Statute providing for reduction of jail time is void insofar as it attempts to commute any portion of sentence imposed by courts before time act took effect. Ch. 78, Stats. 1881 (cf. NRS 209.433), relating to government of state prison, insofar as it attempts to commute any portion of sentence imposed by courts prior to time act took effect, is void under Nev. Art. 3, relating to separation of powers, because it interferes with judiciary. Ex parte Darling, 16 Nev. 98 (1881), cited, Ex parte Woodburn, 32 Nev. 136, 104 Pac. 245 (1909), State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 34 Nev. 94, at 117, 116 Pac. 595 (1911)

Provision that state engineer should determine relative water rights according to procedure in statute was not void as vesting judicial powers in executive officer. Provisions in water law of 1913 that state engineer should determine relative rights of water users upon stream system in accordance with procedure set forth in statute were not void as vesting judicial powers in executive officer in violation of Nev. Art. 3, which divides state government into legislative, executive and judicial departments, because rulings of state engineer were primarily administrative and quasi-judicial only. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 314, 142 Pac. 803 (1914), cited, Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, at 27, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), Nevada Indus. Comm'n v. Reese, 93 Nev. 115, at 120, 560 P.2d 1352 (1977), Southwest Gas Corp. v. Woods, 108 Nev. 11, at 14, 823 P.2d 288 (1992)

Where provisions of water law were adopted from other states and highest courts of those states held provisions constitutional, provisions did not violate Nevada constitution beyond all reasonable doubt. Where provisions of water law of 1913 authorizing state engineer to determine relative rights of water users upon stream system in accordance with procedure set forth in statute were adopted from laws of other states, and highest courts of those states had held that provisions were not unconstitutional as vesting judicial powers in executive officer, it could not be said that provisions violated beyond all reasonable doubt Nev. Art. 3, which regulates distribution of powers of state government. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 314, 142 Pac. 803 (1914), cited, O'Brien v. Trousdale, 41 Nev. 90, at 102, 167 Pac. 1007 (1917), concurring opinion, In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, at 332, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), City of Reno v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 59 Nev. 416, at 445, 95 P.2d 994 (1939), dissenting opinion.

Statute permitting disqualification of judge in civil action without filing of affidavit of bias or grounds for disqualification held unconstitutional. Former statute which established peremptory challenge procedure permitting any party in civil action to disqualify judge without filing affidavit of bias or otherwise alleging any grounds for disqualification (see sec. 2 of ch. 398, Stats. 1977, codified as former NRS 1.240) constituted unwarranted interference with courts in exercise of judicial function and violated doctrine of separation of powers and therefore was unconstitutional. Johnson v. Goldman, 94 Nev. 6, 575 P.2d 929 (1978)

1. The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments,-the Legislative,-the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.

2. If the legislature authorizes the adoption of regulations by an executive agency which bind persons outside the agency, the legislature may provide by law for:

(a) The review of these regulations by a legislative agency before their effective date to determine initially whether each is within the statutory authority for its adoption;

(b) The suspension by a legislative agency of any such regulation which appears to exceed that authority, until it is reviewed by a legislative body composed of members of the Senate and Assembly which is authorized to act on behalf of both houses of the legislature; and

(c) The nullification of any such regulation by a majority vote of that legislative body, whether or not the regulation was suspended.

[Amended in 1996. Proposed and passed by the 1993 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1995 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1996 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1993, p. 3082; Statutes of Nevada 1995, p. 2972.]

Exercise of judicial function by board of county commissioners is constitutional. Exercise of judicial function by board of county commissioners is not violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which provides for separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, because that section is limited by Nev. Art. 4, § 26, which provides that legislature shall prescribe duties of boards of county commissioners. State ex rel. Mason v. Board of County Comm’rs, 7 Nev. 392 (1872)

Construction to be placed on act can be determined only by courts, not legislature. Construction to be placed on act can be determined only by courts. Attempted exercise of this power by legislature, in providing that nothing in act authorizing raffle should be construed as authorizing lottery contrary to provisions of constitution (see Nev. Art. 4, § 24), was assumption of functions of judiciary in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and was disregarded by court. Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101 (1874)

Separation of powers provision of Nevada constitution. Under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, state government is divided into executive, legislative and judicial departments, and no person charged with exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments may exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in cases expressly directed or permitted by constitution. Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101 (1874)

Legislative appointment of officers. Offices and agencies of municipal corporation, through which its affairs are administered, are created by legislature, and persons to fill such offices are chosen or appointed in mode prescribed by law of incorporation. Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which separates powers and duties of respective branches of state government, does not prevent legislative appointment because that power is not generally conferred upon executive, and Nev. Art. 15, § 10, exclusively authorizes legislature to provide for election or appointment. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876), cited, AGO 95-08 (6-2-1995)

Legislature cannot adjudicate claims where only private interests are involved. Where only private interests are involved, legislature cannot adjudicate upon disputed claims, and statute directing city treasurer to set apart certain amount of money as special fund and to pay certain enumerated indebtednesses against city, insofar as it undertook to fix amount due listed persons, was attempt by legislature to exercise judicial powers and repugnant to Nev. Art. 3, § 1, pertaining to separation of powers. State ex rel. Arick v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 439 (1878)

Statute providing for reduction of jail time is void insofar as it attempts to commute any portion of sentence imposed by courts before time act took effect. Ch. 78, Stats. 1881 (cf. NRS 209.433), relating to government of state prison, insofar as it attempts to commute any portion of sentence imposed by courts prior to time act took effect, is void under Nev. Art. 3, relating to separation of powers, because it interferes with judiciary. Ex parte Darling, 16 Nev. 98 (1881), cited, Ex parte Woodburn, 32 Nev. 136, 104 Pac. 245 (1909), State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 34 Nev. 94, at 117, 116 Pac. 595 (1911)

Nonjudicial functions performed by district judge pursuant to statute cannot be reviewed on certiorari. Nonjudicial functions performed by district judge pursuant to statute cannot be reviewed upon certiorari, even though statute requiring performance may violate provisions of Nev. Art. 3, § 1. Esmeralda County v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 18 Nev. 438, 5 Pac. 64 (1884), cited, State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 23 Nev. 247, at 248, 45 Pac. 529 (1896), State ex rel. Fletcher v. Osburn, 24 Nev. 187, at 194, 51 Pac. 837 (1898), State ex rel. Murphy v. County of White Pine, 31 Nev. 113, at 117, 101 Pac. 104 (1909), Degiovanni v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 45 Nev. 74, at 78, 197 Pac. 582 (1921), State ex rel. Casady v. Lauritzen, 70 Nev. 134, at 136, 260 P.2d 783 (1953)

Member of executive or judicial department not prohibited from exercising legislative powers not charged by constitution upon legislature. Although Nev. Art. 3, § 1, dividing state government into three departments, prohibits governor or judiciary from being members of legislature or making laws, it does not prohibit every member of executive or judicial department from exercising powers in their nature legislative, but which are not particularly charged by constitution upon legislature. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437 (1893), cited, Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 314, at 341, 142 Pac. 803 (1914), AGO 93-17 (7-2-1993)

Constitutional prohibition against exercising powers of another department refers to duties and functions charged by constitution. It is state government as created by Nevada constitution which is divided into three departments by Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and provision of such section which prohibits persons charged with exercise of powers properly belonging to one such department from exercising functions of others refers to duties and functions with which departments are charged by other parts of constitution. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437 (1893), cited, Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 314, at 341, 142 Pac. 803 (1914)

Executive branch not prohibited from assessing property. Nev. Art. 3, § 1, dividing government into three departments, does not prevent members of executive branch from assessing or equalizing property. Neither of these functions has been, either expressly or impliedly, placed by constitution upon either of other departments, for although board may act in judicial capacity in equalizing valuations, constitution nowhere contemplates that judicial department, as organized by Nev. Art. 6, shall discharge that duty. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437 (1893)

Provisions authorizing court to grant application for incorporation of city or town does not confer legislative power in violation of constitution. Secs. 2 and 3, ch. 125, Stats. 1907 (cf. NRS 266.020 and 266.025), which authorize majority of qualified taxpayers and electors of city or town to submit to district court a written application for incorporation of such city or town, and require that court grant application upon being satisfied of its legal sufficiency, do not confer legislative power upon judicial department in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, because under them, court is acting simply in order to give law effect after having determined judicially requisites as fixed by legislature. State ex rel. Williams v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 30 Nev. 225, 94 Pac. 70 (1908), cited, Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 314, at 342, 142 Pac. 803 (1914)

Prisoner sentenced before enactment of statute permitting reduction in sentence for good behavior could not avail himself of statute. Where petitioner in 1907 was sentenced to imprisonment for term of 3 years, enactment in 1909 of sec. 3, ch. 96, Stats. 1909 (cf. NRS 209.433), allowing prisoner serving 3-year sentence a credit of 8 months for good behavior instead of credits previously allowed by law, did not reduce sentence of petitioner, because to give act force of commuting any portion of sentence imposed by court prior to time act took effect would allow legislature to usurp functions of judiciary in violation of constitution (Nev. Art. 3, § 1). Ex parte Woodburn, 32 Nev. 136, 104 Pac. 245 (1909), cited, In re Melosevich, 36 Nev. 67, at 75, 133 Pac. 57 (1913)

Statute requiring bank examiner to take possession of property of insolvent banks in custody of receiver previously appointed under law was unconstitutional. Statute which required that bank examiner take possession of property of insolvent banks in custody of any receiver previously appointed under law was void as in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which divides government into legislative, executive and judicial branches, and provides that none of such branches shall perform functions which essentially belong to one of the others, because appointment of receivers and winding up of insolvent corporations are functions of judicial branch, vested by Nev. Art. 6, § 1, not of executive or legislative, going further than latter may prescribe by procedure. State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 34 Nev. 94, 116 Pac. 595 (1911), cited, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co., 37 Nev. 55, at 72, 139 Pac. 505, 142 Pac. 627 (1914), dissenting opinion, Seaborn v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 55 Nev. 206, at 218, 29 P.2d 500 (1934)

Powers other than those expressly mentioned might be delegated to district courts. In enacting Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing that powers of government shall be divided into three separate departments and that none of departments shall exercise functions belonging to others, constitutional convention made it plain that other powers than those expressly mentioned in former provisions of Nev. Art. 6, § 6, might be delegated to district courts. Gay v. Tenth Judicial Dist. Court, 41 Nev. 330, 171 Pac. 156, 173 Pac. 885 (1918)

Statute which authorizes proceedings in district court for adjudication of water rights after state engineer has filed order of determination does not violate separation of powers. In prohibition proceedings, contention that ch. 140, Stats. 1913, as amended, ch. 253, Stats. 1915 (cf. NRS 533.090 et seq.), which authorizes proceedings in district court for adjudication of water rights after state engineer has filed order of determination with clerk, violated Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, and Nev. Art. 1, § 6, vesting judicial power in enumerated courts, on ground that statute confers judicial powers upon state engineer, was not well taken. Procedure before engineer is in no sense judicial proceeding, but simply sets in motion the machinery necessary to invest court with jurisdiction. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 42 Nev. 1, 171 Pac. 166 (1918), cited, In re Waters of Barber Creek, 43 Nev. 407, at 409, 187 Pac. 1004 (1920), Pitt v. Scrugham, 44 Nev. 418, at 427, 429, 195 Pac. 1101 (1921), Dahlquist v. Nevada Industrial Comm’n, 46 Nev. 107, at 119, 206 Pac. 197, 207 Pac. 1104 (1922), In re Waters of Manse Spring, 60 Nev. 280, at 290, 108 P.2d 311 (1940), Provenzano v. Long, 64 Nev. 412, at 427, 183 P.2d 639 (1947), Wolford v. Wolford, 65 Nev. 710, at 716, 200 P.2d 988 (1948), In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 27, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 217, 246 P.2d 805 (1952), Salmon River Canal Co. v. Bell Brand Ranches, Inc., 564 F.2d 1244 (1977)

Statute authorizing state bar to conduct proceedings for suspension or disbarment of attorneys does not violate separation of powers. Secs. 26 and 34, ch. 13, Stats. 1928 (cf. S.C.R. 105), which empower board of governors of state bar to initiate and conduct proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys, do not violate provisions of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, concerning separation of governmental powers, because decision of board is recommendatory in character, and supreme court is only court which has power to disbar or suspend attorney. In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 Pac. 291 (1930), cited, State ex rel. McCloskey v. Greathouse, 55 Nev. 409, at 413, 36 P.2d 357 (1934), Haviland v. Foley, 55 Nev. 455, at 457, 39 P.2d 198 (1935), State ex rel. Alward v. Local Administrative Comm., 58 Nev. 47, at 52, 68 P.2d 580 (1937), In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, at 301, 108 P.2d 858 (1940), In re Porep, 60 Nev. 393, at 398, 111 P.2d 533 (1941), Provenzano v. Long, 64 Nev. 412, at 427, 183 P.2d 639 (1947), In re Kenick, 100 Nev. 273, at 275, 680 P.2d 972 (1984), State Bar v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, at 125, 756 P.2d 464 (1988), see also Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994), distinguished, In re Van Heukelom, 67 Nev. 649, at 656, 224 P.2d 313 (1950), In re Ross, 99 Nev. 1, at 12, 656 P.2d 832 (1983)

Statute requiring approval of municipal bond issue by majority of electors who owned real property and majority of electors who did not own real property did not violate separation of powers or legislative authority. Neither Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which divides government of state into three separate departments, nor Nev. Art. 4, § 1, which vests legislative authority of state in senate and assembly, was violated by statute which required that issuing of bonds by municipality be approved by majority of electors involved who were not real property owners, as well as by majority of electors involved who were owners of real property. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)

Statute relating to discipline of attorneys did not vest state bar with judicial power. Statute relating to discipline of attorneys at law which did not invest board of governors of state bar with judicial power did not violate Nev. Art. 3, § 1, relating to distribution of governmental powers. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Power to discipline attorneys not conferred on state bar. Under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, power to discipline, suspend or disbar attorneys at law cannot be conferred upon board of governors of state bar. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940)

Where construction of statute would have resulted in unconstitutional interference with judicial function, such interference was not attributed to legislature where another construction was possible. Construction of statute which would require judicial action within fixed period of time would result in unconstitutional interference with judicial function by legislature in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and such interference will not be attributed to legislature where another construction is possible. Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230, 245 P.2d 994 (1952), cited, Volpert v. Papagna, 85 Nev. 437, at 439, 456 P.2d 848 (1969), Lindauer v. Allen, 85 Nev. 430, at 434, 456 P.2d 851 (1969), State v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 106 Nev. 880, at 883, 802 P.2d 1276 (1990)

State senator’s motion to dismiss complaint challenging his right to hold executive position was stricken where affidavits supporting motion were not timely filed. In original proceeding in nature of quo warranto to challenge defendant’s right to hold position of director of driver’s license division of public service commission (now driver’s license division of department of motor vehicles and public safety) on ground that he was also state senator, which violated the separation of powers provision of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, affidavit of commission chairman that defendant’s duties as head of driver’s license division were ministerial only and photostatic copy of defendant’s resignation as state senator offered by defendant as supplemental support for his motion to dismiss complaint were stricken on plaintiff’s motion as not timely filed with motion to dismiss as required by N.R.C.P. 6(d) where no justification for late filing was shown. State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 258 P.2d 982 (1953)

Review by certiorari of judicial or quasi-judicial acts of university board of regents is not prohibited where excess of jurisdiction is in question. Although board of regents of university is duly constituted administrative board established under Nev. Art. 11, § 4, and is part of executive department, neither Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, nor NCL § 9231 (cf. NRS 34.020), limiting scope of certiorari, prevent judicial review by certiorari of judicial or quasi-judicial acts of board of regents where excess of jurisdiction is in question. State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953), cited, Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 128, at 151, 869 P.2d 795 (1994)

Legislative and executive branches prohibited from assuming any judicial power or impeding functions of district courts. Under Nev. Art. 6, courts possess entire body of intrinsic judicial power of state, and Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, precludes both legislative and executive branches of government from assuming to exercise any part of that judicial power or from directing, controlling or impeding district courts in their functions. State ex rel. Watson v. Merialdo, 70 Nev. 322, 268 P.2d 922 (1954), cited, Board of County Comm’rs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, at 61, 294 P.2d 366 (1956), Graves v. State, 82 Nev. 137, at 139, 413 P.2d 503 (1966), Volpert v. Papagna, 85 Nev. 437, at 439, 456 P.2d 848 (1969), Lindauer v. Allen, 85 Nev. 430, at 434, 456 P.2d 851 (1969), Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 93 Nev. 614, at 617, 572 P.2d 521 (1977)

Statute requiring district judge to submit affidavit alleging that no matter remained undecided which had been submitted for more than 90 days in order to receive monthly salary held unconstitutional. Statute which provided that before district judge could receive his monthly salary he must file affidavits with county clerk and state controller setting forth number of cases, motions and other matters which had been submitted and decided and alleging that no matter remained undecided which had been submitted for more than 90 days, but provided for no other forfeiture for failure to comply, was unconstitutional as exceeding power to fix salaries of judges under Nev. Art. 6, § 15, and as interfering with judicial process in violation of separation of powers provision of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, in that statute had effect of coercing judge to decide case within 90 days. State ex rel. Watson v. Merialdo, 70 Nev. 322, 268 P.2d 922 (1954), cited, In re Watson, 71 Nev. 227, at 228, 286 P.2d 254 (1955), Board of County Comm’rs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, at 61, 294 P.2d 366 (1956), Lindauer v. Allen, 85 Nev. 430, at 434, 456 P.2d 851 (1969), Marfisi v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 445, at 446, 456 P.2d 443 (1969), Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 93 Nev. 614, at 617, 572 P.2d 521 (1977)

Statute requiring supreme court justice to submit affidavit that no case assigned for opinion remained more than 90 days in order to receive monthly salary held unconstitutional. Statute which required that before justice of supreme court could receive his monthly salary he must file affidavit with state controller alleging that no case had been assigned to him for preparation of opinion for more than 90 days was unconstitutional as interfering with judicial process in that statute had effect of coercing justice to render his opinion within 90 days, which violated separation of powers provision of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and unconstitutional in that it exceeded power to fix salaries of justices granted by Nev. Art. 6, § 15. State ex rel. Watson v. Merialdo, 70 Nev. 322, 268 P.2d 922 (1954), cited, In re Watson, 71 Nev. 227, at 228, 286 P.2d 254 (1955), Board of County Comm’rs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, at 61, 294 P.2d 366 (1956), Marfisi v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 445, at 446, 456 P.2d 443 (1969), Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 93 Nev. 614, at 617, 572 P.2d 521 (1977)

Statute authorizing Nevada commission on equal rights of citizens to obtain information for future legislation did not violate separation of powers. Provisions of NRS ch. 233, establishing Nevada commission on equal rights of citizens, which authorize such administrative agency to obtain information from which future legislation may be formulated, do not violate separation of powers prescribed by Nev. Art. 3, § 1. Nevada Comm’n v. Smith, 80 Nev. 469, 396 P.2d 677 (1964), cited, Dickerson v. Grand Jury, 82 Nev. 113, at 117, 412 P.2d 441 (1966)

Holding that full train crew law did not require firemen on diesel locomotives was not repeal of law. Holding that full train crew law, former provision of NRS 705.390, did not require employment of firemen on diesel locomotives was not repeal of statute by court in violation of constitutional separation of powers, Nev. Art. 3, § 1, because statute remained in effect as to steam engines. Southern Pac. Co. v. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 572, 397 P.2d 187 (1964)

Request by governor for impanelment of state grand jury could be revoked by governor before impanelment. Request by governor for impanelment of state grand jury pursuant to NRS 6.135 could be revoked by governor prior to impanelment. Separation of powers prescribed by Nev. Art. 3, § 1, did not apply because judge to whom such request is made acts ministerially and not judicially. Sawyer v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 53, 410 P.2d 748 (1966)

Writ of prohibition to prevent county grand jury inquiry into security at Nevada state hospital denied. Writ of prohibition to prevent county grand jury inquiry into security at Nevada state hospital on ground that such investigation would violate separation of powers doctrine of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, was denied, because power of executive branch is to administer state hospital and would not be impaired by investigation of security. Dickerson v. Grand Jury, 82 Nev. 113, 412 P.2d 441 (1966)

Legislature had no power to decree what constituted reversible error in criminal case. Legislature had no power to decree what would constitute reversible error in criminal case because that is judicial question. Former provision of NRS 175.170 (cf. NRS 175.171) that giving of certain instruction would constitute reversible error was therefore violation of separation of powers doctrine under Nev. Art. 3, § 1. Graves v. State, 82 Nev. 137, 413 P.2d 503 (1966), cited, Dunphy v. Sheehan, 92 Nev. 259, at 265, 549 P.2d 332 (1976)

Legislative branch may direct which acts executive branch shall or may not perform. Pursuant to Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Nev. Art. 5, § 1, executive department enforces laws enacted by legislative department, and, except where there is constitutional limitation, legislative department may direct which acts executive department shall or may not perform. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, State Bar v. List, 97 Nev. 367, at 368, 632 P.2d 341 (1981), State of Nevada Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, at 21, 824 P.2d 276 (1992), AGO 94-24 (11-30-1994)

Doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental in our system of government. Doctrine of separation of powers established by Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which prohibits one department from exercising powers of other two is fundamental in our system of government. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, Dunphy v. Sheehan, 92 Nev. 259, at 265, 549 P.2d 332 (1976), City of N. Las Vegas ex rel. Arndt v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, at 294, 550 P.2d 399 (1976), O’Bryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 95 Nev. 386, at 388, 594 P.2d 739 (1979), Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, at 879, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Laws are to be construed in favor of legislative power. As used in Nev. Art. 3, § 1, legislative power conferred by Nev. Art. 4, § 1, is power of lawmaking representative bodies to frame and enact laws, and to amend or repeal laws, and, unless there are specific constitutional limitations to contrary, laws are to be construed in favor of legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, AGO 94-24 (11-30-1994), AGO 95-13 (7-19-1995)

"Judicial function" defined. As used in Nev. Art. 3, § 1, "judicial function" is exercise of judicial authority to hear and determine questions in controversy that are proper to be examined in court of justice. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967)

"Judicial power" defined. For purposes of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and Nev. Art. 6, § 1, judicial power is authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies and includes authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order and to exercise any prerogative inherent or incidental to judicial function, but does not include authority that does not stem from constitution or authority derived from legislative or executive power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 93 Nev. 614, at 617, 572 P.2d 521 (1977), Azbarea v. City of N. Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 109, at 111, 590 P.2d 161 (1979), AGO 93-17 (7-2-1993), AGO 94-24 (11-30-1994), Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, at 1511, 908 P.2d 689 (1995), Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev. 369, at 377, 915 P.2d 245 (1996), distinguished, Young v. Board of County Comm’rs, 91 Nev. 52, at 56, 530 P.2d 1203 (1975)

Intent of framers to give only judicial power to courts. Intent of framers of constitution in Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and Nev. Art. 6, § 6, was to give only judicial power to courts. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967)

Statute which required judge to determine qualifications of person to administer marriage ceremony held unconstitutional. Former statute which required district judge to determine qualifications of person to administer marriage ceremony imposes nonjudicial power and is unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, and Nev. Art. 6, § 6. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967), cited, Desert Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, at 644, 600 P.2d 1189 (1979), Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, at 880, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Statute authorizing public service commission to refuse or approve transfers of certificates of public convenience was not unlawful delegation of legislative authority. NRS 704.410, which authorizes public service commission of Nevada to approve or refuse approval of transfers of certificates of public convenience, was not unlawful delegation of legislative authority in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, because NRS ch. 704 established standards to guide commission in making such determinations. City of No. Las Vegas v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 83 Nev. 278, 429 P.2d 66 (1967), cited, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 88 Nev. 582, at 587, 503 P.2d 454 (1972), State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, at 334, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973), Sheriff of Clark County v. Luqman, 101 Nev. 149, at 154, 697 P.2d 107 (1985)

Any legislative undertaking to require judicial action within fixed periods of time is unconstitutional. In appeal from order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss civil action for want of prosecution, where motion to dismiss was filed more than 5 years after filing of complaint, court was required by N.R.C.P. 41(e), which makes dismissal mandatory 5 years after filing of complaint, to dismiss action. Contention of appellant that N.R.C.P. 41(e) had been superseded by former NRS 14.150 to extent that later statute changed time for mandatory dismissal from 5 to 7 years was without merit because under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, powers of governmental branches are divided and any legislative undertaking to require judicial action within fixed periods of time is unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial function. NRS 2.120 gives judicial rulemaking power to courts and, in order for legislature to amend or change effect of rule made by court, legislature must first amend NRS 2.120. Lindauer v. Allen, 85 Nev. 430, 456 P.2d 851 (1969), cited, P.T.P., Inc. v. Casey, 85 Nev. 562, at 563, 459 P.2d 770 (1969), Great W. Land & Cattle Corp. v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 86 Nev. 282, at 285, 467 P.2d 1019 (1970), Meredith v. Arden, 92 Nev. 620, at 621, 555 P.2d 1241 (1976), Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 93 Nev. 614, at 616, 572 P.2d 521 (1977), State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, at 345, 661 P.2d 1298 (1983), Erickson v. One Thirty-Three, Inc., 104 Nev. 755, at 757, 766 P.2d 898 (1988), see also Massey v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 Nev. 367, 724 P.2d 208 (1986)

Statute requiring board of finance approval of method of financing trust for public purposes was not unlawful delegation of legislative authority. Former NRS 242B.070, requiring state board of finance approval of method of finance proposed by any trust created for furtherance of public functions, was not unlawful delegation of legislative authority in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 88 Nev, 582, 503 P.2d 454 (1972), cited, State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, at 334, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973)

County Economic Development Revenue Bond Law was not unlawful delegation of legislative authority. County Economic Development Revenue Bond Law (see NRS 244A.669 et seq.) was not unlawful delegation of legislative or county authority in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, because provisions of statute provided adequate standards for counties to follow. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973)

Court precluded from awarding costs or attorneys’ fees to any party appearing at legislative hearing. Action by city seeking to recover from utility company costs and attorney fees incurred by city in successfully opposing rate increase request at public service commission hearing was properly dismissed for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted because rate hearing conducted by commission pursuant to NRS 704.110 was legislative in nature and Nev. Art. 3, § 1, precluded court, without specific constitutional or legislative authority, from awarding costs or attorney fees to any party appearing at a legislative hearing. City of Las Vegas v. Southwest Gas Corp., 90 Nev. 178, 521 P.2d 1229 (1974), cited, Sun Realty v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 774, at 776, 542 P.2d 1072 (1975), Consumers League v. Southwest Gas Corp., 94 Nev. 153, at 155, 576 P.2d 737 (1978)

Appeals officer of Nevada industrial commission could exercise quasi-judicial powers. Appeals officer of Nevada industrial commission (now state industrial insurance system) could exercise quasi-judicial powers necessary to execute duties under former NRS 616.542 (cf. NRS 616C.340) to conduct administrative hearings, make findings and render administrative decisions thereon without violating separation of powers provision of Nev. Art. 3, § 1. Nevada Indus. Comm’n v. Reese, 93 Nev. 115, 560 P.2d 1352 (1977), cited, Southwest Gas Corp. v. Woods, 108 Nev. 11, at 14, 823 P.2d 288 (1992), State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Snyder, 109 Nev. 1223, at 1228, 865 P.2d 1168 (1993)

Statutory provisions requiring that court determine whether "good cause" existed for establishment of new auto dealership before issuance of license violated separation of powers doctrine. Former provisions of ch. 295, Stats. 1977, relating to motor vehicle franchises (see NRS 482.36311 et seq.), which required that district court determine whether "good cause" existed for establishment of new retail motor vehicle dealership before license could be issued by director of department of motor vehicles (now department of motor vehicles and public safety) were unconstitutional because they violated separation of powers doctrine (see Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Nev. Art. 6, § 6). Under sections 11, 12, 20 and 21 of ch. 295, court was directed to perform prelicensing factfinding function rather than resolve actual case or controversy, and those sections could not stand. Remaining sections, which defined unfair business practices (see NRS 482.36371) and prescribed civil penalties therefor, were severable from licensing provisions, however, and continued in effect. Desert Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 600 P.2d 1189 (1979), cited, Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, at 880, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Attorney general may not represent commission on judicial discipline in matters concerning judicial discipline or prosecute judge or justice before commission. Commission on judicial discipline is part of judicial department of state government (see Nev. Art. 6, § 21), while attorney general is constitutional officer in executive department (see Nev. Art. 5, § 19). Nowhere in constitution is commission required or empowered to employ attorney general to act as its counsel. It is not constitutionally permissible for attorney general to investigate or prosecute judge or justice on behalf of commission. Attorney general may not represent commission in matters concerning judicial discipline, nor may attorney general prosecute judge or justice before commission, because one department cannot exercise power of another department without violating Nev. Art. 3, § 1. Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994), cited, Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 111 Nev. 70, at 100, 893 P.2d 866 (1995)

Attorney general’s investigation of allegations and screening of complaints against judge was improper; process of judicial discipline can be carried out properly and constitutionally only by commission on judicial discipline. Where special deputy attorney general, on behalf of commission on judicial discipline, engaged in very extensive investigation of allegations against district court judge, and was involved in carrying out function of commission of screening complaints and in doing so made determination that many of incidents alleged in complaint against judge did not warrant further action by commission, actions of special deputy were improper because, whether he was acting for commission or was merely advising commission to act, executive department of state government, through office of attorney general, was actively engaged in process of judicial discipline, which process can be carried out properly and constitutionally only by commission on judicial discipline itself. (See Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Art. 6, § 21.) Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Attorney general not constitutionally barred from defending certain lawsuits against commission on judicial discipline or its members for tortious activity. Under former provisions of NRS 1.450 which required attorney general, upon request of commission on judicial discipline, to act as its counsel in any investigation or proceeding of commission, attorney general would not have been constitutionally barred from defending lawsuit if one were filed against commission or its members for tortious activity, so long as it did not involve commission’s constitutional mandate to hear and decide complaints of misconduct against judges. (See Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Art. 6, § 21.) Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Commission on judicial discipline must use independent counsel, not attorney general, to perform both advisory and prosecutorial functions for commission in proceedings relating to judicial discipline. Former provisions of NRS 1.450 which required attorney general, upon request of commission on judicial discipline, to act as its counsel in any investigation or proceeding of commission, could not be read as permitting attorney general to represent commission in matters relating to specific cases of judicial discipline or to act as both legal adviser to commission and prosecutor of complaints relating to judicial discipline. Commission must use independent counsel to perform both advisory and prosecutorial functions for commission in proceedings relating to judicial discipline. (See Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Art. 6, § 21.) Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Former statutory provisions could not constitutionally be read as authorizing attorney general to act as counsel to commission on judicial discipline or as prosecutor in proceedings relating to judicial discipline. Former provisions of NRS 1.450 which required attorney general, upon request of commission on judicial discipline, to act as its counsel in any investigation or proceeding of commission, were constitutional insofar as they permitted commission to request official legal opinions of attorney general in matters unrelated to judicial discipline, but could not constitutionally be read as authorizing attorney general to act as counsel to commission or as prosecutor in proceedings relating to judicial discipline. (See Nev. Art. 3, § 1 and Art. 6, § 21.) Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Provisions creating screening panel to review actions for medical malpractice do not violate separation of powers doctrine. NRS 41A.016, 41A.049 and 41A.056, which establish screening panel to review claims for medical malpractice, do not violate separation of powers doctrine set forth in Nev. Art. 3, § 1 on ground that (1) court is created which is not authorized by constitution whose decisions are immune from collateral attack or review, and (2) district courts are divested of their authority to conduct trials because they are not allowed to determine competency and admissibility of evidence, instruct jury, and award attorney’s fees at their discretion. Screening panel does not exercise judicial power and its findings are not binding, but merely serve as evidence at trial, and may be rejected by jury. Furthermore, it is within constitutional province of legislature to create evidentiary rules and mandate award of attorney’s fees. Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Appointment by supreme court of special master to investigate alleged leaks of information constituted improper exercise of functions of executive department. Where panel of supreme court appointed special master to investigate alleged leaks of information to press in violation of previous orders of panel directing that certain proceedings before court concerning judicial discipline be kept confidential, panel acted in excess of its jurisdiction because: (1) previous orders were invalid in that confidentiality of judicial discipline proceedings mandated by A.R.J.D. 5 applies only to proceedings before commission on judicial discipline (see Nev. Art. 6, § 21, A.R.J.D. 1), not to proceedings before supreme court; (2) pursuant to NRS 1.090, sitting of every court of justice must be public, except as otherwise provided by law; (3) there was no compelling state interest sufficient to override constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and press and access to courts (see U.S. 1st amendment); (4) since previous orders were invalid, their violation could not produce valid judgment of contempt and, therefore, efforts to identify and punish persons who provided information to press were improper; and (5) investigation to expose sources of news leaks to media had nothing to do with power of judicial department of government to hear and determine justiciable controversies, and, therefore, panel had no authority to initiate investigation and initiation of investigation constituted improper exercise of functions of executive department of government in violation of Nev. Art. 3, § 1. Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev. 369, 915 P.2d 245 (1996), cited, Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev. 815, at 817, 920 P.2d 489 (1996)

FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.

Fixing of railroad rates is legislative function. Judicial acts are those declaring and enforcing existing laws. Legislative acts are those changing existing laws. Thus, fixing of railroad rates is legislative function even though procedure is judicial in form. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Appointment is not exclusively executive function. Statute naming state officers to railroad commission does not constitute appointment of such officers to commission but merely acts as increase of their official powers and duties. Under Nevada constitution, appointment is not exclusively executive function, because it is not prohibited to legislature and is conferred upon governor, who holds supreme executive power under Nev. Art. 5, § 1, only to fill vacancies under Nev. Art. 5, § 8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725 (C.C.D. Nev. 1909)

Nature of state engineer’s duties. Judicial function includes power to make and enforce final judgments as well as power to hear and determine evidence. Thus, where state engineer conducts hearing to determine water rights, he is not exercising judicial function under Nev. Art. 6, § 1, as he does not have power to make and enforce final judgment. He is merely performing quasi-judicial acts incident to his administrative powers. Separation of powers required by Nev. Art. 3, § 1, is not violated. (See also NRS ch. 533 and NRS 533.090, 533.125, 533.150 and 533.160.) Bergman v. Kearney, 241 Fed. 884 (D. Nev. 1917), cited, Salmon River Canal Co. v. Bell Brand Ranches, Inc., 564 F.2d 1244, at 1250 (1977), Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994), concurring opinion at 895, dissenting opinion at 911, Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, at 813, 919 P.2d 403 (1996)

Statute making supreme court justices members of Nevada pardons board was not unconstitutional. Provision of NRS 212.010 making supreme court justices members of Nevada pardons board was not unconstitutional under federal separation of powers doctrine, because doctrine has not been extended to states under U.S. 14th amendment. Question of constitutionality under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, was not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceeding. Mears v. State of Nevada, 367 F. Supp. 84 (1973)

Composition of board of pardons set forth in statute did not violate federal separation of powers doctrine. Composition of state board of pardons commissioners set forth in NRS 213.010 did not violate federal separation of powers doctrine because it has not been extended to states under U.S. 14th amendment, and question of constitutionality under separation of powers provision of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, was not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceeding. Bean v. State of Nevada, 410 F. Supp. 963 (1974)

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OPINIONS.

Elected officer may hold appointive office provided such office not created during his terms in legislature. Elected officer may hold appointive office, and draw salaries for both, provided appointment does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits senators and assemblymen from appointment to offices which have been created, or compensation for which has been increased, during their terms in legislature or for 1 year thereafter. AGO (1-30-1911)

Appointment of member of legislature as assistant attorney general did not violate constitution. Appointment of member of legislature as assistant attorney general under special act to investigate affairs of state bank and trust company does not violate Nev. Art. 4, § 8, because it does not create civil office within meaning of that section. AGO 39 (4-23-1913)

Creation of compromise board to adjust debts owed to state was not usurpation of judicial power. Statute creating compromise board to adjust and compromise debts owed to state is not usurpation of judicial power. AGO 294 (1-30-1928)

Courts of general jurisdiction can appoint and compensate reporter at public expense. Regardless of statutory requirements, courts of general jurisdiction have inherent powers necessary for free exercise of their functions independent of legislative and executive branches of government and can appoint and compensate reporter at public expense if facts warrant it. AGO 303 (4-11-1928)

Legislative power cannot be delegated to any officer or board. All legislative power is vested in legislature by constitution, and legislature cannot delegate this power to any officer or board. AGO 257 (5-26-1938)

Justices of the peace cannot hold executive office during their term. Justices of the peace are judicial officers and cannot legally hold executive office during their term. Thus, justice of the peace cannot hold office of state fish and game commissioner. AGO 635 (6-23-1948)

Office of justice of the peace is incompatible with office of county game management board. Office of justice of peace is incompatible with office of member of county game management board as holding both offices would violate separation of powers doctrine set forth in Nev. Art. 3, § 1. AGO 913 (4-28-1950)

State senator prohibited from accepting office of tax commissioner. Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, prohibits state senator from accepting office of tax commissioner while he remains senator. AGO 28 (3-12-1951)

Offices of state senator and tax commissioner are incompatible. Offices of state senator and tax commissioner are incompatible under common law principles and cannot be held by same person. AGO 28 (3-12-1951)

Appointment of justice of the peace as deputy county recorder violates separation of powers doctrine. Appointment of justice of peace as deputy county recorder is violation of separation of powers doctrine as set forth in Nev. Art. 3, § 1. AGO 88 (8-1-1951)

Executive department includes all persons who administer public affairs. Executive department in Nev. Art. 3, § 1, includes all persons who have functions in administration of public affairs. AGO 183 (7-9-1952)

Member of legislature may not hold office of "director of drivers license." Member of legislature may not hold office of "director of drivers license" as such office is in executive department of government and holding of both positions would violate separation of powers doctrine in Nev. Art. 3, § 1. AGO 183 (7-9-1952)

Person may hold offices of deputy sheriff and member of county board of education. It is not violation of separation of powers for same person to hold offices of deputy sheriff and member of county board of education as both such offices are executive in nature. AGO 288 (1-26-1953)

Assemblyman may not accept appointment to office of deputy county assessor. Assemblyman, in accepting appointment to office of deputy county assessor, would be violating separation of powers doctrine set forth in Nev. Art. 3, § 1. AGO 353 (11-24-1954)

Granting leave without pay to enable state employee to serve in state legislature is prohibited. Granting of leave without pay to state employee to enable him to serve in state legislature to which he has been elected is prohibited by Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which provides for separation of powers. AGO 357 (12-22-1954)

Assemblyman may not be employed by school district. Same person may not be employed by school district and hold office of state assemblyman at same time. Nev. Art. 3, § 1. AGO 59 (5-9-1955), but see AGO 4 (1-26-1971)

Legislator is prohibited from membership on state boards and commissions. State boards and commissions are executive arms of government and legislator is prohibited by Nev. Art. 3, § 1, from accepting membership thereon. AGO 212 (9-21-1956)

Mayor may not hold office of assemblyman. Nev. Art. 3, § 1, prohibits same person from holding office of mayor and office of assemblyman at same time. If mayor runs for assembly and is elected, mayor’s office then becomes vacant regardless of expressed intention of mayor that he will hold both offices. AGO 379 (4-30-1958)

Appointment of legislator who has resigned from legislature to any state civil office will not be rendered invalid by increase in emoluments of such office by next legislative session. Restriction imposed by Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which prohibits appointment of legislators to any state civil office of profit which was created or emoluments of which were increased during term for which such legislator was elected, must be strictly construed, and since restriction goes to appointment and not to incumbency, appointment of legislator who has resigned from legislature to any state civil office will not be rendered invalid by increase in emoluments of such office by next-succeeding legislative session, notwithstanding such session takes place during term for which such legislator was elected. AGO 25 (3-23-1959)

District court has and retains exclusive jurisdiction in juvenile matters until juvenile reaches age 21. Under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, relating to separation of powers, Nev. Art. 6, § 1, relating to vesting of judicial power, and NRS 62.040 and former NRS 62.070 (cf. NRS 62.082), relating to district court’s original jurisdiction over juvenile matters and retention of such jurisdiction, district court has and retains exclusive jurisdiction in juvenile matters until juvenile reaches age 21. (See also NRS 210.290.) AGO 86 (8-25-1959)

Assemblyman may resign and accept appointment in Nevada industrial commission. Under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, relating to separation of powers, assemblyman may resign and accept appointment in Nevada industrial commission, branch of executive department, if there are no other legal impediments to appointment. AGO 95 (9-28-1959)

Governor precluded from appointing member of legislature to Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education. Members of Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education appointed pursuant to NRS 397.030 perform executive function; therefore, Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which provides for separation of powers among departments of state government, precludes requirement that governor appoint one member from legislative branch. AGO 207 (2-26-1965)

Member of legislature may accept position in classified service or as superintendent of public instruction. Under Nev. Art. 4, § 8, which forbids appointment of legislator to office which has been created or its emoluments increased during his term of office, member of legislature may accept position in classified service where salary schedule is established by personnel division of department of administration or as superintendent of public instruction where salary is set by state board of education. (But see Nev. Art. 3, § 1.) AGO 280 (11-24-1965)

City fire chief may be member of state legislature. Where city ordinance provides for appointment of fire chief and prescribes his duties but leaves final determination of his salary and salaries and number of employees in city council, such fire chief may be member of Nevada state legislature without contravening intent of Nev. Art. 3, § 1, which provides for separation of governmental powers. AGO 401 (4-20-1967)

Since separation of powers doctrine is not applicable to local governments, school teachers may serve in legislature. Local boards of school trustees have power under NRS 386.350 to grant leaves of absence without pay to school teachers to serve as members of legislature, and such teachers may continue to be so employed during periods legislature is not in session; because separation of powers of government provided by Nev. Art. 3, § 1 does not apply to local governments as distinguished from departments of state government. AGO 4 (1-26-1971)

Highway patrol officer may not hold state legislative or judicial office but may hold local governmental office. Under Nev. Art. 3, § 1, Nevada highway patrol officer, being member of executive branch of state government, may not simultaneously hold state legislative or judicial office, including that of justice of the peace, but is not constitutionally prohibited from holding local government office. AGO 168 (5-22-1974), cited, Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, at 881, 878 P.2d 913 (1994)

Authority to hire, fire or reprimand employees of juvenile department rests exclusively with the district court. Under NRS 62.100 and 62.110 and Nev. Art. 3, § 1, boards of county commissioners have no authority for hiring, firing or reprimanding of juvenile department employees, including chief juvenile department probation officer. Authority rests exclusively with district court. County commissioners’ limited authority over fixing of salaries has no connection with question of hiring, firing or reprimanding employees. AGO 212 (6-16-1977)