’s half to satisfy federal tax lien. Where H and W had filed homestead declaration (see Nev. Art. 4, § 30 and NRS 115.020) and homestead property had been sold, execution could be had upon H’s half of proceeds of sale to satisfy federal tax lien against H. Under NRS 115.050, homestead interest of W in H’s half of proceeds would not prevent execution under federal tax law and doctrine of federal supremacy. In re Am. Business Mach., Inc., 6 B.R. 166 (D. Nev. 1980)

Even though mobile home was declared personal property it could be claimed under homestead exemption. Federal bankruptcy court applying Nevada law concluded that mobile home situated on leased space in mobile home park was personal, not real, property even though its wheels had been removed and it was connected to local utilities. Court stated that it was intent of legislature that mobile home be deemed real property only where it is not legally severable from land to which it is affixed. Such was rule under NRS 361.244, relating to taxation, and inclusion of mobile home within definition of residence upon which homestead exemption may be claimed, whether or not underlying land is owned by claimant (see NRS 115.010), did not compel contrary result since nowhere in NRS 115.010 or in Nev. Art. 4, § 30, on which it is based, was homestead defined as including only real property. In re Colver, 13 B.R. 521 (D. Nev. 1981)

[Amended in 1978. Proposed and passed by the 1975 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1977 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1978 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1975, p. 1917; Statutes of Nevada 1977, p. 1703.]

Separate and community property defined by statute. Separate and community property were not defined until adoption of ch. 119, Stats. 1873 (cf. NRS ch. 123), which defines rights of husband and wife, except that separate property of wife was defined in former provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 31. In re Estate of Cook, 34 Nev. 217, 117 Pac. 27 (1911)

Wife could assert her right of homestead in community property mortgaged by her husband even though no homestead declaration had been recorded. RL § 2160 (cf. former provision of NRS 123.230) gives husband the management of community property, but provides he cannot mortgage homestead without his wife joining in, and was enacted by authority of former provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 31, to define property rights of wife and was not intended to protect homesteads at law under Nev. Art. 4, § 30, and RL § 2142 (cf. NRS 115.010, 115.020 and 115.030), but to protect homesteads in fact. Therefore, defendant wife could assert her right of homestead in community property mortgaged by her husband even though no homestead declaration had been recorded. First Nat’l Bank of Ely v. Meyers, 39 Nev. 235, 150 Pac. 308 (1916), cited, Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 251, at 252, dissenting opinion at 253, 156 Pac. 439 (1916), Porch v. Patterson, 40 Nev. 299, 161 Pac. 933 (1916), McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, at 38, 111 P.2d 537 (1941), Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 14, at 21, 278 P.2d 876 (1955)

Under statute, one-half of community property is held in present ownership by wife. In RL § 2165 (cf. NRS 123.250), which provides that one-half of community property goes to surviving wife, phrase goes to does not imply that interest of wife in community property vests in her only upon death of husband, and that before dissolution of community she is not vested with any part of community property, because under former provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 31, which requires enactment of laws defining rights of wife as to property held in common with her husband, word "held" indicates not simply future expectancy, but present ownership by wife of her share of community property. In re Estate of Williams, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916), cited, Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, at 453, 214 Pac. 524 (1923), In re Estate of Condos, 70 Nev. 271, at 277, 266 P.2d 404 (1954)

Legislature has authority under section to enact statute providing that no conveyance shall be valid unless executed by husband and wife. Under former provision of Nev. Art. 4, § 31, which requires passage of laws more clearly defining rights of wife in relation to property held in common with her husband, legislature had power to enact sec. 6, ch. 119, Stats. 1873, as amended by sec. 1, ch. 20, Stats. 1897 (cf. NRS 123.230), which provides that no mortgage or conveyance of homestead, whether or not declaration thereof has been filed, shall be valid unless executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife. First Nat’l Bank v. Meyers, 40 Nev. 284, 161 Pac. 929 (1916), cited, McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, at 38, 111 P.2d 537 (1941), Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 14, at 21, 278 P.2d 876 (1955)

Intent of section. Manifest intent of ch. 119, Stats. 1873 (cf. NRS ch. 123), and Nev. Art. 4, § 31, was to create, define and fix status of legal separate estate in husband and wife, and any attempt to hold, by judicial interpretation, that rule of property so created is changed by fact of dissolution of marriage would be repugnant to constitution and implementing statute. Walker v. Walker, 41 Nev. 4, 164 Pac. 653, 169 Pac. 459 (1917)

Property of wife received before marriage was separate property that could not be sold by husband without her consent. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 4, § 31, and NCL § 3355 (cf. NRS 123.130), all property owned by wife before marriage is her separate property, and where household furniture was received by wife as gift before marriage and was sold by husband without her consent, there was no doubt the furniture was separate property of wife of which she could not be divested without her consent, unless by her conduct she was estopped from denying authority of husband to sell it. Thomas v. Nevans, 67 Nev. 122, 215 P.2d 244 (1950)

Section adopts community property system and recognizes joint tenancy. Nev. Art. 4, § 31, and NCL §§ 3360 and 3362 (cf. NRS 123.230 and 123.030), adopt community property system and recognize and accept certain estates known to common law, including joint tenancy, though manner of acquisition is modified by statute. See 1931 NCL § 3710 (cf. NRS 111.065). Mullikin v. Jones, 71 Nev. 14, 278 P.2d 876 (1955)

Wife’s right to sue husband for personal injuries caused by him before marriage was separate property not extinguished by marriage. Wife’s right to sue husband for personal injuries caused by his negligence before marriage was her separate property under Nev. Art. 4, § 31, and right was not extinguished by their subsequent marriage. Pearce v. Boberg, 89 Nev. 266, 510 P.2d 1358 (1973), cited, Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, at 402, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974)

[Amended in 1889 and 1972. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1887 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1889 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held February 11, 1889. See: Statutes of Nevada 1887, p. 161; Statutes of Nevada 1889, p. 151. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1969 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1971 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1972 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1723; Statutes of Nevada 1971, p. 2232.]

NEVADA CASES.

People derive power to elect officers from state constitution, organic act or statutory enactments of legislatures. People derive their power to elect officers either from state constitution, organic act or statutory enactments of state or territorial legislatures. Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75 (1865), cited, AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

Residents are not entitled to vote for any officer without some provision of law authorizing such vote. Under laws of Nevada which provide how and when citizens may exercise elective franchise and for what officers they may vote, there is no inherent right in citizens to elect and, therefore, citizens are not entitled to vote for any officer without some provision of law, either express or clearly implied, authorizing such vote to be cast. Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75 (1865), cited, State ex rel. Daggett v. Collins, 2 Nev. 351, at 353 (1866), State ex rel. Bridges v. Jepsen, 48 Nev. 64, at 70, 227 Pac. 588 (1924), Grant v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, at 256, 107 P.2d 307 (1940), AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)

Legislature may abolish or create any county office not provided for in state constitution. Legislature is allowed to create or abolish any county offices not provided for in state constitution. State v. Tilford, 1 Nev. 240 (1865), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, at 224, 204 Pac. 880 (1922), State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 233, at 234, 235 (dissenting opinion), 29 P.2d 839 (1934)

Legislature may not abolish office named in constitution without constitutional change. Where state constitution calls for election of certain county officers (see Nev. Art. 4, §§ 26 and 32), legislature cannot abolish named offices without constitutional change. State v. Tilford, 1 Nev. 240 (1865), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, at 224, 204 Pac. 880 (1922), State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 233, at 234, 235 (dissenting opinion), 29 P.2d 839 (1934)

Statute creating new county and naming certain persons county officers until next general election did not violate section. Statute creating new county and naming certain persons county officers until next general election does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which requires legislature to provide for election of county officers. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869)

Section does not apply to cases of emergency or to special occasions, such as creation of new office or vacancy. Where legislature has provided by general law for election of county officers, it has done all that is required by Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which requires legislature to provide for election of county officers. That section does not apply to cases of emergency or to special occasions, such as creation of new office or vacancy. State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111 (1869), cited, State ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, 55 Nev. 46, at 52, 24 P.2d 313 (1933), distinguished, State v. Consolidated Va. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 432, at 442 (1882), State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, at 420, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), State ex rel. Mack v. Torreyson, 21 Nev. 517, at 525, 527, 34 Pac. 870 (1893), State ex rel. Dickerson v. Elwell, 73 Nev. 187, at 190, 313 P.2d 796 (1957), County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, at 331, 550 P.2d 779 (1976)

Statute fixing salaries of various county officers throughout state was general law of uniform operation. Statute entitled "An act fixing salaries of the various county officers in the several counties of this state, and other matters relating thereto," which contained section authorizing county commissioners to transfer from general fund to salary fund sufficient sums to meet all warrants drawn against salary fund, was general law which operated uniformly throughout state, and was enacted pursuant to Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which provides that legislature shall fix by law duties and compensation of certain specified county officers. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289, 30 Pac. 896 (1883)

Necessary county officers. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which required that certain named county officers and "other necessary officers" be selected by election, and Nev. Art. 15, § 10, which governed "officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for," county assessors could be selected only by election as long as office of county assessor existed, because creation of office by legislature was determination that office was necessary, and act extending term of incumbent county assessors from 2 to 4 years was unconstitutional. State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, 4 Pac. 735 (1884), cited, Moore v. Humboldt County, 46 Nev. 220, at 225, 204 Pac. 880, 210 Pac. 401 (1922), King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, at 564, 200 P.2d 221 (1948), distinguished, State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333, at 338, 31 Pac. 545 (1892), State ex rel. Dickerson v. Elwell, 73 Nev. 187, at 191, 313 P.2d 796 (1957)

Office of clerk of district court and clerk of board of county commissioners are ex officio offices held by county clerk. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 32, office of clerk of district court and of clerk of board of county commissioners are ex officio offices held by county clerk. Lobenstein v. County of Storey, 22 Nev. 376, 40 Pac. 1016 (1895)

Office of clerk of supreme court not abolished even though not mentioned in section. Fact that amendment of Nev. Art. 4, § 32, required that legislature provide for election of various county officers, but did not mention election of clerk of supreme court, did not justify conclusion that constitutional office of clerk of supreme court had been abolished, because clerk of supreme court is necessary both under Nev. Art. 15, § 8, which requires that opinions of supreme court be filed with clerk before they take effect, and under Nev. Art. 15, § 12, which requires that clerk keep his office at seat of government. State ex rel. Howell v. LaGrave, 23 Nev. 373, 48 Pac. 193, 674 (1897), cited, State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, at 86, 110 Pac. 177 (1910)

Fact that amendment of section did not mention clerk of supreme court did not abolish office. Where, pursuant to Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which, in its original form, required that legislature provide for election of clerk of supreme court, legislature enacted statute which provided that at first general election following its enactment, and every 4 years thereafter, clerk of supreme court should be chosen by qualified electors of state, fact that amendment of Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which required that legislature provide for election of various county officers, did not mention clerk of supreme court, did not abolish constitutional office of clerk of supreme court. State ex rel. Howell v. LaGrave, 23 Nev. 373, 48 Pac. 193, 674 (1897)

Legislature is without power to make one constitutional office subordinate to another. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 32, expressly designating certain county offices which may be consolidated or abolished, legislature is without power to make one constitutional office subordinate to another, and act providing that secretary of state shall be ex officio clerk of supreme court, although sufficient to confer color of authority on secretary of state acting as clerk, was without force as amendment or repeal of secs. 1 and 12, ch. 108, Stats. 1866 (cf. NRS 2.200), which provide for election of clerk of supreme court as other state officers are elected. State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, 110 Pac. 177 (1910), cited, State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 123, at 130, 27 P.2d 537 (1933), dissenting opinion, King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, at 545, 550, 200 P.2d 221 (1948), distinguished, Shamberger v. Ferrari, 73 Nev. 201, at 205, 314 P.2d 384 (1957)

Section excludes all county offices not enumerated. Nev. Art. 4, § 32, which enumerates certain county offices which may be consolidated, abolished, increased or diminished, excludes all other constitutional offices. State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, 110 Pac. 177 (1910)

Legislature did not have power to make secretary of state ex officio clerk of supreme court. In proceeding in mandamus, where issue was whether office of clerk of supreme court was required to be filled by election as provided by secs. 1 and 12, ch. 108, Stats. 1866 (cf. NRS 2.200), respondent secretary of state was required to certify petitioner’s name as candidate for his party nomination, because under Nev. Art. 4, § 32, designating certain county offices which might be consolidated or abolished, legislature did not have power to make secretary of state ex officio clerk of supreme court, both being constitutional offices. State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, 110 Pac. 177 (1910), cited, King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, at 545, 200 P.2d 221 (1948), Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, at 880, 878 P.2d 913 (1994), distinguished, State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 123, at 130, 27 P.2d 537 (1933), dissenting opinion, Shamberger v. Ferrari, 73 Nev. 201, at 205, 314 P.2d 384 (1957)

Requirement of section that legislature fix compensation of certain county officers applies only to officers named. Requirement of Nev. Art. 4, § 32, that legislature fix compensation of certain county officers applies only to officers named, and does not prevent legislature from delegating to county commissioners the power to fix compensation of township officers. Cawley v. Pershing County, 50 Nev. 237, 255 Pac. 1073 (1927), cited, Ritts v. Humboldt Co., 50 Nev. 247, at 247, 255 Pac. 1076 (1927)

It is duty of county clerk to provide sealed records of divorce actions to parties or their attorneys. Under 1931 NCL § 9467.03 (cf. NRS 125.110), which provides for inspection of sealed records in divorce actions by parties or their attorneys, upon application by party or his attorney, it is ministerial duty of county clerk, who by constitutional provision, Nev. Art. 4, § 32, is ex officio clerk of district court, and who has custody of record, to unseal it. In re Mulford, 64 Nev. 506, 186 P.2d 360 (1947)

Office of county sheriff cannot be abolished by legislature. Office of county sheriff is constitutional office and thus cannot be abolished by act of legislature. AGO 247 (3-13-1957)

Qualified elector may run for office of county surveyor only in county in which he resides. Qualified elector may run for office of county surveyor only in county in which he resides, because office is elective county office under Nev. Art. 4, § 32, and NRS 281.055 prohibits filing for or holding more than one elective office at same time. AGO 674 (7-14-1970)

County clerk is ex officio clerk of justice court. Pursuant to NRS 1.020 and Nev. Art. 4, § 32, county clerk is ex officio clerk of justice court. AGO 84-19 (12-26-1984)

[Amended in 1958. Proposed and passed by the 1955 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1957 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the 1958 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 946; Statutes of Nevada 1957, p. 794.]

Section does not prevent allowance of compensation to officers upon whom duties or responsibilities are imposed which are not connected to the office. Nev. Art. 4, § 33, and Nev. Art. 15, § 9, which prohibit increase in compensation of members of legislature and constitutional officers during term for which they are elected, are intended to prevent increase of compensation of such officers as such officers, or for duties naturally belonging to such offices, and do not prevent allowance of compensation to officers upon whom duties or responsibilities are imposed which are not connected to the office. Crosman v. Nightingill, 1 Nev. 323 (1865), cited, State ex rel. Howell v. LaGrave, 23 Nev. 373, at 383, 48 Pac. 674 (1897), State ex rel. Jennett v. Stevens, 34 Nev. 128, at 143, 116 Pac. 601 (1911), State ex rel. Miller v. Lani, 55 Nev. 123, at 128, 27 P.2d 537 (1933), dissenting opinion.

Section does not prohibit holding of two offices by same person or receipt of salary of two offices by same person. Nev. Art. 4, § 33, and Nev. Art. 15, § 9, which prohibit increase in compensation of members of legislature and constitutional officers during term for which they are elected, should be confined to increase of compensation for discharge of duties naturally belonging to such offices. Such provisions do not prohibit holding of two offices by same person or receipt of salary of two offices by same person. Crosman v. Nightingill, 1 Nev. 323 (1865), cited, State ex rel. Howell v. LaGrave, 23 Nev. 373, at 383, 48 Pac. 674 (1897)

Interest on warrants issued for compensation does not constitute increase in compensation. Allowance of interest on warrants issued for compensation of legislators does not constitute increase of compensation prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 33, because interest is paid not as compensation for services, but as damages for delay in payment. State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15 (1869)

Increase in compensation of president pro tem of senate during his term in office was prohibited by section. Where state senator was elected president pro tem of senate, and subsequently the legislature passed act directing payment for services rendered by him as president pro tem, act was attempt to increase compensation of legislator during his term of office, which is prohibited by Nev. Art. 4, § 33, and application for writ of mandamus to compel payment was denied. State ex rel. King v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 152 (1881)

Repeal of law increasing monthly pension benefits of retired legislators did not result in impairment of vested contractual rights under circumstances. Legislators are special class of persons, and have special rights, responsibilities and special limitation against vesting of increased pension benefits (see Nev. Art. 4, § 33). Thus, where legislature enacted statute which increased monthly pension benefits of retired legislators, but later repealed statute before natural expiration of appellant’s term of office as legislator, appellant’s increased pension benefits under former law did not vest, and legislature’s action did not result in impairment of appellant’s vested contractual rights under Nev. Art. 1, § 15. Mello v. Woodhouse, 110 Nev. 366, 872 P.2d 337 (1994)

Equity cannot be invoked to change, modify or ignore constitutional prohibition against increasing legislator’s retirement pension during his natural term of office. In action brought by former legislator for breach of contract and declaratory and injunctive relief after legislature repealed statute which had increased former legislator’s monthly pension benefits, supreme court held that, because courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements than can courts of law, equity could not be invoked to change, modify or ignore restriction of Nev. Art. 4, § 33 against increasing legislator’s pension during his natural term of office in order to shape remedy for former legislator. Therefore, former legislator was not entitled to equitable relief based on doctrine of promissory estoppel, and district court’s dismissal of his claims was accordingly upheld. Mello v. Woodhouse, 110 Nev. 366, 872 P.2d 337 (1994)

[Amended in 1958. Proposed and passed by the 1955 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1957 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the 1958 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 946; Statutes of Nevada 1957, p. 794.]-(Amendment proposed and passed by the 1995 legislature and agreed to and passed by the 1997 legislature; effective November 25, 1998, if the proposed amendment is approved by the voters at the 1998 general election)

Courts cannot decide whether reasons for veto possessed merit. Although failure of secretary of senate to sign enrolled copy of bill was probably no reason why it should not have been approved by governor, it is not within province of courts, in determining whether act of legislature became law, to determine whether or not reasons for veto possessed any merit. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154 (1867)

How act of legislature can become law without signature of governor. Act of legislature can become law without signature of governor only in one of following ways: Passage by vote of two-thirds of members of both houses after being returned unsigned by governor; failure of governor to return bill within 5 days of receipt during session; or failure of governor to file bill with secretary of state within 10 days of adjournment, if adjournment occurs within 5 days of receipt of bill. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154 (1867)

Bill was effectively vetoed where governor filed bill unsigned with secretary of state after adjournment. Where secretary of senate neglected to sign enrolled copy of bill, and governor filed bill unsigned with secretary of state after adjournment, giving as his reason the lack of signature of secretary of senate, bill was effectively vetoed and did not become law. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154 (1867)

Special session may not reconsider bill vetoed by governor unless requested to do so. Although secretary of state is required by Nev. Art. 4, § 35, to transmit to next session of legislature, whether general or special, all bills vetoed after adjournment of preceding session, special session may not reconsider such a bill unless requested to do so by governor. Jones v. Theall, 3 Nev. 233 (1867)

Legislature may not reconsider bill vetoed by governor and transmitted to them by secretary of state. Transmission of vetoed bill and governor’s objections thereto by secretary of state to special session of legislature is not calling of attention to bill within meaning of Nev. Art. 5, § 9, and legislature may not reconsider bill at the special session. Jones v. Theall, 3 Nev. 233 (1867)

Indiana constitution did not support contention that act vetoed by governor, reconsidered and passed over veto at next legislative session, did not require signature of proper legislative officers to become effective. Where provision in Indiana constitution which corresponds to Nev. Art. 4, § 18, relating to passage of bills by legislature, was found in article devoted to legislative department, and provision which corresponds to Nev. Art. 4, § 35, relating to presentation of bills to governor, was found in article devoted to executive department, such provisions of Indiana constitution did not support contention that act vetoed by governor, reconsidered at next session of legislature, as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 35, and there passed over his veto, need not be signed by legislative officers specified in Nev. Art. 4, § 18. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Nev. Art. 4 §§ 18 and 35 should be read and construed together. Because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35, are both found in article of constitution devoted to legislative department of state government, where construction of either section is necessary, the two sections should be read and construed together. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Indiana constitution was not authority for proposition that act passed over veto of governor need not be signed. Where Indiana constitution provided that act passed over veto of governor at same session of legislature in which act originated should "be a law," and was silent as to act so passed at subsequent session, Indiana constitution was not authority for proposition that act vetoed by governor and passed over his veto at next session of legislature, as provided in Nev. Art. 4, § 35, need not be signed by legislative officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, because Nev. Art. 4, § 35, states that act so passed shall become a law, thereby presupposing subsequent presentation and signing of act. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Historically, legislature has construed provision to mean bill passed over governor’s veto was not effective without subsequent attestation by officers. Fact that at many sessions of legislature following adoption of constitution, bills which had been passed at preceding session, vetoed by governor, reconsidered and passed over veto were again attested by officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, showed that legislature construed Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35, to mean that bill so passed was not effective without subsequent attestation, and such long-continued and contemporaneous construction placed by coordinate branch of government upon matter of procedure in such branch was entitled to be given great weight by court in construing the sections. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Framers intended that act passed over governor’s veto should not be effective unless properly signed by required legislative officers. By providing in Nev. Art. 4, § 35, that if, after final adjournment of legislature, governor does not within specified time file bill which he has vetoed with secretary of state, bill shall "be a law," and that if he does so file such bill, it shall be placed before next session where, if approved over veto, it shall "become a law," framers of constitution intended that act vetoed by governor, and passed over his veto at next session of legislature, should not be effective unless subsequently signed by legislative officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Fact that officers did not uniformly place their attestation on bill did not mean construction given provision by legislature was without force. Where legislature, by its repeated action, construed Nev. Art. 4, §§ 18 and 35, to mean that bills passed at preceding session, vetoed by governor, reconsidered and passed over veto were not effective without attestation by officers named in Nev. Art. 4, § 18, fact that such officers often inserted over their signatures a history of action taken, and did not uniformly place their attestation upon face of bill, did not mean that construction given sections by legislature was without force, because substance of constitution should not be sacrificed to matter of form where form is not the essence. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466 (1901)

Assembly concurrent resolution does not have force and effect of law because it does not contain enacting clause and is not presented to governor. Assembly concurrent resolution does not have force and effect of law because it does not contain enacting clause required by Nev. Art. 4, § 23, and is not presented to governor for his signature as required by Nev. Art. 4, § 35. Nevada Highway Patrol Ass’n v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 107 Nev. 547, 815 P.2d 608 (1991)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Where governor signs bill and files it with secretary of state, bill becomes law even if secretary fails to place file mark on it. Where governor signs bill, files it with secretary of state, bill becomes law and is considered filed at that time even though secretary of state fails to place file mark upon it. Thus, if governor takes bill next day and cuts off signature, bill is still valid law. AGO (3-13-1899)

Under section, when 5-day period in which governor must take action on bills expires, bill becomes law. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 35, when 5-day period in which governor must take action on bills expires, bill becomes state law. Thus, where governor vetoes bill on sixth day, returns it to legislature and legislature sustains veto, bill is still valid law. AGO (12-30-1909)

Where governor vetoes bill after expiration of session, next legislature must consider vetoed bill. Where governor vetoes bill after expiration of session, next legislature must consider vetoed bill; but, in so doing, legislature is not precluded from passing new bills containing same subject matter. AGO 4 (1-23-1913)

Bill not signed by speaker of assembly does not become law even if governor fails to veto it within 10 days after adjournment. Bill which has not been signed by speaker of assembly does not become law even though governor fails to veto it within 10 days after legislature has adjourned. AGO 32 (4-1-1913)

Secretary of state’s duty is to place bills vetoed by the governor after adjournment before next legislature. Where governor returns bills with his objections to secretary of state after legislature has adjourned, secretary of state’s only duty is to lay bills before next legislature; he is under no duty to compile such bills into pamphlet form. AGO 98 (11-18-1913)

Joint resolution appropriating money, adopted by both houses but never presented to governor does not become law. Joint resolution appropriating money from highway fund, adopted by both houses but never presented to governor for signature, does not become law; thus, appropriation is invalid under Nev. Art. 4, § 19. AGO 85 (7-25-1951)

[Sec. 36.] Abolishment of county; approval of voters in county. The legislature shall not abolish any county unless the qualified voters of the county affected shall at a general or special election first approve such proposed abolishment by a majority of all the voters voting at such election. The legislature shall provide by law the method of initiating and conducting such election.

[Added in 1940. Proposed and passed by the 1937 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1939 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1940 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1937, p. 564; Statutes of Nevada 1939, p. 360.]

Section 37. Continuity of government in case of enemy attack; succession to public offices; legislative quorum requirements; relocation of seat of government. The legislature, in order to insure continuity of state and local governmental operations in periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack, shall have the power and the immediate duty to provide for immediate and temporary succession to the powers and duties of public offices, of whatever nature and whether filled by election or appointment, the incumbents of which may become unavailable for carrying on the powers and duties of such offices, and to adopt such other measures as may be necessary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations, including changes in quorum requirements in the legislature and the relocation of the seat of government. In the exercise of the powers hereby conferred, the legislature shall conform to the requirements of this constitution except to the extent that in the judgment of the legislature so to do would be impracticable or would admit of undue delay.

[Added in 1968. Proposed and passed by the 1965 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1967 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1968 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1965, p. 1515; Statutes of Nevada 1967, p. 1797.]