ARTICLE. 2.
Right of Suffrage.
Sec. 1. Right to vote; qualifications of elector; qualifications of nonelector to vote for President and Vice President of United States.
2. When residence not gained or lost.
3. Armed Forces personnel. [Repealed in 1972.]
4. Privilege of qualified electors on general election day.
5. Voting by ballot; voting in elections by legislature.
6. Registration of electors; test of electoral qualifications.
7. Poll tax: Levy and purpose. [Repealed in 1966.]
8. Qualifications of voters on adoption or rejection of constitution.
9. Recall of public officers: Procedure and limitations.
10. Limitation on contributions to campaign.
Section 1. Right to vote; qualifications of elector; qualifications of nonelector to vote for President and Vice President of United States. All citizens of the United States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this constitution) of the age of eighteen years and upwards, who shall have actually, and not constructively, resided in the state six months, and in the district or county thirty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that now or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at such election; provided, that no person who has been or may be convicted of treason or felony in any state or territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights, and no idiot or insane person shall be entitled to the privilege of an elector. There shall be no denial of the elective franchise at any election on account of sex. The legislature may provide by law the conditions under which a citizen of the United States who does not have the status of an elector in another state and who does not meet the residence requirements of this section may vote in this state for President and Vice President of the United States.
[Amended in 1880, 1886, 1914, 1970 and 1971. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1877 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1879 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1880 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1877, p. 213; Statutes of Nevada 1879, p. 149. The second amendment was approved and ratified by the people at the 1886 general election, but no entry of the proposed amendment had been made upon the journal of either house of the legislature, and such omission was fatal to the adoption of the amendment. See: State ex rel. Stevenson v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391 (1887). The third amendment was proposed and passed by the 1911 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1913 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1914 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1911, p. 457; Statutes of Nevada 1913, p. 581. The fourth amendment was proposed and passed by the 1967 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1969 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1970 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1967, p. 1827; Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1657. The fifth amendment was proposed and passed by the 1969 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1971 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at a special election held on June 8, 1971. See: Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1685; Statutes of Nevada 1971, p. 2263.]
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 70-73, 80-104, 243-246, 253, 271, 272, 467, 493, 785, 835.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Elections ! 1.
WESTLAW Topic No. 144.
C.J.S. Elections §§ 1, 2.
NEVADA CASES.
Only oaths legislature may constitutionally require are those necessary as tests of electoral qualification. Where plaintiff in election contest offered to prove that defendant was elected by votes of persons who were allowed to register and vote without taking statutory oath of loyalty to U.S. Constitution and Government, evidence was properly excluded, because statute required oath to be taken in addition to other qualifications prescribed by law, but the only oaths which legislature may constitutionally require under Nev. Art. 2, § 6, are those necessary as tests of electoral qualifications of Nev. Art. 2, § 1. Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64 (1871)
Legislature has no power to change qualifications of voter as prescribed by constitution. Any citizen possessing qualifications of elector, as declared in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and who is not disqualified by any of the provisions thereof, is entitled to right of suffrage. Legislature has no power to deny, abridge, extend or change qualifications of voter as prescribed by constitution. State ex rel. Whitney v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 19 Pac. 241 (1888), cited, State ex rel. Boyle v. State Bd. of Examiners, 21 Nev. 67, at 69, 24 Pac. 614 (1890), State ex rel. Riggle v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 492, at 506, 143 Pac. 238 (1914), dissenting opinion, Caton v. Frank, 56 Nev. 56, at 66, 44 P.2d 521 (1935), State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, at 292, 63 P.2d 921 (1937), Cirac v. Lander County, 95 Nev. 723, at 730, 602 P.2d 1012 (1979), distinguished, Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, at 438, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)
Statute prohibiting Mormons from voting violated constitution. Statute prohibiting Mormons from voting and requiring applicants for registration to take oath that they are not members of Mormon church is in direct violation of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and is not authorized by Nev. Art. 2, § 6, requiring provision to be made by law for registration. State ex rel. Whitney v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 19 Pac. 241 (1888), distinguished, Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, at 438, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)
Qualifications of elector cannot be altered or impaired by legislature. Qualifications of elector are prescribed by Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and cannot be altered or impaired by legislature. State ex rel. Boyle v. State Bd. of Examiners, 21 Nev. 67, 24 Pac. 614 (1890), cited, State ex rel. Riggle v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 492, at 506, 143 Pac. 238 (1914), dissenting opinion, Caton v. Frank, 56 Nev. 56, at 66, 44 P.2d 521 (1935)
Election which disenfranchised new voters by using last official registration as test for qualification of voters was not unconstitutional without showing that disenfranchised voters would have changed election outcome. Where questions concerning bond issue for Reno city waterworks were submitted to electors of city pursuant to statute, and election was challenged in quo warranto proceedings on ground that adoption of last official registration as test for qualification of voters disfranchised those who had become voters since last election, election was not in violation of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, relating to qualifications for voters, in absence of showing that result would have been different were it not for disfranchisement. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 Pac. 274 (1898), cited, Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, at 312, 202 Pac. 802 (1922)
Statute may not add qualifications. Nev. Art. 2, § 6, authorizes and requires legislature to provide by law for registration of all persons who possess prescribed qualifications of electors, but it does not authorize legislature to impose any conditions on right of registration other than prescribed qualifications of electors under Nev. Art. 2, § 1. State ex rel. Wilson v. Stone, 24 Nev. 308, 53 Pac. 497 (1898)
Where election precincts were not properly established and bounded, elector could register at any polling place in same county. Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that 6 months' residence in state and 30 days' residence in district or county entitles every person to vote, and where statute provided that it was duty of boards of county commissioners to establish defined election precincts, in county where election precincts were not properly established and bounded, elector was properly registered by any registry agent and legally able to have his registration certificate registered at any polling place in same county before delivery of certified copy of register to inspectors of election. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)
Assemblymen and state senators are elected by their districts. Although Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that qualified voters may vote for all officers including state assemblymen and state senators elected by people, no elector claims to exercise such right, because Nev. Art. 4, §§ 3 and 4, provide that assemblymen and senators be elected from their districts. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 131, 58 Pac. 284, 59 Pac. 546, 63 Pac. 128 (1899)
Legislature cannot violate constitutional provision defining who is entitled to right to suffrage. Nevada legislature is authorized by direct constitutional authority (1) to make provision for registration of electors, (2) to make provision as to who shall be entitled to vote, (3) to make provision to preserve purity of elections, (4) to make provision for manner of holding elections, (5) to make provision for manner of making returns, (6) to prescribe any rule which may be deemed necessary as test of electoral qualifications. The only limitation is that legislature cannot violate Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which provides who are entitled to right of suffrage. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)
Constitution did not prevent legislature from enacting direct primary law. Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and Nev. Art. 2, § 6, gave full authority to legislature to pass all legislation necessary for general elections, and no provision of constitution prohibited legislature from enacting direct primary law so long as law conformed in other respects to Nevada constitution. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)
Women are qualified electors and may be grand jurors. Indictment found by grand jury consisting partly of women was valid, and contention that women are ineligible under constitution to serve as grand jurors was without merit because under Nev. Art. 4, § 27, providing that all qualified electors may serve on juries, and Nev. Art. 2, § 1, conferring right of electorship upon women, women are qualified electors and may be grand jurors. Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706 (1918), cited, Caton v. Frank, 56 Nev. 56, at 64, 44 P.2d 521 (1935)
Right to vote is political privilege. Right to vote conferred by Nev. Art. 2, §§ 1 and 6, is political privilege and not inherent, unqualified, personal or political right. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921)
Statute providing that anyone over 21 who holds title to land in irrigation district may vote in elections under irrigation district act was constitutional. Sec. 8, ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS 539.123), providing that anyone over 21 years of age who holds title to land situated in irrigation district may vote at any election held under provisions of irrigation district act, did not violate Nev. Art. 2, §§ 1 and 6, prohibiting imposition of property qualifications on right to vote, because districts organized under such statute are not political or governmental subdivisions of state, and the term "elections" in constitution does not embrace irrigation district elections. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, at 28, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935), Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 202, at 212, 96 P.2d 201 (1940), Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. Baber, 80 Nev. 263, at 266, 392 P.2d 46 (1964), AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)
Constitutional provision that all citizens may vote for all officers was not intended to apply to irrigation districts. Nev. Art. 2, § 1, providing that all citizens shall be entitled to vote for all officers who now or hereafter may be elected by the people, was not intended by framers of constitution to apply to irrigation district elections under ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS 539.010 et seq.), but only to elections required by constitution itself. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, at 316, 202 Pac. 802 (1922), Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, at 28, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)
Organization of irrigation districts was constitutional. Ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS ch. 539), providing for organization of irrigation districts, is not violation of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, prescribing residential qualifications of electors, because irrigation districts are not political subdivisions of state, or created for political or governmental purposes, and term "elections" in that section of constitution is used in its restrictive political sense. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 202, at 212, 215, 96 P.2d 201 (1940), Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. Baber, 80 Nev. 263, at 266, 392 P.2d 46 (1964), AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)
Municipal charter that required voters in special bond election to be taxpayers held constitutional. Provision of municipal charter which requires as qualification to vote in special bond election that voter be taxpayer was not in derogation of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which prescribes qualifications required to vote for all officers and upon all questions submitted to electors, because municipality, in transaction of bond election, was acting in its proprietary rather than its governmental capacity, and its activity was not controlled by constitutional provision. Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, 202 Pac. 802 (1922), cited, Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, at 28, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)
Term "all officers" in section refers to officers provided for in constitution. Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which prescribes qualifications to vote for all officers and upon all questions, has reference to all officers and questions of governmental as distinguished from proprietary character, and term "all officers" refers to officers provided for in constitution. Carville v. McBride, 45 Nev. 305, 202 Pac. 802 (1922), cited, Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, at 28, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)
Constitutional provision that plurality of election votes shall constitute choice was not applicable to municipal election on proposed bond issue. Nev. Art. 15, § 14, which provides that plurality of votes given at election by the people shall constitute choice, where not otherwise provided by constitution, complements Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which defines right to vote and qualifications of electors, and therefore does not apply to elections of type required by statute which provided that where municipality proposed to issue bonds, such proposal should be submitted at general or special election to electors involved who were not owners of real property, as well as to electors involved who were owners of real property. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)
Statute requiring that proposed state and municipal bond issues be submitted to vote by owners and nonowners of real property held not in conflict with constitution. Statute which provided that where state or any municipality therein proposed to issue bonds such proposal should be submitted to electors involved who were not real property owners, and to electors who were real property owners, was not in conflict either with Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which defines right to vote and qualifications of electors, or with Nev. Art. 2, § 6, which provides for registration of electors and prescribes test of electoral qualifications. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)
Legislative intent was that "qualified elector" was voter who had complied with registration laws. Where petition to amend city charter alleged that it had been signed by 60 percent of "qualified electors" of city, such petition was invalid under statute which authorized amendment of city charter upon petition signed by 60 percent of qualified voters of city, because whether "qualified electors" as used in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and "qualified voters" as used in statute were synonymous depended entirely upon intention of legislature, and such intention was that signers of petition, in addition to being simply electors as provided in constitution, must have complied with registration laws, thereby becoming voters. Caton v. Frank, 56 Nev. 56, 44 P.3d 521 (1935), cited, State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, at 291, 63 P.2d 921 (1937), AGO 96-16 (6-25-1996)
Person must possess qualifications of elector and register in order to vote. In addition to possessing qualifications of elector prescribed in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, in order to be able to vote, person must register in compliance with statutes regulating registration of voters. Caton v. Frank, 56 Nev. 56, 44 P.2d 521 (1935), cited, State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, at 291, 63 P.2d 921 (1937), AGO 96-16 (6-25-1996)
Person who changed residence to township 30 days before general election was entitled to be candidate for justice of the peace. In defining residential requirements for electors, Nev. Art. 2, § 1, prescribes residence in state 6 months and residence in "district or county" 30 days next preceding general election, and even if word "district" were construed to include townships, person who changed his residence to township more than 30 days preceding general election was entitled to have his name printed on official ballots for general election as candidate for justice of the peace of township. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937)
Resident of county was entitled to be candidate for justice of the peace even though not resident of township. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 1, qualified elector must reside in state 6 months and in district or county 30 days next preceding general election, and Nev. Art. 15, § 3, which provides that no person who is not qualified elector shall be eligible to any office, does not place any additional residential limitations of eligibility of candidates for office, and candidate for justice of the peace who was resident of county was entitled to have his name printed on official ballots for general election, even though he was not resident of township. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937)
"District" was not intended to include any subdivision of less extent than county. In defining residential requirements for electors, Nev. Art. 2, § 1, prescribes residence in state 6 months and residence in "district or county" 30 days next preceding any election, and while not conclusive, order in which words "state," "district" and "county" are placed is some indication that "district" was not intended to include any subdivision of less extent than county. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937)
Qualified elector of county need not be resident of township when filing declaration of candidacy. One who filed declaration of candidacy for office of justice of the peace and was qualified elector of county, but not resident of township at time the declaration was filed, was entitled to have his name printed on official ballots for general election, because word "district" in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, relating to qualifications of electors, was not intended to be construed as including "township" within its meaning, and it was not necessary that candidate be resident of township when he filed his declaration of candidacy. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937)
"District" not intended to mean or include "township." Word "district" in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, relating to qualifications of electors, was not intended to mean "township," or to be construed as including "township" within its meaning. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937)
Person possessing qualifications of elector entitled to right of suffrage. Any person possessing qualifications of elector, as set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and who is not disqualified by any of its provisions, is entitled to right of suffrage, and it is not within power of legislature to deny, abridge, extend or change qualifications of elector as prescribed by state constitution. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937)
"Qualified elector" not necessarily same as qualified voter. In construing Nev. Art. 2, § 1 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3, the term "qualified elector" is not necessarily same as qualified voter. To be qualified voter, one must necessarily be qualified elector, but converse is not true. State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921 (1937), cited, AGO 96-16 (6-25-1996)
Complaint seeking removal of district attorney for failure to prosecute person for voting without right of franchise was insufficient where complaint did not state where such allegedly illegal voter had been convicted of felony. Nev. Art. 2, § 1, provides that no person who has been convicted of felony in any state or territory of United States, unless restored to civil rights, shall be entitled to privileges of elector. Count of complaint seeking removal of district attorney for alleged neglect of duty or nonfeasance in office for failure to investigate or prosecute person for voting without right of franchise because he had allegedly been convicted of felony was insufficient where it did not indicate in which state or territory such person was convicted or what other information or evidence had been placed before district attorney. Jones v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 404, 219 P.2d 1055 (1950)
Minimum age requirement of 21 to hold legislative office not rendered unconstitutional by reduction of voting age to 18. Provisions of NRS 218.010, establishing minimum age of 21 years to qualify as candidate for legislative office, were not rendered unconstitutional by amendment to Nev. Art. 2, § 1, reducing voting age to 18, because Nev. Art. 4, § 5, requiring senators and members of assembly to be qualified electors established minimum qualifications only, and did not prevent legislature from prescribing additional reasonable qualifications. Mengelkamp v. List, 88 Nev. 542, 501 P.2d 1032 (1972), cited, MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, at 305 (D. Nev. 1993)
Reduction in voting age to 18 years did not repeal by implication statute establishing minimum age of 21 years for eligibility for legislative office. Amendment of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, reducing minimum voting age to 18 years, did not work implied repeal of NRS 218.010, establishing minimum age of 21 years for eligibility to hold legislative office, because provisions were not irreconcilably repugnant to each other and reduction of voting age was not manifestation of intent to abolish age requirements for candidates for office. Mengelkamp v. List, 88 Nev. 542, 501 P.2d 1032 (1972)
FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.
Place of business or post office address is not per se equivalent of residence. Persons place of business or post office address is not per se the equivalent of his residence for purposes of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and NRS 293.485, relating to qualifications of voters. De La Cruz v. Dufresne, 533 F. Supp. 145 (D. Nev. 1982)
Twelve-month residency requirement contained in city charter for person seeking seat on city council was not violative of section. Where plaintiff filed motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin city from enforcing section of its charter which requires person running for city council to have been resident of city for at least 12 months before filing of candidacy for office, and where in support of motion plaintiff argued that, based on cumulative reading of Nev. Art. 2, § 1 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3, city was prevented from imposing residency requirement stricter than living 6 months within Nevada and 30 days within district in which representation is being sought, district court held that nothing in language of either Nev. Art. 2, § 1 or Nev. Art. 15, § 3 indicated that city, while acting in conjunction with legislature and governor, could not place reasonable residency requirements upon candidate running for its city council. Nevada legislature may impose reasonable qualifications on elector who desires to become candidate, and in order to be qualified elector under Nevada constitution, there is no requirement that person be qualified voter. District court therefore denied plaintiff's motion to enjoin imposition of 12-month residency requirement. MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303 (D. Nev. 1993)
Act providing only qualified electors who are taxpayers may vote on bond issues is unconstitutional. Act providing that at special elections for bond issues or other means of raising revenue for counties, cities or school districts only qualified electors who are taxpayers may vote is unconstitutional. AGO 10 (3-16-1915)
Candidate for office need not be registered voter. Candidate for public office need not be registered voter, registration not being qualification of elector, but mere condition to right to vote. AGO 68 (3-30-1916)
Registration is not qualification of elector. Registration is not qualification of elector. AGO 180 (4-30-1918)
Residence on Indian reservation constitutes residence in State of Nevada. Residence within boundaries of Indian reservation constitutes residence in State of Nevada for purpose of qualifying Indians as electors, since U.S. citizenship is conferred by federal statute. AGO 247 (9-28-1926), see also AGO 166 (5-2-1974)
Residence on federal ammunition base does not disqualify person from voting. Residence within boundaries of federal ammunition base at Hawthorne does not disqualify person from registering and voting. AGO 90 (8-9-1932)
Deputy of public officer must be qualified elector. Deputy of public officer is public officer and must be elector under Nev. Art. 15, § 3. He must, therefore, be U.S. citizen 21 years of age or over, resident of state for 6 months and resident of district or county for 30 days. AGO B-66 (11-10-1941)
Punishment inflicted determines grade of offense not charge brought. In determining whether person is ineligible for public office because of conviction of felony, punishment inflicted determines grade of offense, not charge brought against him. AGO 62 (7-29-1943)
Meaning of "convicted of felony." Phrase "convicted of felony" in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, when relating to eligibility of person to public office, means that person must have been convicted of felony by judgment of court. Thus if court grants probation and then dismisses case, there has been no judgment of felony and officer is not disqualified. AGO 62 (7-29-1943)
Residence on Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot is not disqualification from voting. Residence within boundaries of Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot does not disqualify civilian to register and vote, despite cession of limited jurisdiction to United States. AGO 281 (3-29-1946)
Party candidate need not be registered voter. Party candidate need not be registered voter, registration not being a qualification to hold public office. AGO 327 (7-19-1946)
Changing party affiliation after general election prohibits candidacy in ensuing primary election. Person who changes political affiliation from one party to another by reregistering after general election may not be candidate of such party at ensuing primary election. AGO 898 (3-30-1950), cited, AGO B942 (8-9-1950)
Requirement of 5-year domicile in state preceding candidacy is unconstitutional. Requirement that candidate be domiciled in state for 5 years next preceding declaration or acceptance of candidacy imposes unconstitutional qualification upon seeking public office. AGO 311 (1-13-1954), cited, AGO 312 (1-21-1954)
Person meeting elector qualifications is qualified whether or not registered. Person meeting qualifications set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1, is qualified elector whether registered voter or not. AGO 146 (2-6-1956)
Right to hold office not coextensive with right to vote. Right to hold office is not coextensive with right to vote. AGO 186 (7-11-1956)
Right to vote is mere political privilege. Right to vote is mere political privilege and not inherent, unqualified personal right. AGO 375 (4-23-1958)
Qualified elector not same as qualified voter. Qualified elector is not same as qualified voter. Qualified voter, in addition to holding electoral qualifications, must also be registered to vote. AGO 376 (4-25-1958)
Provision limiting suffrage to persons over 21 years of age is unconstitutional. Provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, limiting right of suffrage to persons 21 years of age and older, is unconstitutional and unenforceable as to national elections because in conflict with federal statute permitting persons 18 years of age and older to vote in elections for federal offices. County clerks must register persons 18 years of age and over who are otherwise qualified for purpose of voting in national elections only. AGO 2 (1-11-1971)
Qualified electors aged 18 to 20 may be elected to office for which no other qualifications are required. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 1 and Nev. Art. 15, § 3, persons aged 18 through 20 years who are qualified electors are eligible for election to any office for which no other qualifications are required, and may be elected to other offices if specific additional statutory qualifications are met. AGO 46 (10-12-1971)
Students aged 18 to 20 may register and vote where they attend school. Students and other citizens aged 18 through 20 are sui juris for all purposes related to voting and can establish legal residence for voting purposes separate and apart from their parents or guardians. Such persons may register and vote where they attend school if they are residents of county and meet statutory and constitutional requirements of age and residency as previously applied to individual voters 21 years of age and over under Nev. Art. 2, § 1, former NRS 10.020 (cf. NRS 10.155) and NRS 293.485 et seq. AGO 48 (10-20-1971)
Person dishonorably discharged from military for commission of felony is disqualified as elector. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which prescribes qualifications of electors, person dishonorably discharged from military service for commission and conviction of offense recognized under Nevada law as felony is disqualified as elector and may not register to vote unless restored to civil rights. AGO 72 (3-30-1972)
Secretary of state may promulgate regulation permitting election officials to assist physically disabled voter mark ballot. Under NRS 293.247, which requires secretary of state to promulgate regulations for conduct of elections, he has authority to prescribe regulation permitting election officials to assist physically disabled voter to mark ballot or operate voting machine where disability prevents voter from doing so himself, because denial of assistance would prevent exercise of right of suffrage guaranteed by Nev. Art. 2, § 1. AGO 77 (4-25-1972)
Members of Armed Forces who entered service from outside of Nevada may establish residency for voting purposes in Nevada. Members of Armed Forces who entered service from outside Nevada may establish residency for voting purposes in Nevada on same basis as other residents of state and are entitled to register to vote if otherwise qualified under Nev. Art. 2, § 1, former NRS 10.020 (cf. NRS 10.155) and NRS 293.485 et seq. AGO 78 (4-27-1972)
Provision requiring 6-month residency to qualify as elector violated equal protection clause. Provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and NRS 293.485, which require 6-month residence in state to qualify as elector, violate equal protection clause of U.S. 14th amendment, and persons otherwise qualified are entitled to register to vote up to time prescribed by NRS 293.560 for close of registration. AGO 85 (6-19-1972)
Residence within township unnecessary for appointment to office of justice of the peace. If vacancy occurs in office of justice of the peace and county commissioners elect, pursuant to NRS 4.150, to fill vacancy by appointment, residency restrictions of NRS 281.050 and 293.1755 do not apply to applicants for appointment and county commissioners need only appoint "suitable person" (see NRS 4.150 and 245.170) which means one who is qualified elector meeting qualifications set forth in Nev. Art. 2, § 1. Residence within township to which office pertains is unnecessary for appointment to that office. AGO 87-13 (7-30-87)
Person who is 17 years of age may be candidate for office of trustee of school district if he meets certain qualifications before date of general election. Person who is 17 years of age may be candidate for office of trustee of school district pursuant to NRS 386.240 if he will be qualified elector as defined in Nev. Art. 2, § 1 and he meets qualifications to register to vote set forth in NRS 293.485 before date of general election. (See also Nev. Art. 15, § 3.) AGO 94-18 (3-9-1994)
Recognition of restoration of civil rights by foreign jurisdiction. State may give full faith and credit to foreign jurisdictions restoration of civil rights of person who would otherwise be prohibited from voting under Nev. Art. 2, § 1 if: (1) jurisdiction that restored persons civil rights was jurisdiction that convicted that person; (2) restoration complies with all constitutional and statutory requirements of foreign jurisdiction; and (3) this state has no reason or public policy for not recognizing restoration. AGO 96-27 (9-25-1996)
Felon convicted in federal court prohibited from registering to vote. Pursuant to Nev. Art. 2, § 1, county registrar of voters is prohibited from allowing person convicted of felony in U.S. District Court to register to vote until his civil rights are restored by federal authorities. AGO 96-27 (9-25-1996)
Sec. 2. When residence not gained or lost. For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence solely by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the United States, nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of the United States or of the high seas; nor while a student of any institution of learning; nor while kept at any charitable institution or medical facility at public expense; nor while confined in any public prison.
[Amended in 1972. Proposed and passed by the 1969 legislature;
agreed to and passed by the 1971 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the
1972 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1695; Statutes of Nevada 1971, p.
2240.]
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 107, 108, 252, 272, 493, 785, 835.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Elections ! 71 to 78.
WESTLAW Topic No. 144.
C.J.S. Elections §§ 19 to 25.
FEDERAL AND OTHER CASES.
Provision of Texas constitution that person in military service could vote only in county
of residence at time of entry into service was unconstitutional denial of equal
protection. Provision of Texas constitution that person in military service of United
States may vote only in county of residence at time of entry into service is invalid to
extent it denies service personnel opportunity to establish new voting residence on same
basis as other persons, as violation of equal protection clause. Nev. Art. 2, § 3 (cf.
also Nev. Art. 2, § 2) is construed to permit such establishment by clear and unequivocal
evidence. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 Sup.Ct. 775 (1965)
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS.
Section does not permit change of residence entitling person to vote in any place other than last place of voting before entering service. Under provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 2, no change of residence entitling person to vote in any place other than place in which he was last entitled to vote at time of entering service of United States, or becoming inmate of any almshouse or asylum where he is kept at public expense, can or does take place. AGO (8-19- 1898)
Student may establish residence where he attends school. Although student does not lose his residence while absent attending university, he has right to assert claim to different residence and if he registers at place where attending school it will be recognized as valid. AGO 168 (8-25-1920)
Federal officer or employee residing on Indian reservation may qualify as elector. Provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 2, do not prohibit persons named from qualifying as electors, if person manifests intention of claiming residence and fully complies with requirements of law; but mere presence within state is insufficient to constitute residence for purpose of registration and voting. Accordingly, federal officer or employee residing on Indian reservation may qualify as elector. AGO 316 (9-1-1928)
Residence comprehends physical presence and definite intention to make state and county home. Term "residence," as used in statutes defining who shall have right to vote, comprehends not only physical presence but a definite intention to make the state and county his home. Since presence of members of Civilian Conservation Corps in state depends wholly upon authorities in command and they are not free to change their place of abode, fact of presence in state does not evidence intention on their part to make their legal residence within the state and is not in itself sufficient to constitute residence to authorize registration and voting. AGO 220 (7-22-1936), see also AGO 194 (12-4-1935)
Section applies only to residential requirement for voting. This section applies only to residential requirement for voting. It does not apply to other residential requirement laws such as residence in order to obtain resident hunting or fishing license. AGO 210 (10-9-1952)
Notwithstanding constitutional provision, member of Armed Forces stationed in Nevada may establish residence for voting purposes. Notwithstanding constitutional provision, Nev. Art. 2, § 2, and NRS 293.487 to effect that residence for voting purposes is not gained by reason of presence while employed in service of United States, member of Armed Forces stationed in Nevada who entered such service while resident of another state may, with required intention to make Nevada his domicile and clear proof thereof, establish his residence in Nevada for voting purposes. AGO 276 (3-7- 1962)
Section 3. Armed Forces personnel. [Repealed in 1972.]
[Amended in 1956. Proposed and passed by the 1953 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1955 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the 1956 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1953, p. 732; Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 952. Repealed in 1972. Repealer proposed and passed by the 1969 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1971 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the 1972 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1695; Statutes of Nevada 1971, p. 2240. The section as amended in 1956 and repealed in 1972 read: "The right of suffrage shall be enjoyed by all persons, otherwise entitled to the same, who may be in the military or naval service of the United States; provided, the votes so cast shall be made to apply to the county and township of which said voters were bona fide residents at the time of their entry into such service; and provided further, that the payment of a poll tax shall not be required as a condition to the right of voting. Provision shall be made by law, regulating the manner of voting, holding elections, and making returns of such elections, wherein other provisions are not contained in this constitution."]
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 108, 109, 271, 272, 478, 493, 785, 835.
Sec: 4. Privilege of qualified electors on general election day. During the day on which any General Election shall be held in this State no qualified elector shall be arrested by virtue of any civil process.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 111, 272, 493, 785, 835.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Elections ! 63.
WESTLAW Topic No. 144.
C.J.S. Elections § 30.
Sec: 5. Voting by ballot; voting in elections by legislature. All elections by the people shall be by ballot, and all elections by the Legislature, or by either branch thereof shall be "Viva-Voce".
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 111, 272, 493, 785, 835.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Elections ! 161.
WESTLAW Topic No. 144.
C.J.S. Elections § 149.
Sec: 6. Registration of electors; test of electoral qualifications. Provision shall be made by law for the registration of the names of the Electors within the counties of which they may be residents and for the ascertainment by proper proofs of the persons who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage, as hereby established, to preserve the purity of elections, and to regulate the manner of holding and making returns of the same; and the Legislature shall have power to prescribe by law any other or further rules or oaths, as may be deemed necessary, as a test of electoral qualification.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 111, 269, 272, 479, 493, 785, 786, 835.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
Elections ! 96.
WESTLAW Topic No. 144.
C.J.S. Elections § 36.
NEVADA CASES.
Statute that required oath that was not test of electoral qualification held unconstitutional. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 6, which provides that legislature may prescribe oaths as test of electoral qualification, legislature is judge of what oaths may be necessary, and oath designated as test of electoral qualification must stand, but where a statute stated that an oath was required as additional qualification to right to vote, the oath was not a test of electoral qualification and the statute was unconstitutional. Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64 (1871)
Only oaths legislature may constitutionally require are those necessary as tests of electoral qualification. Where plaintiff in election contest offered to prove that defendant was elected by votes of persons who were allowed to register and vote without taking statutory oath of loyalty to the U.S. Constitution and Government, evidence was properly excluded, because statute required oath to be taken in addition to other qualifications prescribed by law, but only oaths which legislature may constitutionally require under Nev. Art. 2, § 6, are those necessary as tests of electoral qualifications of Nev. Art. 2, § 1. Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64 (1871)
Legislature can add no qualifications for voting to those prescribed by constitution. Legislature can add no qualifications for voting to those prescribed by constitution, and statute which required oath in addition to qualifications of elector prescribed by Nev. Art. 2, § 6, was unconstitutional. Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64 (1871), cited, State ex rel. Whitney v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, at 200, 19 Pac. 241 (1888), State ex rel. Wilson v. Stone, 24 Nev. 308, at 310, 53 Pac. 497 (1898)
Where purity of elections are not threatened, qualified electors should not be deprived of their votes through strict construction of election laws. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 6, which requires that legislature make provisions for registration of electors so as to preserve purity of elections, election laws should be strictly followed where necessary to accomplish this purpose, but where noncompliance with election laws on part of officers of election does not impair purity of elections, qualified electors should not be deprived of their votes. Stinson v. Sweeney, 17 Nev. 309, 30 Pac. 997 (1883), cited, State ex rel. Galusha v. Davis, 20 Nev. 220, at 229, 19 Pac. 894 (1888), dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Thatcher v. Keith, 37 Nev. 452, at 456, 142 Pac. 532 (1914)
Legislature may adopt rules, regulations and oaths necessary to preserve purity of ballot and test qualifications of electors. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 6, legislature may adopt such rules and prescribe such oaths as deemed necessary to test qualifications of elector. It may also adopt such reasonable, uniform and impartial regulations of constitutional rights of voter as may be deemed necessary to preserve order at elections, to guard against fraud, undue influence or oppression, and to preserve purity of ballot. State ex rel. Whitney v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 19 Pac. 241 (1888), cited, Cirac v. Lander County, 95 Nev. 723, at 730, 602 P.2d 1012 (1979)
Statute prohibiting Mormons from voting violated constitution. Statute prohibiting Mormons from voting and requiring applicants for registration to take oath that they are not members of Mormon church is in direct violation of Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and is not authorized by Nev. Art. 2, § 6, requiring provision to be made by law for registration. State ex rel. Whitney v. Findlay, 20 Nev. 198, 19 Pac. 241 (1888), distinguished, Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, at 438, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)
Laws authorized to preserve purity of elections will sometimes prevent elector from voting. While legislature cannot directly deprive elector of his voting privilege, Nev. Art. 2, § 6, specially authorizes it to enact laws for registration of electors, to preserve purity of elections, and to regulate manner of holding and making returns of elections, and such laws will necessarily sometimes prevent elector from voting. Lynip v. Buckner, 22 Nev. 426, 41 Pac. 762 (1895)
Law may require voter to mark ballot in certain way and comply with other conditions. To be effectual, law for registration of voters, authorized by Nev. Art. 2, § 6, must provide that one not registered may not vote, and laws enacted to preserve purity of elections, also authorized by such section, may require voter to mark his ballot in certain way and to comply with many other conditions. Lynip v. Buckner, 22 Nev. 426, 41 Pac. 762 (1895)
Legislature may not impose any conditions on right of reregistration other than prescribed qualifications for electors. Nev. Art. 2, § 6, authorizes and requires legislature to provide by law for registration of all persons who possess prescribed qualifications of electors, but it does not authorize legislature to impose any conditions on right of registration other than prescribed qualifications of electors under Nev. Art. 2, § 1. State ex rel. Wilson v. Stone, 24 Nev. 308, 53 Pac. 497 (1898)
Constitution does not prohibit legislative enactment of direct primary law. Nev. Art. 2, § 1, and Nev. Art. 2, § 6, gave full authority to legislature to pass all legislation necessary for general elections, and no provision of constitution prohibited legislature from enacting direct primary law so long as law conformed in other respects to Nevada constitution. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)
Right to vote is political privilege. Right to vote conferred by Nev. Art. 2, §§ 1 and 6, is political privilege and not inherent, unqualified, personal or political right. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921)
Statute providing that anyone over 21 who holds title to land in irrigation district may vote in elections under irrigation district act was constitutional. Sec. 8, ch. 64, Stats. 1919 (cf. NRS 539.123), providing that anyone over 21 years of age who holds title to land situated in irrigation district may vote at any election held under provisions of irrigation district act, did not violate Nev. Art. 2, §§ 1 and 6, prohibiting imposition of property qualifications on right to vote, because districts organized under such statute are not political or governmental subdivisions of state, and the term "elections" in constitution does not embrace irrigation district elections. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921), cited, Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. McLean, 49 Nev. 278, at 287, 245 Pac. 285 (1926), Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, at 28, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935), Magee v. Whitacre, 60 Nev. 202, at 212, 96 P.2d 201 (1940), Truckee- Carson Irr. Dist. v. Baber, 80 Nev. 263, at 266, 392 P.2d 46 (1964), AGO 96-23 (8-9-1996)
Statute requiring that proposed state and municipal bond issues be submitted to vote by owners and nonowners of real property held not in conflict with constitution. Statute which provided that where state or any municipality therein proposed to issue bonds such proposal should be submitted to electors involved who were not real property owners, and to electors who were real property owners, was not in conflict either with Nev. Art. 2, § 1, which defines right to vote and qualifications of electors, or with Nev. Art. 2, § 6, which provides for registration of electors and prescribes test of electoral qualifications. Hard v. Depaoli, 56 Nev. 19, 41 P.2d 1054 (1935)
Section 7. Poll tax: Levy and purpose. [Repealed in 1966.]
[Amended in 1910. Proposed and passed by the 1907 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1909 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the 1910 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1907, p. 450; Statutes of Nevada 1909, p. 344. Repealed in 1966. Repealer proposed and passed by the 1963 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1965 legislature; approved and ratified by the people at the 1966 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1963, p. 1421; Statutes of Nevada 1965, p. 1495. The section as amended in 1910 and repealed in 1966 read: "The Legislature shall provide by law for the payment of an annual poll tax of not less than two, nor exceeding four, dollars from each male resident in the State between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years (uncivilized American Indians excepted) to be expended for the maintenance and betterment of the public roads."]
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 111-122, 145, 146, 272, 493, 535, 785, 786, 836.
Sec: 8. Qualifications of voters on adoption or rejection of constitution. All persons qualified by law to vote for representatives to the General Assembly of the Territory of Nevada, on the twenty first day of March A.D. Eighteen hundred and sixty four and all other persons who may be lawful voters in said Territory on the first Wednesday of September next following, shall be entitled to vote directly upon the question of adopting or rejecting this Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.
Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 122-125, 129-138,
272, 493, 785, 786, 836.
Sec. 9. Recall of public officers: Procedure and limitations. Every public officer in the
State of Nevada is subject, as herein provided, to recall from office by the registered
voters of the state, or of the county, district, or municipality which he represents. For
this purpose, not less than twenty-five per cent (25%) of the number who actually voted in
the state or in the county, district, or municipality which he represents, at the election
in which he was elected, shall file their petition, in the manner herein provided,
demanding his recall by the people. They shall set forth in said petition, in not
exceeding two hundred (200) words, the reasons why said recall is demanded. If he shall
offer his resignation, it shall be accepted and take effect on the day it is offered, and
the vacancy thereby caused shall be filled in the manner provided by law. If he shall not
resign within five (5) days after the petition is filed, a special election shall be
ordered to be held within thirty (30) days after the issuance of the call therefor, in the
state, or county, district, or municipality electing said officer, to determine whether
the people will recall said officer. On the ballot at said election shall be printed
verbatim as set forth in the recall petition, the reasons for demanding the recall of said
officer, and in not more than two hundred (200) words, the officer's justification of his
course in office. He shall continue to perform the duties of his office until the result
of said election shall be finally declared. Other candidates for the office may be
nominated to be voted for at said special election. The candidate who shall receive
highest number of votes at said special election shall be deemed elected for the remainder
of the term, whether it be the person against whom the recall petition was filed, or
another. The recall petition shall be filed with the officer with whom the petition for
nomination to such office shall be filed, and the same officer shall order the special
election when it is required. No such petition shall be circulated or filed against any
officer until he has actually held his office six (6) months, save and except that it may
be filed against a senator or assemblyman in the legislature at any time after ten (10)
days from the beginning of the first session after his election. After one such petition
and special election, no further recall petition shall be filed against the same officer
during the term for which he was elected, unless such further petitioners shall pay into
the public treasury from which the expenses of said special election have been paid, the
whole amount paid out of said public treasury as expenses for the preceding special
election. Such additional legislation as may aid the operation of this section shall be
provided by law.
[Added in 1912, amended in 1970 and 1996. The addition was proposed and passed by the 1909 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1911 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1912 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1909, p. 345; Statutes of Nevada 1911, p. 448. The first amendment was proposed and passed by the 1967 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1969 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1970 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1967, p. 1782; Statutes of Nevada 1969, p. 1663. The second amendment was proposed and passed by the 1993 legislature; agreed to and passed by the 1995 legislature; and approved and ratified by the people at the 1996 general election. See: Statutes of Nevada 1993, p. 3135; Statutes of Nevada 1995, p. 2887.]
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Officers and Public Employees ! 70 1/2.
WESTLAW Topic No. 283.
C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees §§ 182 to 185.
NEVADA CASES.
People have no power to fill office by election for unexpired term. Power conferred on people to elect for full term does not carry with it, by implication, power to fill office by election for unexpired term. Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75 (1865), cited, AGO 96-29 (10-10-1996)
After petition for recall is filed, city governing body must provide for special election. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and ch. 258, Stats. 1913 (cf. NRS ch. 306), relating to recall of public officers, after appropriate petition had been filed, duty of clerk to call and city governing body to provide for special election was clear and allowed of no discretion. Mandamus was proper remedy to enforce compliance with duty. State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott, 52 Nev. 216, 285 Pac. 511 (1930), cited, State ex rel. Cooper v. Reese, 57 Nev. 125, at 130, 59 P.2d 647 (1936)
Legislative intent was that petitions be filed with city clerk. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and ch. 258, Stats. 1913 (cf. NRS ch. 306), relating to recall of public officers, which contained no exact designation of official with whom petitions for recall of city mayor were to be filed, provisions of election laws and other analogous statutes demonstrated legislative intent that petitions were to be filed with city clerk. State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott, 52 Nev. 216, 285 Pac. 511 (1930)
No right to withdraw signatures from petition. Under Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and ch. 258, Stats. 1913 (cf. NRS ch. 306), relating to recall of public officers, which contained no provision for withdrawal of signatures from petition, and pursuant to policy to construe act liberally to promote its purposes, no such right could be inferred. State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott, 52 Nev. 216, 285 Pac. 511 (1930), cited, Cleland v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 92 Nev. 454, at 456, 552 P.2d 488 (1976)
Jurisdiction to call special election attached with filing of petition. Jurisdiction to call special election after petition for recall of city mayor had been filed pursuant to ch. 258, Stats. 1913 (cf. NRS ch. 306), attached at time a proper petition was filed, and could not be ousted where names were subsequently withdrawn from petition. State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott, 52 Nev. 216, 285 Pac. 511 (1930)
Withdrawal of names from petition for recall had no legal effect. Withdrawals of names from petitions for recall of city mayor after petitions were filed pursuant to ch. 258, Stats. 1913 (cf. NRS ch. 306), were of no legal effect, absent statutory provision, because officer with whom they were filed was required to ascertain, on date of filing, whether petition on its face complied with statutory requirement. Officer had no authority to consider matters beyond petition, or matters arising subsequent to its filing. State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott, 52 Nev. 216, 285 Pac. 511 (1930)
Failure to comply with statutory requirements for recall is fatal. Provisions of NRS 306.020 and 306.030 are intended to safeguard operation of recall procedures under Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and thus aid in operation thereof, and failure to comply with statutory requirements is fatal. Fiannaca v. Gill, 78 Nev. 337, 372 P.2d 683 (1962)
Petitions not properly verified did not contain enough valid signatures. Recall petitions which were not properly verified did not contain number of valid signatures required by NRS 306.020 and 306.030. Fiannaca v. Gill, 78 Nev. 337, 372 P.2d 683 (1962), cited, Lundberg v. Koontz, 82 Nev. 360, at 365, 418 P.2d 808 (1966)
Statute requiring petition for recall be signed by 25 percent of qualified city electors who voted in last election of supreme court justice held constitutional. Former language of NRS 306.020 was consistent with former language of Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and both required that petition for recall of city councilman and mayor be signed by not less than 25 percent of qualified electors of city who voted at last general election for supreme court justice. Batchelor v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 81 Nev. 629, 408 P.2d 239 (1965)
Statement satisfying statutory requirement of reason for recall. Statement of petition for recall of city councilman and mayor that "[designated person] has lost the respect and confidence of the great majority of the citizens of [designated city] in that the manner in which he contrived to discharge the City Manager . . . violated the concept of fairness held by a majority of such citizens" satisfied requirements of Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and former provisions of NRS 306.020 for statement of reason. Batchelor v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 81 Nev. 629, 408 P.2d 239 (1965)
Requirement of statement of reason for recall does not require statement of good reason. Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and former provisions of NRS 306.020, which require statement of reason on petition for recall, do not require statement of good reason. Merit is for people to decide, and court in ruling on sufficiency of petition would not intrude on people's prerogative. Batchelor v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 81 Nev. 629, 408 P.2d 239 (1965)
Term "general election" referred to preceding statewide general election. Group attempting to recall members of city council were required to obtain signatures of not less than 25 percent of registered voters who actually voted in city at preceding statewide general election, rather than at preceding citywide general election, because term "general election" in former provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 9 referred to statewide general election. Cook v. Maher, 108 Nev. 1024, 842 P.2d 729 (1992)
Required number of signatures was determined from general election preceding filing of recall petition. Former provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 9 required that recall petition must be signed by at least 25 percent of persons who voted in general election preceding filing of petition, rather than general election preceding filing of notice of intent to circulate petition. (See NRS 306.040.) Foley v. Kennedy, 110 Nev. 1295, 885 P.2d 583 (1994)
Equitable estoppel did not apply to require registrar to accept legally insufficient recall petition and go forward with recall election. Where persons seeking to recall public officer received erroneous advice from office of registrar of voters concerning number of signatures required for valid recall petition, principle of equitable estoppel did not apply to require registrar to accept legally insufficient recall petition and go forward with recall election because legality of holding election is judicial question to be decided according to requirements of constitution. (See Nev. Art. 2, § 9 and NRS 306.040.) Foley v. Kennedy, 110 Nev. 1295, 885 P.2d 583 (1994)
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS.
Recall provision requires enabling statute. Recall provision of constitution by its terms requires enabling statute to make it operative. AGO 59 (9-19-1921)
Signer of recall provision may not withdraw signature after filing. Signer of recall petition may not withdraw name after petition is filed. AGO 84 (12-31-1921)
Recall ballot must contain statement of officer being recalled. Recall ballot must contain statement of officer being recalled, and if officer is misled as to his rights concerning statement, election is illegal. AGO 42 (7-14-1931)
Recall election should not be part of regular election. Recall elections are special elections and should not be held as part of regular election. AGO B-10 (9-17-1940)
Signer of recall petition must be qualified elector at time of signing. Signer of recall petition must be qualified elector at time of signing. AGO 585 (3-15-1948)
Recall provisions do not apply to federal officers. Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and ch. 306 of NRS, relating to recall of public officers, do not apply to federal officers and thus do not authorize filing of notice of intent to circulate petition to recall U.S. Senator elected from Nevada. Such notice is defective on its face and secretary of state should refuse to file it. AGO 225 (6-8-1978)
Number of voters voting in last general election was basis for determining number of signatures needed for recall petition. Under former provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and former provisions of NRS 306.020, total number of voters voting in last preceding general election of state or of county, district or municipality from which officer was elected was basis for determining minimum number of signatures needed on recall petition for that officer. To extent that former provisions of NRS 306.020 refer to election at which such officer was elected, they are in conflict with former provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 9, and provisions of constitution govern. AGO 80-17 (5-21-1980), cited, Foley v. Kennedy, 110 Nev. 1295, at 1301, 885 P.2d 583 (1994)
Public officer may not be recalled within first 6 months of term regardless of whether term is first term or subsequent term of office. Provisions of Nev. Art. 2, § 9 do not permit recall of public officer, including county commissioner (see NRS 244.030), within first 6 months of his term regardless of whether he is in his first term or subsequent term of office, because office exists for specific duration established by law. Therefore, each time public officer is reelected he begins to hold his office on day he takes his oath of office for that term. AGO 95-04 (4-3-1995)
Filing of invalid recall petition or notice of intent to circulate recall petition. Where public officer is in first 6 months of term, regardless of whether term is first or subsequent term, filing officer should not accept for filing either notice of intent to circulate petition for recall of officer or actual petition for recall of officer. (See Nev. Art. 2, § 9 and NRS 306.015.) AGO 95-04 (4-3-1995)
Sec. 10. Limitation on contributions to campaign.
1. As used in this section, "contribution" includes the value of services provided in kind for which money would otherwise be paid, such as paid polling and resulting data, paid direct mail, paid solicitation by telephone, any paid campaign paraphernalia printed or otherwise produced, and the use of paid personnel to assist in a campaign.
2. The legislature shall provide by law for the limitation of the total contribution by any natural or artificial person to the campaign of any person for election to any office, except a federal office, to $5,000 for the primary and $5,000 for the general election, and to the approval or rejection of any question by the registered voters to $5,000, whether the office sought or the question submitted is local or for the state as a whole. The legislature shall further provide for the punishment of the contributor, the candidate, and any other knowing party to a violation of the limit, as a felony.
[Added in 1996. Proposed by initiative petition and approved and ratified by the people at the 1994 and 1996 general elections.]