CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.

Constitution supreme law of state. Provisions of constitution are supreme law of state and must be enforced by courts in letter and spirit whether or not courts consider policy of such provisions wise. State v. Duffy, 6 Nev. 138 (1870), cited, Goldman v. Bryan, 106 30, at 37, 787 P.2d 372 (1990)

Limitation on period of employment in underground mine is valid exercise of police power. Secs. 1-4, ch. 10, Stats. 1903 (cf. NRS 608.200), which limits period of employment of workingmen in all underground mines to 8 hours per day, is valid exercise of police power and does not violate either Nev. Art. 1, § 1, providing, in part, that all men have right to acquire, possess and protect property, or U.S. 14th amendment, which prohibits state from depriving any person of his property without due process of law. Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1 (1904), cited, Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, at 141, 80 Pac. 463 (1905), In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, at 112, 85 Pac. 352 (1906), Lawson v. Halifax-Tonopah Mining Co., 36 Nev. 591, at 602, 131 Pac. 134, 137 Pac. 514 (1913)

Right to acquire property includes right to labor. Right to acquire and hold property guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 1, is one of most essential for existence and happiness of man, and it implies and includes right to labor. Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1 (1904), cited, Branson v. I.W.W., 30 Nev. 270, at 296, 95 Pac. 354 (1908)

Statute making it misdemeanor to work more than 8 hours per day in mines is valid exercise of police power. Provision of ch. 10, Stats. 1903 (cf. NRS 608.200), making it misdemeanor to work more than 8 hours per day in mines, is valid exercise of police power and application for writ of habeas corpus based on contention that such act limited right to contract in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 1, guaranteeing right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of U.S. 8th amendment, prohibiting imposition of excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments was denied. Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 80 Pac. 463 (1905), cited, In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, at 112, 85 Pac. 352 (1906), Ex parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385, at 399, 91 Pac. 137 (1907), Lawson v. Halifax-Tonopah Mining Co., 36 Nev. 591, at 602, 135 Pac. 611, 138 Pac. 261 (1913), concurring opinion.

Right to acquisition and protection of property includes right to enter vocation. Nev. Art. 1, § 1, providing that acquisition and protection of property are inalienable rights, means more than protection of property already owned by citizen. It includes right to enter ordinary vocations for purpose of acquiring property. Marymount v. Nevada State Banking Bd., 33 Nev. 333, 111 Pac. 295 (1910)

Act prohibiting private individual from engaging in banking business held unconstitutional. On petition for writ of mandamus to compel issuance of license to engage in business of banking, act making it unlawful for private individual to engage in banking business was held unconstitutional under Nev. Art. 1, § 1, declaring rights to liberty, property and pursuit of happiness, Nev. Art. 1, § 8, guaranteeing due process of law, and Nev. Art. 1, § 20, providing that enumeration of rights in constitution does not impair others retained by the people. Marymount v. Nevada State Banking Bd., 33 Nev. 333, 111 Pac. 295 (1910), cited, Eureka Bank Cases, 35 Nev. 80, at 98, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308 (1912)

Constitution supersedes previous inconsistent laws. In absence of saving clause, adoption of new constitution or amendment of existing constitution operates to supersede and revoke all previous inconsistent and irreconcilable constitutional and statutory provisions and rights exercised thereunder, at least so far as future operation of such provisions is concerned. Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 170, 161 Pac. 722, 167 Pac. 324 (1916), cited, Goldman v. Bryan, 106 Nev. 30, at 37, 787 P.2d 372 (1990)

Effect of constitutional provision. Express constitutional provision requiring that certain thing be done in certain way is exclusive to like extent as if it included negative provision to effect that it may not be done in any other way. Robison v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 73 Nev. 169, 313 P.2d 436 (1957), cited, Goldman v. Bryan, 106 Nev. 30, at 37, 787 P.2d 372 (1990)

Any statute authorizing hunting on private land without consent of owner would be unconstitutional. Any statute authorizing hunters to hunt on privately owned lands without permission of owner would violate U.S. 14th amendment and Nev. Art. 1, § 1, but fish and game act, NRS chs. 501-504, nowhere contains such authorization, and NRS 503.240 forbidding hunting on posted and enclosed private property, former NRS 503.250 forbidding hunting on enclosed, occupied and cultivated property of another, and NRS 207.200 relating to trespass give exclusive right to owner to possess land and exclude hunters. Flick v. Nevada Fish & Game Comm’n, 75 Nev. 100, 335 P.2d 422 (1959)

Use of eminent domain power to transfer private property from one individual to another for private use held constitutional. Nev. Art. 1, §§ 1 and 8, which guarantee inalienable right to possess property, and prohibit taking of private property for public use without compensation, are not violated by condemnation proceeding under Urban Renewal Law, NRS 279.010 et seq., on ground that such law contemplates taking of private property from one individual and its transfer to another for private as distinguished from public purposes, because power of eminent domain is simply means of achieving public purpose of redevelopment, and possessory use by public is not prerequisite to exercise of power of eminent domain. Urban Renewal Agency v. Iacometti, 79 Nev. 113, 379 P.2d 466 (1963)

Statute prohibiting sale of commodity below resale price established by owner of trade-mark held unconstitutional as applied to seller who had not signed agreement to maintain price. Former NRS ch. 599, which prohibited sale of any commodity below minimum resale price established by owner of trade-mark, brand or trade name covering that commodity, was unconstitutional as applied to seller who had not signed any agreement to maintain resale price, because it violated Nev. Art. 1, § 1, guaranteeing rights in property, Nev. Art. 1, § 8, providing due process of law, and Nev. Art. 1, § 20, which provides that enumeration of rights does not impair or deny others retained by the people, and exceeded legislative authority conferred by Nev. Art. 4, § 1. Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964)

Right to dispose of property in any legitimate manner and at price obtained by fair barter. Nev. Art. 1, § 1, which provides that all men have right to acquire, possess and protect property, and Nev. Art. 1, § 8, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, in combination establish right to dispose of property in any legitimate manner at such price as can be obtained by fair barter. Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964)

Where regulation of commodity is required for public health or welfare, police power of state may be used. Notwithstanding constitutional guarantees of property rights and due process contained in Nev. Art. 1, §§ 1 and 8, police power of state may be used to regulate sale of commodity affected with public use or whose regulation is required for public health or welfare. Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964)

State employment preference for veterans constitutional. NCL § 6173 (cf. NRS 281.060 and 338.130), giving preference to employment of veterans in offices of state and political subdivisions is constitutional. AGO 167 (5-27-1935)

Veterans not given point advantages in scoring of civil service examinations. Veterans cannot be given point advantages in scoring required civil service examinations. They are entitled to preferential employment only if they comply with all requirements of law and score as high as nonveterans on examinations without regard to any advantageous scoring system. AGO 132 (4-17-1944)

Only reasonable fee may be exacted by state for use of courts. Every person has inalienable right to protect life and property in federal, state courts; state can exact only reasonable fee for use of courts. If unreasonable fee imposed on one type action alone, such fee is discriminatory and unconstitutional. AGO 425 (2-28-1947)

Prohibition on employment of aliens as gambling operators not invasion of inalienable rights or due process. Provisions of Nev. Art. 1, §§ 1 and 8, relating to individual’s inalienable rights and requirement of due process of law, are not invaded by statute prohibiting aliens from being employed as gambling operators. AGO 135 (2-17-1960)

Prohibition on possession of specified dangerous weapons without sheriff’s permit is valid exercise of police power. Subsection 1(a) of NRS 202.350, which prohibits possession of certain specified dangerous weapons by person who has not been granted sheriff’s permit and is not eligible for any of other exceptions enumerated, constitutes valid exercise of police power by state in furtherance of its legitimate interests in public health, safety and crime control. Provisions of NRS 202.350 do not violate Nev. Art. 1, § 1, which provides that citizen has inalienable right to protect his person and property. Thus possession of billy club by private security guard on private property in course of his employment without permit from sheriff is punishable as public offense. Possession of such weapon (or even concealment of it upon his person) would be lawful for anyone to whom permit has been issued, however. AGO 82-15 (6-25-1982)

Sec: 2. Purpose of government; paramount allegiance to United States. All political power is inherent in the people[.] Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it. But the Paramount Allegiance of every citizen is due to the Federal Government in the exercise of all its Constitutional powers as the same have been or may be defined by the Supreme Court of the United States; and no power exists in the people of this or any other State of the Federal Union to dissolve their connection therewith or perform any act tending to impair[,] subvert, or resist the Supreme Authority of the government of the United States. The Constitution of the United States confers full power on the Federal Government to maintain and Perpetuate its existance [existence], and whensoever any portion of the States, or people thereof attempt to secede from the Federal Union, or forcibly resist the Execution of its laws, the Federal Government may, by warrant of the Constitution, employ armed force in compelling obedience to its Authority.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.

Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 41-53, 194, 200-202, 781, 833, 834.

States ! 1, 18.1.

WESTLAW Topic No. 360.

C.J.S. States §§ 2, 16, 22

NEVADA CASES.

Legislative power is limited only by Federal Constitution and state constitution. All political power is inherent in the people. Certain specific powers have been vested in Federal Government pursuant to U.S. Constitution. Remaining powers are retained by the people and are exercised through state governments. Legislative power of people of State of Nevada is vested in state legislature, and such power is unlimited except by Federal Constitution and such restrictions as are expressly placed on it by state constitution. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283 (1869), cited, County of Pershing v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 78, at 93, 181 Pac. 960 (1919), Moore v. Humboldt County, 48 Nev. 397, at 405, 232 Pac. 1078 (1925), Matthews v. State ex rel. Nevada Tax Comm’n, 83 Nev. 266, at 268, 428 P.2d 371 (1967)

Direct primary law did not violate Nevada constitution. Direct primary law did not violate provisions of Nev. Art. 1, § 2, or Nev. Art. 1, § 20, that all power is inherent in the people in restricting right of political parties in selecting candidates but rather retained this right to the people by giving them opportunity to ratify or reject candidate of political convention or clique of politicians at primary election. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1910), cited, State ex rel. Donnelley v. Hamilton, 33 Nev. 418, at 426, 111 Pac. 1026 (1910), State ex rel. Allen v. Brodigan, 34 Nev. 486, at 490, 125 Pac. 699 (1912), Kelly v. Reed, 76 Nev. 389, at 394, 355 P.2d 969 (1960)

Enactment of direct primary law was within power of legislature. Nev. Art. 1, § 2, providing that all political power is inherent in the people and that government is instituted for benefit of the people, who have right to alter or reform it when they see fit, expressly gives legislature power to reform law when public good requires it. Enactment of direct primary law establishing entirely new manner of selecting candidates than previously prevailed was within power of legislature, and wisdom of such law was entirely within its province. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1910)

When state adopted common law it did not give counties preferential right to public funds. Under Nev. Art. 1, § 2, all political power is inherent in the people, and because people are state itself, and state inherited prerogatives of sovereignty from common law, it cannot be said that when state adopted common law it gave to counties preferential right derived from its sovereignty in respect to public funds. Lothrop v. Seaborn, 55 Nev. 16, 23 P.2d 1109 (1933)

Nevada supreme court is bound by decisions of U.S. Supreme Court but not by decisions of lower federal courts. Prior decisions of Nevada supreme court, made in light of latest U.S. Supreme Court decision on point, would not be overruled because in conflict with later decision of lower federal court, because, while Nevada court is bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions under Nev. Art. 1, § 2, it is not bound by decisions of other federal courts, and point of law, once determined, will not be unsettled except for weighty and conclusive reasons. Bargas v. Warden, 87 Nev. 30, 482 P.2d 317 (1971), cited, Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, at 633, 748 P.2d 494 (1987)

State court injunction enjoining school desegregation directed by federal court violated supremacy clauses of U.S. and Nevada constitutions. State court preliminary injunction enjoining school board from effectuating federal court judgment directing implementation of school desegregation plan was entered without jurisdiction and was peremptorily set aside because it violated federal supremacy clauses of U.S. and Nevada constitutions (see Nev. Art. 1, § 2). Clark County School Dist. v. Jones, 88 Nev. 556, 502 P.2d 110 (1972)

In wrongful death action, requirements of notice statutes constituted arbitrary classification of tortfeasors and victims in violation of equal protection. In wrongful death action, order granting summary judgment for defendant county and its hospital on ground that claim against county had not been filed within time required by former provisions of NRS 244.245 and NRS 244.250 was reversed on appeal because purpose of NRS 41.031 et seq., waiving sovereign immunity, was to place governmental tortfeasors and private tortfeasors and their victims on equal footing, and requirement of former provisions of notice statutes constituted arbitrary classification of tortfeasors and victims in violation of equal protection guarantees of United States Constitution and Nev. Art. 1, § 2. Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cited, King v. Baskin, 89 Nev. 290, at 292, 511 P.2d 115 (1973), Hopper v. Clark County School Dist., 89 Nev. 466, at 466, 514 P.2d 1294 (1973), Colby v. Lyon County, 89 Nev. 510, at 510, 515 P.2d 672 (1973), State ex rel. Tidvall v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 91 Nev. 520, at 526, 539 P.2d 456 (1975), Jiminez v. State, 98 Nev. 204, at 206, 644 P.2d 1023 (1982), Frank Briscoe Co. v. County of Clark, 643 F. Supp. 93, at 100 (D. Nev. 1986), Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. City of Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, at 500, 797 P.2d 946 (1990), distinguished, L-M Architects v. City of Sparks, 100 Nev. 334, at 336, 683 P.2d 11 (1984)

Sec: 3. Trial by jury; waiver in civil cases. The right of trial by Jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever; but a Jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law; and in civil cases, if three fourths of the Jurors agree upon a verdict it shall stand and have the same force and effect as a verdict by the whole Jury, Provided, the Legislature by a law passed by a two thirds vote of all the members elected to each branch thereof may require a unanimous verdict notwithstanding this Provision.

Statute that denied right to challenge jurors for actual bias violated right to jury trial. Statute which provides that 36 competent jurors free from implied bias be selected in certain felony cases, that such jurors be examined concerning actual bias, that state and defendant, alternately, shall challenge peremptorily until 12 jurors remain, and that these 12 shall serve, violates Nev. Art. 1, § 3, (right to trial by jury) because it denies right to challenge for actual bias. State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), cited, State v. Johnson, 11 Nev. 148, at 149 (1876), distinguished, State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, at 224, 255 Pac. 1002 (1927)

Challenges for actual bias are a matter of right while peremptory challenges are permitted by statute. Challenges for actual or implied bias are allowed as matter of right, while peremptory challenges are permitted by statutory enactment. (See NRS 175.036.) State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), cited, State v. Pritchard, 15 Nev. 74, at 94 (1880)

Legislature may change common law method of impaneling juries. Legislature may change forms of common law in establishing method of impaneling juries. State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), cited, Stocks v. Warden, 86 Nev. 758, at 763, 476 P.2d 469 (1970)

Legislature may not deprive citizen accused of crime right to challenge juror for actual bias. Legislature may not deprive citizen, accused of crime, of right to challenge juror for actual bias. (See NRS 175.036.) State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), distinguished, State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, at 224, 255 Pac. 1002 (1927)

Right to jury trial not conferred where it did not exist at time of adoption of constitution. Provision of Nev. Art. 1, § 3, that "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever," refers to right of trial by jury as it existed at time of adoption of constitution, and does not confer right where it did not exist at that time. State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), cited, State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, at 354, 40 Pac. 372 (1895), Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, at 243, 174 Pac. 706 (1918), Ex parte Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, at 119, 217 Pac. 233 (1923), State v. Steward, 74 Nev. 65, at 67, 323 P.2d 23 (1958), Howard v. State, 83 Nev. 53, at 57, 422 P.2d 548 (1967), Rains v. State, 83 Nev. 58, at 61, 422 P.2d 541 (1967)

Right to challenge juror for implied bias may be regulated by legislature to some extent. Right to challenge for implied bias, for having formed or expressed opinion upon guilt or innocence of defendant, may, to some extent, be regulated by legislature if care is taken to preserve inviolate the right of trial by jury of 12 impartial men. State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), distinguished, State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, at 224, 255 Pac. 1002 (1927)

Right to jury trial in criminal and civil trials. Right to trial by jury guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, applies to civil as well as criminal cases. State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), cited, Ruley v. Nevada Bd. of Prison Comm’rs, 628 F. Supp. 108, at 112 (D. Nev. 1986)

Meaning of the term "jury." Term "jury," as used in Nev. Art. 1, § 3, means "twelve competent men who are free from all the ties of consanguinity and all other relations that would tend to make them dependent on either party. It means twelve men who are not interested in the event of the suit, and who have no such bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, either party as would render them partial toward either party." State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39 (1876), cited, State v. Borowsky, 11 Nev. 119, at 127 (1876), State v. McMahon, 17 Nev. 365, at 370, 30 Pac. 1000 (1883), Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, at 251, 174 Pac. 706 (1918)

Specific facts where defendant not prejudiced by erroneous overruling of challenge to jurors. Where court refused to disqualify four jurors on ground of bias, and state and defendant each challenged two of such jurors peremptorily, and court allowed defendant two more peremptory challenges than were allowed by statute, B § 1960 (cf. NRS 175.051), no substantial right was denied defendant and he had fair and impartial jury (see Nev. Art. 1, § 3). (See NRS 175.036.) State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98 (1876), cited, State v. Johnson, 12 Nev. 121, at 124 (1877), Odom v. State, 91 Nev. 473, at 474, 538 P.2d 167 (1975)

Statute providing for summary trial of infractions of city ordinances of police nature not unconstitutional. Statute providing that trial in all cases for infraction of Reno city ordinances of police nature shall be summary in character without jury did not violate Nev. Art. 1, § 3, which guarantees right of jury trial to all. Constitutional provision secures right of jury trial only as it was understood at common law and has never been extended to cover petty offenses. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 Pac. 274 (1898), cited, Ex parte Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, at 118, 217 Pac. 233 (1923), Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 81 Nev. 677, at 680, 409 P.2d 245 (1965), Close v. Isbell Constr. Co., 86 Nev. 524, at 529, 471 P.2d 257 (1970), State v. Smith, 99 Nev. 806, at 809, 672 P.2d 631 (1983), Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, at 628, 748 P.2d 494 (1987), see also Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

No right to jury trial in proceeding to remove county sheriff from office. In certiorari proceedings to inquire into jurisdiction of district court to enter judgment removing county sheriff from office, contention that complaint in removal proceedings charged defendant with crime and that he was entitled to jury trial under Nev. Art. 1, § 3, was without merit, because legislature had plenary power under Nev. Art. 7, § 4 to enact statute under which removal proceeding was conducted. Gay v. Tenth Judicial Dist. Court, 41 Nev. 330, 171 Pac. 156, 173 Pac. 885 (1918), cited, In re Jones, 41 Nev. 523, at 529, 530, 173 Pac. 885 (1918), concurring opinion, Adler v. Sheriff, Clark County, 92 Nev. 436, at 439, 552 P.2d 334 (1976)

Constitution guarantees right to jury trial but leaves to legislature duty of providing means to enforce the right. Nev. Art. 1, § 3, securing right of trial by jury but providing that it may be waived in civil cases, guarantees right and leaves to legislature the duty of providing means and methods by which right is to be enforced. O’Banion v. Simpson, 44 Nev. 188, 191 Pac. 1083 (1920)

Plea of guilty. In prosecution for murder, where defendant entered plea of guilty, there was no issue remaining to try, jury trial as guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, was not necessary to establish defendant’s guilt, and trial judge could properly determine degree of offense, as distinguished from situation where defendant enters plea of not guilty, in which case jury is required to determine not only guilt or innocence, but also degree of offense. State v. Ceja, 53 Nev. 281, 2 P.2d 124 (1931), cited, Ramos v. State, 58 Nev. 446, at 448, 83 P.2d 147 (1938), State v. Blackwell, 65 Nev. 405, at 414, 427, 198 P.2d 280 (1948)

Jury trial must be given unless waived by one of the statutory methods. Right to trial by jury is guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, and must be given unless it is waived by one of methods provided by statute, and such waiver appears of record. Murrish v. Kennedy, 54 Nev. 159, 10 P.2d 636 (1932)

Right to jury may be waived in criminal prosecution. That Nev. Art. 1, § 3, securing right to jury trial, does not prevent waiver of such trial in criminal prosecutions is evidenced by NCL § 10920 (cf. NRS 175.011 and 175.021), which provides that issues of fact must be tried by jury unless trial by jury is waived by consent of both parties. Absence of jury in such prosecutions does not affect jurisdiction of court to proceed to trial and judgment. In re Ohl, 59 Nev. 309, 92 P.2d 976 (1939)

Jury trial may be waived by failure to demand jury as required. Jury trial provided for by statute and Nev. Art. 1, § 3, may be waived by failure to demand jury as required by NCL § 8782 (cf. N.R.C.P. 38). Kohlsaat v. Kohlsaat, 62 Nev. 485, 155 P.2d 474 (1945), cited, Underhill v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, at 81, 226 P.2d 794 (1951)

Common law right to jury trial subject to modification by legislature in particular instances. Information charging murder while traveling in moving van across state, which was filed in county where trip ended, was sufficient under NRS 171.040, providing for venue in any county traversed or in county of destination for offenses committed in traveling conveyances. Nev. Art. 1, § 3, which guarantees right to jury trial, preserves such right as it existed at common law, but common law right was recognized as essentially subject to modification by legislature in particular instances, and statute is constitutional. State v. Stewart, 74 Nev. 65, 323 P.2d 23 (1958), cited, Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 81 Nev. 677, at 680, 409 P.2d 245 (1965)

No right to jury trial in prosecution for contributing to delinquency of minor. In prosecution for contributing to delinquency of minor, jury trial guarantee of U.S. Constitution did not apply because it is limited to right as it existed anciently at common law. Jury trial guarantee of Nev. Art. 1, § 3, did not apply because it is limited to right as it existed at adoption of state constitution. Offense charged was unknown to common law. Hudson v. City of Las Vegas, 81 Nev. 677, 409 P.2d 245 (1965), cited, Hudson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 83 Nev. 62, at 63, 422 P.2d 688 (1967)

Defendant convicted of attempted robbery not entitled to jury trial on controverted allegation of three prior felony convictions. Defendant convicted of attempted robbery was not entitled to jury trial on controverted allegation of three prior felony convictions, because habitual criminality is status, not separate crime, and provision of NRS 207.010 for its determination by trial judge does not violate jury trial guarantee of Nev. Art. 1, § 3. Howard v. State, 83 Nev. 53, 422 P.2d 548 (1967), cited, White v. State, 83 Nev. 292, at 295, 429 P.2d 55 (1967), Craig v. State, 85 Nev. 128, at 129, 451 P.2d 368 (1969), Hollander v. Warden, 86 Nev. 369, at 373, 468 P.2d 990 (1970), Parkerson v. State, 100 Nev. 222, at 224, 678 P.2d 1155 (1984), Clark v. State, 109 Nev. 426, at 428, 851 P.2d 426 (1993)

Defendant has no absolute right to compel private trial. Although defendant under some circumstances can waive constitutional right to jury trial, he has no absolute right to compel private trial. The only constitutional right of defendant concerning method of trial is to impartial trial by jury pursuant to Nev. Art. 1, § 3. Rains v. State, 83 Nev. 58, 422 P.2d 541 (1967), cited, Goldstein v. Pavlikowski, 87 Nev. 512, at 514, 489 P.2d 1159 (1971), Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205, at 211, 808 P.2d 551 (1991)

Defendant in criminal case may waive right to jury trial with consent of state. Right to jury trial guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, may be waived in criminal case pursuant to former NRS 174.480 (cf. NRS 175.011), which conditions defendant’s right to waive jury on consent of state, because right of trial by jury is as much for protection of people as for individual defendant. Rains v. State, 83 Nev. 58, 422 P.2d 541 (1967)

Habitual criminal proceeding is not deprivation of right to jury trial. Adjudging defendant habitual criminal and sentencing him accordingly, pursuant to NRS 207.010, did not deprive him of trial by jury as guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, because habitual criminal proceeding is procedural and does not charge separate offense, but determines facts which will affect punishment. White v. State, 83 Nev. 292, 429 P.2d 55 (1967), cited, Hollander v. Warden, 86 Nev. 369, at 373, 468 P.2d 990 (1970), Parkerson v. State, 100 Nev. 222, at 224, 678 P.2d 1155 (1984)

Right to jury trial does not extend to mechanic’s lien foreclosure proceedings. Right to jury trial afforded by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, and N.R.C.P. 38(a) does not extend to mechanic’s lien foreclosure proceedings, because such proceedings are equity matters and no right to jury trial in equity matters existed at common law. Close v. Isbell Constr. Co., 86 Nev. 524, 471 P.2d 257 (1970)

Right to jury trial of defendant convicted of first degree kidnaping not impaired by statute which permits jury to impose death penalty. Where defendant convicted of first degree kidnaping had demanded and received jury trial and was sentenced to life imprisonment under NRS 200.320, defendant was not prejudiced by provisions of statute which permit jury to impose death penalty, and constitutional right to jury trial guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3, was not impaired. Pacheco v. Warden, 87 Nev. 231, 484 P.2d 1082 (1971), cited, Askew v. State, 89 Nev. 338, at 340, 513 P.2d 441 (1973)

Court has no jurisdiction to conduct trial of capital case without jury. In prosecution for murder on plea of not guilty, trial court could neither permit waiver of jury trial nor allow bench trial because it had no jurisdiction to conduct trial without jury since Nev. Art. 1, § 3, Nev. Art. 6, § 6, and NRS 175.011, which give courts jurisdiction of criminal cases, make no allowance for trial solely before court in capital cases. Goldstein v. Pavlikowski, 87 Nev. 512, 489 P.2d 1159 (1971)

Neither additur nor remittitur are precluded by provisions guaranteeing right to jury trial. On appeal from denial of motion for additur or new trial on issue of damages in personal injury action, where record clearly established that damages awarded by jury were inadequate, matter was remanded to trial court with instructions to grant new trial limited to issue of damages unless defendants agreed to additur in amount set by appellate court; because neither additur nor remittitur are precluded by provisions of Nev. Art. 1, § 3, guaranteeing right to jury trial, and both promote economy and efficiency in judicial proceedings. Drummond v. Mid-West Growers Cooperative Corp., 91 Nev. 698, 542 P.2d 198 (1975), cited, Eikelberger v. Tolotti, 94 Nev. 58, at 61, 574 P.2d 277 (1978), Shere v. Davis, 95 Nev. 491, at 493, 596 P.2d 499 (1979), Jacobson v. Manfredi, 100 Nev. 226, at 232, 679 P.2d 251 (1984), Arnold v. Mt. Wheeler Power Co., 101 Nev. 612, at 616, 707 P.2d 1137 (1985), Moore v. Bannen, 106 Nev. 679, at 681, 799 P.2d 564 (1990), Donaldson v. Anderson, 109 Nev. 1039, at 1041, 862 P.2d 1204 (1993)

No right to jury trial for petty offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In prosecution under former provisions of NRS 484.379 (cf. NRS 484.3792) for driving motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor, defendant was not entitled to trial by jury under U.S. Constitution or Nev. Art. 1, § 3, because, as maximum possible penalty for offense charged was not more than 6 months imprisonment, offense was petty offense for which no constitutional right to trial by jury has been conferred. State v. Smith, 99 Nev. 806, 672 P.2d 631 (1983), cited, Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, at 631, 748 P.2d 494 (1987), State v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 104 Nev. 91, at 92, 752 P.2d 238 (1988), distinguished, Bronson v. Swinney, 648 F. Supp. 1094, at 1100 (D. Nev. 1986)

Right to jury trial does not extend to every criminal proceeding. In consolidated appeals and petitions arising from denial of jury trials by municipal courts of cities of Las Vegas and North Las Vegas for persons charged with driving under influence of alcohol (see NRS 484.379), court held that right to trial by jury guaranteed by Nev. Art. 1, § 3 is coextensive with that guaranteed by U.S. Constitution and that U.S. 6th amendment right to trial by jury does not extend to every criminal proceeding. Court concluded that no constitutional right to trial by jury attaches to first time driving under influence offense where maximum penalty is misdemeanor (see NRS 484.3792). Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623, 748 P.2d 494 (1987), aff’d, Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989), cited, State v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 104 Nev. 91, at 92, 752 P.2d 238 (1988), Pettipas v. State, 106 Nev. 377, at 379, 794 P.2d 705 (1990), Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, at 1501, 908 P.2d 689 (1995), see also McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1992)

Person charged in justice’s court with misdemeanor driving under influence has no right to jury trial. When charged as misdemeanor, driving under influence of alcohol in violation of NRS 484.379 is petty offense for which trial by jury is not constitutionally mandated, regardless of whether defendant is charged in municipal court or justice’s court. State v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 104 Nev. 91, 752 P.2d 238 (1988)

Constitutionality of statute containing grounds for vacation of arbitration award. Requirements of NRS 38.145, which specify grounds for court to vacate award entered in arbitration proceeding, when applied to compulsory arbitration statute (see former NRS 38.215), placed unconstitutional restriction on right to obtain jury trial (see Nev. Art. 1, § 3). However, such requirements are not unconstitutional when applied to voluntary arbitration statute. Williams v. Williams, 110 Nev. 830, 877 P.2d 1081 (1994)

Mandatory award of fees and costs in action for medical malpractice does not deprive claimant of right to trial by jury. NRS 41A.056, which requires trial court to award attorney’s fees to defendant in action for medical malpractice if decision of screening panel and judgment at trial are not in favor of claimant, does not deprive claimant of right to trial by jury in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 3 on ground that access to courts is limited because of financial consequences if claimant fails at trial. Rule that each party pays his attorney’s fees has no constitutional basis and may be abrogated by contract, statute or rule of court. Furthermore, right of claimant to bring action for medical malpractice does not involve fundamental constitutional right and access to court, therefore, may be hindered if there exists rational basis for doing so. NRS 41A.056 is rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose as it attempts to minimize actions that have no merit and encourage settlement of claims, thereby lowering costs of malpractice insurance and health care. Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Admissibility of findings of screening panel in action for medical malpractice does not divest court of authority to admit or reject evidence. NRS 41A.016, which requires decision of screening panel reviewing claim for medical malpractice to be introduced at trial, does not deprive claimant of right to trial by jury in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 3 on ground that district court is divested of its authority to admit or reject evidence. Provision is essentially evidentiary rule allowing expert opinion as exception to rule prohibiting hearsay and legislature has authority to enact such rules of evidence. Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Procedures for review of claim for medical malpractice by screening panel do not deprive claimant of right to trial by jury. NRS 41A.016 and 41A.049 do not violate right of claimant in action for medical malpractice to trial by jury in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 3 on ground that decision of screening panel is admissible at trial, even though claimant may not cross-examine witnesses at proceeding before panel, depose or subpoena members of panel, or seek judicial review of decision of panel, because, under NRS 41A.056, claimant may file action in court and, despite decision of panel, present case to jury which remains final arbiter in action. Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Jury’s consideration of decision of screening panel in action for medical malpractice does not deprive claimant of right to trial by jury. NRS 41A.016 and 41A.049 do not deprive claimant in action for medical malpractice of right to trial by jury in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 3 on ground that decision of screening panel that reviewed claim is admissible at trial and jurors overvalue weight of that decision without knowing that decision relies on evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. Instructions required to be given to jury by NRS 41A.069 clearly indicate that decision of panel is expert opinion which is to be evaluated by jury in same manner as it would evaluate any other expert opinion and is not conclusive on determination of case. Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 908 P.2d 689 (1995)

Sec: 4. Liberty of conscience. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed in this State, and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of his religious belief, but the liberty of consciene [conscience] hereby secured, shall not be so construed, as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace, or safety of this State.

Sec: 5. Suspension of habeas corpus. The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require its suspension.

Sec: 6. Excessive bail and fines; cruel or unusual punishments; detention of witnesses. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES.

Nevada Constitutional Debates and Proceedings, pp. 59, 194, 782, 834.

Bail ! 52.

Criminal Law ! 1213.1 to 1213.14.

Witnesses ! 20.

WESTLAW Topic Nos. 49, 110, 410.

C.J.S. Bail; Release and Detention Pending Proceedings § 69.

C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1593 to 1608.

C.J.S. Witnesses § 33.

NEVADA CASES.

Statute which authorizes proceedings in district court for adjudication of water rights after state engineer has filed order of determination does not violate separation of powers. In prohibition proceedings, contention that ch. 140, Stats. 1913, as amended, ch. 253, Stats. 1915 (cf. NRS 533.090 et seq.), which authorizes proceedings in district court for adjudication of water rights after state engineer has filed order of determination with clerk, violated Nev. Art. 3, § 1, providing for separation of powers, and Nev. Art. 1, § 6, vesting judicial power in enumerated courts, on ground that statute confers judicial powers upon state engineer, was not well taken. Procedure before engineer is in no sense judicial proceeding, but simply sets in motion machinery necessary to invest court with jurisdiction. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 42 Nev. 1, 171 Pac. 166 (1918), cited, In re Waters of Barber Creek, 43 Nev. 407, at 409, 187 Pac. 1004 (1920), Pitt v. Scrugham, 44 Nev. 418, at 427, 429, 195 Pac. 1101 (1921), Dahlquist v. Nevada Industrial Comm’n, 46 Nev. 107, at 119, 206 Pac. 197, 207 Pac. 1104 (1922), In re Waters of Manse Spring, 60 Nev. 280, at 290, 108 P.2d 311 (1940), Provenzano v. Long, 64 Nev. 412, at 427, 183 P.2d 639 (1947), Wolford v. Wolford, 65 Nev. 710, at 716, 200 P.2d 988 (1948), In re Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, at 27, 202 P.2d 535 (1949), McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 214, at 217, 246 P.2d 805 (1952), Salmon River Canal Co. v. Bell Brand Ranches, Inc., 564 F.2d 1244 (1977)

Raising bail of defendant charged with criminal syndicalism from $2,500 to $5,000 violated spirit of constitutional provision against excessive bail. Raising bail of defendant charged with criminal syndicalism from $2,500 to $5,000 violated spirit of provision of constitution against excessive bail, Nev. Art. 1, § 6, but in habeas corpus proceedings, question of ordering reduction of bail was refused consideration where it appeared that defendant was unable to furnish bail in any amount. In re Moriarity, 44 Nev. 164, 191 Pac. 360 (1920), cited, State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, at 653, 200 P.2d 657 (1948)

Matters to be considered in determining reasonable bail. Under Nev. Art. 1, § 6, providing that excessive bail shall not be required, matters to be considered in determining reasonable bail are object of bail which is to assure presence of accused for trial, nature of offense charged, penalty which may be inflicted, probability of appearance of accused, his pecuniary condition, his character and reputation, and circumstances surrounding the case relative to likelihood of conviction. In re Jagles, 44 Nev. 370, 195 Pac. 808 (1921), cited, Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, at 253, 256 Pac. 512 (1927), In re Toczylowski, 69 Nev. 194, at 195, 245 P.2d 1004 (1952)

It was not intended that accused should be judge of his ability to give bail in certain amount. Although purpose of Nev. Art. 1, § 6, prohibiting excessive bail, is to prevent fixing of bail in amount so great as to preclude its being given, it was not intended that accused should be judge of his ability to give bail in certain amount, or whether amount fixed is excessive. Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927)

Bail is excessive when greater than accused can reasonably be expected to pay under the circumstances. Bail is excessive and within prohibition of Nev. Art. 1, § 6, if amount is more than accused can reasonable be expected to give under circumstances. But inability to procure bail in certain amount does not, of itself, make such amount excessive. Regard must be had to circumstances and ability of prisoner in connection with atrocity of offense or turpitude of crime, and punishment involved. Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927), cited, In re Toczylowski, 69 Nev. 194, at 195, 245 P.2d 1004 (1952)

Fine of $500 and removal from office of district attorney for neglect of duty not unreasonable fine or cruel and unusual punishment. Fine of $500 and removal from office of district attorney convicted of neglect of duty in failing to turn over county money in amount of $273.41 was not unreasonable fine or cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 6. Wood v. State, 59 Nev. 445, 96 P.2d 441 (1939)

Where convicted murderer serving life sentence sought relief from subsequent larceny sentence by writ of habeas corpus, situation did not justify appeal to justice of the courts. In habeas corpus proceeding, where, in order to become eligible for parole, petitioner sought relief from allegedly invalid sentence for larceny to commence after completion of life sentence for murder, on ground that constitutional prohibition, Nev. Art. 1, § 6, against cruel and unusual punishment was violated, fact that petitioner coldbloodedly murdered police officer in perpetration of larceny presented situation which did not justify appeal to justice of the courts. In re Sheply, 66 Nev. 33, 202 P.2d 882 (1949)

Petition for writ of habeas corpus on ground of excessive bail denied where no facts alleged to allow court to determine appropriate amount. Where defendant arraigned on charge of first degree burglary petitioned for writ of habeas corpus on ground that bail of $20,000 was excessive under Nev. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 7 and NCL § 11108 (cf. NRS 178.484), petition had to be denied, even if amount was excessive per se, where no facts were alleged which would have allowed court to determine more appropriate amount. In re Toczylowski, 69 Nev. 194, 245 P.2d 1004 (1952)

Punishing by death crime of causing death of any person while attempting to escape from state prison is not cruel and unusual punishment. NCL § 10499 (cf. NRS 200.030), which defines causing death of any person while attempting to escape from state prison as first degree murder punishable by death, does not provide cruel and unusual punishment in violation of U.S. 8th amendment or Nev. Art. 1, § 6, because penalty is not disproportionate to offense, on analogy of death penalty for killing in commission of felony. Hinrichs v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 71 Nev. 168, 283 P.2d 614 (1955), cited, Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265, at 269, 578 P.2d 1183 (1978)

Sentencing defendant to prison while codefendant received probation was not cruel and unusual punishment. In criminal action, fact that defendant received prison sentence while codefendant was allowed probation was not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 6, because codefendants may be punished separately for same crime. Bates v. State, 84 Nev. 43, 436 P.2d 27 (1968)

Condition of probation requiring addict to obey drug laws was not cruel and unusual punishment. Condition of probation requiring narcotics addict to obey drug laws was not impossible condition amounting to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Nev. Art. 1, § 6, and revocation of his probation did not violate due process because fact of his addiction had been concealed, and possession and use of narcotics is illegal per se. Jennings v. State, 89 Nev. 297, 511 P.2d 1048 (1973), cited, McNallen v. State, 91 Nev. 592, at 593, 540 P.2d 121 (1975), Rosser v. Housewright, 99 Nev. 476, at 479, 664 P.2d 961 (1983)

Mandatory life sentence for infamous crime against nature by use of force did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Mandatory life sentence imposed by former provision of NRS 201.190 (cf. NRS 200.366) for commission of infamous crime against nature by use of force did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of U.S. 8th amendment or Nev. Art. 1, § 6, because sentence imposed was not manifestly disproportionate to seriousness of offense. Anderson v. State, 92 Nev. 21, 544 P.2d 1200 (1976), cited, Schmidt v. State, 94 Nev. 665, at 668, 584 P.2d 695 (1978)

Mandatory death sentence for murder perpetrated by person under life sentence without possibility of parole was held constitutional. Former provisions of NRS 200.030 which imposed mandatory death penalty for murder perpetrated by person under sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole were not unconstitutional under provisions of U.S. 8th amendment or Nev. Art. 1, § 6, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, because lesser sentence would impose no effective punishment upon perpetrator already imprisoned for life without possibility of parole and no mitigating circumstances could exist which would justify such result. Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265, 578 P.2d 1183 (1978), cited, Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, at 677, 601 P.2d 407 (1979), contra, Shuman v. Wolff, 791 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1986)

Sentence of imprisonment within statutory limits normally not considered cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant challenged sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment for conviction of indecent exposure under NRS 201.220 as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual in contravention of U.S. 8th amendment and Nev. Art. 1, § 6. Court held that sentence of imprisonment which is within limits of valid statute, regardless of its severity, is normally not considered cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant’s 6-year sentence did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Schmidt v. State, 94 Nev. 665, 584 P.2d 695 (1978), cited, Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, at 664, 747 P.2d 1376 (1987), Epp v. State, 107 Nev. 510, at 515, 814 P.2d 1011 (1991), Glegola v. State, 110 Nev. 344, at 348, 871 P.2d 950 (1994), see also White v. State, 105 Nev. 121, 771 P.2d 152 (1989)

Statutory punishment unconstitutional if so disproportionate to crime for which inflicted that it shocks conscience. Appellant challenged sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment for conviction of indecent exposure under NRS 201.220 as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual in contravention of U.S. 8th amendment and Nev. Art. 1, § 6. Court held that while statutes enacted by state legislature are presumed valid, punishment may be constitutionally impermissible if it is so disproportionate to crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. Court, unable to characterize penalty in issue as manifestly disproportionate to seriousness of offense or affront to human dignity, concluded that appellant’s sentence could not be interpreted as cruel or unusual punishment prohibited by federal and state constitutions. Schmidt v. State, 94 Nev. 665, 584 P.2d 695 (1978), cited, DePasquale v. State, 104 Nev. 338, at 341, 757 P.2d 367 (1988)

Death penalty imposed pursuant to penalty hearing for first degree murder with aggravating circumstances not cruel and unusual punishment. Death penalty imposed pursuant to NRS 175.552 et seq., 200.033 and 200.035 was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not offend either U.S. Constitution or Nevada constitution (see Nev. Art. 1, § 6). Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979), cited, Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, at 677, 601 P.2d 407 (1979), Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, at 1309, 100 S. Ct. 3 (1979), Rogers v. State, 101 Nev. 457, at 465, 705 P.2d 664 (1985), Ford v. State, 102 Nev. 126, at 138, 717 P.2d 27 (1986), Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, at 814, 919 P.2d 403 (1996), Sonner v. State, 112 Nev. 1328, at 1346, 930 P.2d 707 (1996), see also Nevius v. State, 101 Nev. 238, 699 P.2d 1053 (1985), Williams v. State, 103 Nev. 227, 737 P.2d 508 (1987)

Sentence not cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant received three 10-year sentences for three counts of issuance of no account check, and two 10-year sentences for two counts of uttering forged instrument. Appellant contended her sentence of 50 years violated constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment (see Nev. Art. 1, § 6) because it was grossly disproportionate to seriousness of her crimes. Court held that appellant’s sentence did not appear harsh when considered in light of numerous crimes she committed while out on bail, number of charges that were either dismissed or not pursued, and her prior record. Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 747 P.2d 1376 (1987)

Municipal ordinance that set no limit on fine that could be imposed was unconstitutional. Municipal ordinance that vested city officials with unlimited discretion to establish fines was unconstitutional pursuant to Nev. Art. 1, § 6, because it created great risk of excessive fines. City of Las Vegas v. Nevada Indus., Inc., 105 Nev. 174, 772 P.2d 1275 (1989)

Sentencing of murderer who was 13 years of age to life imprisonment without possibility of parole was cruel and unusual punishment. Sentencing of mentally and emotionally disordered defendant who was 13 years of age to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for murder (see NRS 200.010) of paraplegic who purportedly had been sexually molesting him constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of U.S. 8th amendment and Nev. Art. 1, § 6. Court questioned soundness of proceedings in light of defendant’s mental condition, conviction for unspecified degree of murder, and presumption of incapacity under NRS 194.010, and held that to adjudicate child of 13 years of age to be forever irredeemable and to subject him to hopeless, lifelong punishment and segregation is not usual or acceptable response to childhood criminality, even when criminality amounts to murder. Court ordered that sentence be changed to allow possibility of parole. Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 779 P.2d 944 (1989)

Sentence of 15 years in prison for engaging in solicitation for prostitution after testing positive for exposure to human immunodeficiency virus was not cruel and unusual punishment. Where appellant was convicted of violating NRS 201.358 by engaging in solicitation for prostitution after testing positive for exposure to human immunodeficiency virus and was sentenced to 15 years in prison, fact that she was likely to die of AIDS-related illness while in prison did not make sentence cruel and unusual punishment (see Nev. Art. 1, § 6), and supreme court would not disturb sentence absent showing of abuse of discretion by trial court. Glegola v. State, 110 Nev. 344, 871 P.2d 950 (1994)

Prohibition against excessive fines applies to civil forfeiture proceedings. Civil forfeiture of property used or intended to be used for drug-related activity (see NRS 453.301) is payment to sovereign for some offense and, therefore, is subject to prohibition against excessive fines set forth in U.S. 8th amendment (see Nev. Art. 1, § 6). Levingston v. Washoe County, 112 Nev. 479, 916 P.2d 163 (1996)